Political legitimacy, representation, and confucian Virtue by Lee, KH
  
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Kwanhu Lee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Political Science Ph.D. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
1 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis first examines the compatibility of political development and Confucian traditional 
thought in East Asia, and South Korea in particular, and then suggests an alternative methodology 
for the study of political theory in regards to culture. In order to accomplish these goals, this 
research focuses on three concepts: legitimacy, representation, and Confucian virtue. 
This research proposes political legitimacy as the most fundamental basis in the study of the 
relationship between political development and culture. Legitimacy is essential in every 
government and cannot be borrowed externally. Rather, it must be established through the practices 
and customs of the people and thus, involves culture. From this view, Confucian traditional thought 
should be considered the foundation of political development in Confucian East Asia. 
In most cases in modern politics, representation is the only legitimate form of democratic 
governments. While in principle, representation seems to conflict with democracy, in the sense that 
not all people participate in the decision-making procedure and representatives are required to have 
some level of competence, in modern representative democracy, it has been accepted as reasonable 
by the people. This is possible through an epistemic understanding of democracy whereby 
democracy is regarded as a system in which people pursue better decisions. Although the concepts 
of representation and democracy conflict, and the linking of the two in representative democracy 
shows the double-sided characteristics of representation, this double-sidedness emerges from the 
conceptual nature of representation in politics—the representation of the people’s interest and will. 
While representation of will seems to be the intrinsic element in the democratic principle of equality, 
the epistemic understanding of modern representative democracy implies that the representation of 
the people’s interest is also important. Based on this view of representative democracy, this thesis 
argues that Confucian representative theory, that only good people make good representatives, is 
not in conflict with modern representative democracy. 
It is often alleged that Confucian virtues do not coincide with the virtues required for modern 
democracy, even though representative democracy also demands competence in its representatives. 
However, Confucian virtue is based on the theory of conditional government founded on the 
Mandate of Heaven. This idea of limited government requires rulers to hear and to respect the 
people because Heaven only speaks and hears through the people. Therefore, the concepts that are 
regarded as essential in representative democracy - responsibility, responsiveness, and cooperation 
- are also important elements in Confucian representative theory, both in principle and practice. 
The coherence of virtue, one of the characteristics of Confucianism, is not unique to Confucian 
East Asia. The concept that integrated virtue is necessary in a good representative can also be found 
in western tradition. Some western theorists have been interested in this topic in regards to whether 
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the good representative in reference to virtue is relevant in modern democracy. For this reason, there 
seems to be no reason to deny the Confucian view of the virtue of a representative in regards to the 
coherence of virtue. 
Although this thesis mainly discusses democratic legitimacy and Confucian virtue, one of the 
most important implications of this research is the existing methodology used in the comparative 
research of political theory. This thesis suggests the concept of legitimacy as the foundation of 
comparative political theory study. Second, this research argues that in comparative political theory 
research, it is necessary to focus on practice as the accumulation of the people’s behaviours in 
belief-systems, rather than formal institutions. Third, this thesis proposes that there is a need to find 
and use more neutral concepts for comparative study, such as representation, which is common in 
both modern western democracy and Confucian traditional thought. In such neutral categories, an 
interactive understanding is conceivable in any political system. 
First, this thesis argues that comparative research of political theory, particularly of different 
cultures, should start from an understanding of the nature of political legitimacy. This suggests that 
there should be relative conceptions in political theory and that they should be distinguished from 
others. For example, while the framework of legitimacy as a belief-system may be common to every 
government, the contents of the belief-systems are varied, insofar as the way of life is different in 
different societies. In the same way, though democracy is the only legitimate system of politics, 
there are varied forms of electoral systems, party systems, and government systems. 
Second, this thesis suggests that if politics are to be understood in the relationship between 
legitimacy and culture at a radical level, the practice and custom of the people in each belief-system 
must also be examined, since legitimacy cannot directly or automatically be established through 
institutions, nor can it be borrowed from institutions. Although institutions can be established by 
cultural aliens, a procedure of legitimation created through the practices of the people themselves 
is necessary. Without practice, the institution cannot be a foundation of political legitimacy. If we 
focus on institutional aspects, especially those based on the standards of modern values, the 
comparison may become an unfair one since modern values must be conceptualized in the West 
first. For this reason, it is necessary to examine the contextual understanding of practice and custom 
within the belief-system. 
Third, existing research on different systems of political thought frequently seem to compare 
different theories on the basis of certain values and ideologies, such as democracy, liberal 
democracy, or human rights. Based on these standards, theories were compared by statistical 
indexes in empirical studies, or by institutional or conceptual differences in normative research. 
Some theorists have tried to clarify whether there is a common idea of equality, liberty, or rights. 
Some have been interested in institutional similarity and differences. However, since much of the 
concepts are conceptualized in the context of the modern West, such research easily succumbs to 
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misunderstanding or misjudging non-western theories. Even though we must also be conscious of 
the prejudice of non-western concepts or ideas, the continued use of western originated standards 
can lead to unfair comparisons. For this reason, neutral concepts are useful for fair comparison. 
Along this vein, this thesis offers the concept of representation, a necessary element for legitimate 
government in both the West and Confucian East. In this case, the main task is to examine the ways 
in which each tradition is compatible with modern standards of political legitimacy, such as 
democracy. 
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Ch1. Introduction 
 
1. Research Problem 
 
A. Background 
 
In a society with a Confucian cultural background like South Korea, what is the 
relationship between political legitimacy and democracy? This question is based on the 
assumption that the contemporary politics of South Korea has been faced with the challenge of 
political legitimacy and that the relationship of democracy to culture is at the core of this 
challenge. This is not a problem merely for South Korea, but for many East Asian countries, 
even North Korea. In these countries, democratic development has raised questions about its 
cultural influence. In regards to this issue, there seem to be three positions: 
 
1) Political legitimacy within any society must make essential reference to the belief-
systems immanent in those societies. 
2) Only democratic procedures are fully capable of legitimating the exercise of political 
power. 
3) Confucianism is incompatible with democratic authority. 
 
Although any two of these claims may be true, all three cannot be. Seen from various 
positions, it is possible to deny each of these claims. There seems to be no general agreement 
regarding the relationship between them.  Investigating this problem is the main challenge of 
this research. 
In order to understand the gravity of the problem, let us first consider the various positions 
that have been adopted in relation to each of these claims. Most political modernization 
theorists reject the first position—that political legitimacy must reference a society’s existing 
belief-systems. The representative scholars that refuted this position are: Lipset (1959), who 
advocated Anglo-American exceptionalism in democratic development; Almond and Verba 
(1989 [1963]),1 who argued a western cultural basis for democracy; and Huntington (1991, 
1993), who claimed that westernization is essential to the development of democracy. The first 
                                           
1 Since the time in which works were first published is important to the meaningful understanding of the context 
in which they were written, the year it was first published year will be shown in square brackets throughout this 
thesis. 
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position is a view that is not only actively rejected by such modern western theorists, but is 
also subconsciously rejected by most ordinary people in the contemporary world. 
There are some who reject the second position that democratic procedures alone are able 
to gain legitimacy in the exercise of political power. In the Asian value debate in the 1990s, the 
Prime Minister of Singapore refuted this claim, instead defending an “Asian type of 
democracy”. Although he argued that it is a type of democracy distinct from western liberal 
democracy, many theorists understood it to just mean a weak authoritarian regime. Daniel A. 
Bell (1995, 2006) is one of the leading theorists who deny the second position. On the basis of 
Asian communitarianism, Bell claims that the meritocratic elements in Confucianism can be a 
source of political legitimacy, arguing that this view does not conflict with democracy. 
However, Bell’s stance is not clear, as will be seen, even in his own words. In contemporary 
politics, the Chinese government would also refute the second position. 
There are relatively few people who deny the third position—that Confucianism is 
incompatible with democratic principles. In general, Confucianism is regarded as an ancient 
and medieval thought, and is often understood as being based on pre-modern anti-democratic 
principles. Theorists who criticize the authoritarian characteristics of Confucianism have 
established and expanded the argument that Confucianism is incompatible with democracy. 
Such claims were founded on Orientalism and the concept of Asian despotism follows the same 
logic, broadly speaking. Interestingly, even many modern Confucian theorists do not refute this 
claim entirely, with most admitting that there is almost no affinity between Confucianism and 
democracy. Instead, they try to find democratic elements within Confucianism, in fields 
unrelated to the political system or government, such as education or citizenship. 
However, in this thesis, I reject such long-held beliefs and will argue that Confucian 
political thought is compatible with democratic authority. In my analysis, I accept both the first 
and second positions. Political legitimacy requires democracy and therefore, South Korea must 
become democratic. However, at the same time, Confucian culture must be the source of 
political legitimacy. Accordingly, all of the elements - legitimacy, democracy, and Confucian 
culture - are capable of congruency with one another. The task of this thesis is to establish the 
necessary conceptual analysis of legitimacy, democracy, and Confucian political thought to 
bolster such an argument.  
 
B. Is it possible to borrow political legitimacy? 
 
In most of the non-western countries that emerged after the Second World War, political 
legitimacy was borrowed from the West. During the period of the Second Wave of 
democratization, the process of borrowing political legitimacy that involved the transplantation 
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of Western political systems, ideas, and even culture under the name of modernization was 
standard. But is it really possible to borrow legitimacy, and if so, how? One reason for 
scepticism is that democratic practices emerged in historically and collectively specific 
conditions. Therefore, it would seem, generally speaking, that for countries to become 
democratic, they must change their cultures to create the conditions under which democracy 
can arise. 
 “Borrowed legitimacy” is a term that will be used throughout this research in order to 
indicate and explain certain beliefs about an imagined legitimacy in the non-western world, 
such as South Korea. This term was suggested by a Korean theorist, Kang Jeongin (2009), to 
refer to the distinctive character of democratic legitimacy in South Korean compared to the 
West. 
Most present-day countries do not have their own historical or theoretical foundations for 
their democratic political systems. Most of their political institutions and systems have been 
established on the model of representative democracy found in the modern West. In other words, 
most of the countries where there are now democratic constitutions and institutions have not 
established those political systems by themselves. Rather, these political systems were given to 
them; according to an expression coined by Peter Winch, such political institutions have been 
given to them by “aliens” (Winch, 1990 [1960], p. 51).2 Though there was a massive cultural 
gap during the process of the transplanting of the political systems, the West had almost no 
consideration or respect for cultural differences.3 From the West’s perspective of the West, the 
non-western culture might have been seen as something to be ignored or dismissed in order to 
make way for the new political systems. They were not interested in conserving any immanent 
elements that might have had an affinity with the new political systems. In most cases, the 
establishing of the systems was purposefully done without consideration of the culture and 
opinions of the receivers. 4  Cultural aliens had brought new political institutions and the 
legitimacy of the imported political institutions must be granted by the cultural aliens that 
brought them. 
Accordingly, the legitimacy of these political systems depends on the West. For this reason, 
there is a strong presumption that the governments and politics of non-western countries could 
only be deemed as legitimate if they followed the Western political systems and principles. 
                                           
2 Winch wrote, “The force of this condition becomes more apparent in relation to cases where ‘democratic 
institutions’ have been imposed by alien administrators on societies to which such ways of conducting political 
life are foreign” (Winch, 1990 [1960], p. 51). 
3 In this thesis, this argument mainly refers to the relationship between the USA and South Korea. However, 
these phenomena can be seen in many colonised countries during the period of imperialism, particularly in Asia 
and Africa. 
4 It remains true in the 21st century. See Fukuyama’s (2005) Nations Building. 
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The argument of this thesis, however, is that such a view contains a misunderstanding—
legitimacy is something that must be established fundamentally, by those who live within the 
society, based on their own cultural beliefs and rules. In other words, legitimacy should be 
rooted in the immanent values of a society. Borrowed legitimacy is merely an illusion. In this 
research, I examine the different conceptions of legitimacy. The ultimate goal of this research 
is to offer a plausible argument concerning the relationship between legitimacy and cultural 
diversity. 
 
C. The teleological concept of democratization5 
 
“Borrowed legitimacy” was, is, and will be the political foundation of South Korea’s 
government and ruling administrations. Like many contemporary countries, South Korea did 
not have a chance for democratic development through its own initiatives. Its democratic 
constitution and political system were formed following the models of representative 
democracy in the West. 
However, it has not only been institutions that have been borrowed from the West. When 
post-war political institutions were borrowed, the legitimacy of those systems was also 
imported with the established political theory. In effect, the legitimacy of the South Korean 
political system depended on the West as well. For this reason, there was a strong presumption 
that South Korea’s government would only be legitimate if South Korea followed the model of 
Western political systems, in the form of liberal representative democracy. This is the pursuit 
of the “teleological end to a certain type of democracy” (Kang 2002, 29-35), in a sense, a 
“manifest destiny”.6 
From this point of view, the goal of achieving Western liberal democracy is clear, not only 
in South Korea, but also in most non-western countries. The desirability of Western liberal 
democracy was first advanced by Western theorists as a universal belief and truth.7 People in 
developing countries also accepted Western liberal democracy as natural—the only way to 
acquire political legitimacy and prosperity. These empirical developments took place in the 
context of the massive influence wielded by social evolution theory and modernization theory 
                                           
5 The term, teleological concept, is borrowed from Aristotle’s theory that everything has a telos, which is already 
determined. In this section, this term refers to the democratization strategy of non-western countries toward the 
western model of democracy. 
6 Here, I use the term in the same way it was used in the American propaganda that legitimized the conquering 
of American Indians and their lands in the name of God for the welfare of immigrant Americans’ exclusively. 
7 For example, in “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, Lipset (1959) emphasized the connection between 
economic growth based in modernization and democracy, and in The Civic Culture, Almond and Verba (1989 
[1963]) added cultural elements from the view of Anglo-American exceptionalism. 
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throughout the 20th century.8  As western countries conquered and dominated non-western 
countries by military power, western thought overwhelmed non-western thought, regardless of 
whether it was reasonable or not. As a result, the West has monopolized the authority to grant 
political legitimacy, not only practically, but also theoretically and ideologically. 
Ironically, however, against the solid expectations for political development, the challenges 
to the teleological goal of liberal democracy have caused negative consequences, specifically a 
“vicious circle of hope and discouragement” (Choi, 2002). Given institutions that seemed well 
constructed, at least by the standards of early western institutions, the South Korean people 
expected that their democracy would soon work well. Like many other countries, however, 
there was a long military dictatorship from 1961 to 1987. Since the memorable democratization 
of South Korea in 1987,9 clear development has been seen, with regular elections, peaceful 
regime changes, and remarkable political stability, even considering its tense relationship with 
North Korea. It was a time of genuine restoration and the first realization of politics since the 
formal democratic constitution founded in 1950s. At the time, the people once again anticipated 
a rapid recovery of democratic development that could offset the dark past. Yet, soon enough, 
the people came to recognize that their democracy, which had democratic institutions and multi-
party systems, would not work well compared to the West. Again, they became pessimistic 
about their democratic future and lost confidence in political legitimacy (Choi, 2002). 
The belief and doctrine of change to a predetermined end causes serious distortion in the 
thinking about democracy itself. Most of all, it removes the progressive and creative 
characteristics of liberal democracy in Korea (Kang, 2002). The end is not a feature of the future 
that can be explored by the people themselves in South Korea, rather, it is a present already 
established by the others in the West. While in the West, liberal democracy was an advanced 
and even revolutionary ideology that, at the time, no one knew what future forms it would take 
                                           
8 Particularly, in East Asia, Fukuzawa Yukichi (1835-1901) was the dominant theorist and journalist who 
introduced Social Darwinism. The modernization of Japan progressed under his influence and he is still 
respected as the forefather of modern Japan. In the 1880s, a leading Korean official, Ryu Giljun who visited 
Japan was impressed by Japanese modernization and the idea of Social Darwinism. Ryu reported these changes 
and ideas to the government and the king of Korea. During the Japanese colonization period, the view that in the 
competition of civilizations, the West was the fittest and that Western modernization was the only way to attain 
that level of civilization had already deeply rooted itself in the minds of the Korean people. After the Second 
World War, this view still seems to be influential due to the restoration of Japan. 
9 This year was the turning point in Korean modern politics. Except for the two years between 1960 and 1962, 
since its establishment in 1948, the South Korean government had clearly not been democratic, even by the 
lowest of standards. In 1987, a massive demonstration by millions of students, workers, and civilians took place 
and the government declared the reform of the constitution and direct elections of the president. For more 
information on the democratization movement and its implications, see James Cotton (1989)’s “From 
Authoritarianism to Democracy in South Korea”. Interestingly, while this article does a good job describing the 
events of South Korean politics around 1987, it also exhibits many of the typical ways of understanding the 
political transformation exclusively from a modernization theory perspective, like Samuel Huntington’s 
argument. One of the main purposes of this research is to argue against such misunderstandings of Korean 
politics and, more fundamentally, political legitimacy. 
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on, in Korea, it has been a predetermined and visible goal. The people of South Korea have had 
a clear view of liberal democracy through the models that have been established in other 
countries of the contemporary world. For this reason, it is almost impossible to imagine that 
there could be other models of democracy that could be formulated by the people themselves. 
This tendency has been made all the worse by the fact that the term “Korean type of democracy” 
has been wrongly used by dictators to defend their non-democratic regimes. As a result, it has 
often been forgotten that democracy should be supported by human practices, not just by 
institutions.10  Therefore, liberal democracy has been deemed a conservative and negative 
political idea since the very beginning of South Korea’s independence. 
This might have also occurred in many non-western countries in similar ways. However, it 
is not merely a matter of establishing democracy in developing countries, but of what that 
democracy is. In fact, only a few countries in the world have achieved their democracies by 
their own hands, and in most countries where the people want a democratic government, they 
still suffer from undemocratic regimes. If most countries where the people desire democracy 
have similar problems in respect to democratic development, it is not an issue of the exceptional 
deformity of democracy in specific countries, but rather, a general problem within democratic 
theory. In other words, even if perfect democratic institutions existed in some places, it would 
have little meaning for many other countries.11 
To be sure, there are gaps, contradictions and ironies in the development of democracy in 
non-western countries regarding the concept of legitimacy. While in the West, democratization 
has been a constant process toward an uncertain future, in non-western countries, it is a project 
aiming to catch-up with the western model. Democratization in the West is a creative and 
progressive process. However, it is also true that democratization is a ready-made and 
conservative one in the non-western world. For this reason, while democratization surely lends 
legitimacy to such governments, the evaluation of this process depends on how similar it is with 
western democracies. There seems to be no alternative. Yet, at the same time, the forms of 
                                           
10 This research does not intend to raise a sophisticated debate about the definition of ‘institution’. Even in 
Institutionalism, there are different views, such as historical, social, and rational choice, of what constitutes an 
institution. For the purpose of this thesis, institution is used to indicate a more formal system than practice or 
human activities. Surely, institution is a result of the accumulation of certain human activities. However, while 
institution is a result of them, practice means the accumulation itself. Moreover, institution is more dependent 
from culture than practice insofar as it is a separated subject from human activities. In contrast, since these 
activities cannot be separated from culture, practice also cannot be separated from culture. In this context, 
practice is not a dependent subject from culture. Though some institutionalists argue that practice should also be 
included within a broad understanding of institution, they still accept that the two are not the same. Of practice, 
see chapter 2. 
11 South Korea is often regarded as one of the most successful democratic countries among the democratic 
countries born since the Second World War. If it can be said that South Korea still rests on a borrowed 
legitimacy in regards to its democratic development, it would not be an exaggeration to say that many other 
countries have an even greater crisis with legitimacy. 
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western democracies also have continuously changed. Thus, there is a problem that occurs that 
stems from the difference of time and place insofar as democratization is essentially a game of 
catch-up. 
In terms of “borrowed legitimacy” and “vicious circle”, we may infer two fundamental 
difficulties. First, there is a logical dilemma with time and place.12 In regards to democratic 
development, the “present” in the non-western countries is the “past” of the West.  Similarly, 
the “future” of the non-western world is the “present” of the West. Pursuit of a predetermined 
end is the obstacle that prevents the non-western world from overtaking the West. In a quotation 
of Ernst Bloch, Korean theorist Kang Jeongin calls it “the contemporaneity of the 
uncontemporary” (Kang, 2002).  
The second difficulty is due to the fact that the path towards and features of democratic 
development in non-western countries do not coincide exactly with the history of the West. Just 
as America, France, and England developed different types of democracy respectively, the 
features of democracy in non-western cultures are naturally distinctive from each other, as well 
as the western model. Thus, the problem is not found just in the application or diffusion of 
democracy, but also in the need for different types of democracy and the recognition of their 
legitimacy. 
I would argue that the teleological conception of democratization is a misunderstanding that 
distorts both theory and practice. Most of all, there is a misunderstanding regarding the meaning 
of political legitimacy. Legitimacy is a broader concept than democracy. If the teleological 
conception of democratization is not legitimate, teleological democratization is also 
meaningless. For example, by nature of its characteristics, if democratic legitimacy cannot be 
borrowed, there is no need to follow the Western model and no grounds for disappointment 
when the Western model proves unachievable. If a regime cannot be sufficiently legitimate only 
in contract with an alien political system or its ideas, there is a need for careful reflection 
regarding even the most general political concept of democracy. If legitimacy is something that 
ought to be fundamentally established by concerned parties in their own field, with their own 
beliefs, rules, and expressed actions, then borrowing legitimacy is merely an illusion. 
Democracy is not merely a set of institutions. Democracy needs practices as a set of meaningful 
human activities, which are an accumulation of the people’s participation in decision-making 
procedures about public affairs. In order for human activities to be meaningful, there must be a 
                                           
12 Here, we can see the paradox of the “Race of Achilles and the tortoise”. In Zeno’s paradox, Achilles can never 
draw ahead of the tortoise, because there are an infinite number of points Achilles must reach where the tortoise 
has already been; such a paradox has been witnessed in many non-western countries in regards to economic and 
political development strategies and practices. There must also be some opposite cases in history, in which such 
countries have overtaken those which developed earlier. However, in these opposite cases, logically speaking, 
this can only be achieved by Achilles’ recognition that he does not need to follow the tortoise’s path. 
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common foundation among members. In other words, insofar as the activities of political 
decision-making are collective and coherent actions, the subjects of the activities have to 
recognize their cooperative actions. According to Wittgenstein, such activities should be carried 
out in a system of a shared grammar. In a society, this grammar may include culture as the most 
important background of human political activities. Therefore, political practices necessitate a 
cultural basis. In order to achieve a legitimate democratic government, there should be an 
accumulation of internal practices based on indigenous tradition, not borrowed tradition. These 
are the assumptions and arguments that will be examined in this thesis. 
 
 
2. Aim of Research 
 
This research is inspired by debates and arguments about the relationship between democracy 
and cultural values. In terms of the relationship between democratic development and culture, there 
have been two different views: advocates of the modernization theory and critics of the 
modernization theory. 
On the one side, there is the argument that representative democracy is intrinsically an invention 
of the modern West and a product of its cultural background, and as such, in order for non-western 
countries to pursue democratic development, they should accommodate western culture. From this 
perspective, western culture is not only favourable, it is considered necessary for modern 
democracy. According to this argument, democratization in non-western countries depends 
exclusively on the degree to which non-western cultures are able to accept and integrate western 
culture. 
On the other side, however, some critical scholars argue that western modernization does not 
guarantee democracy outside of the West. They maintain that modernization theory is not so clear 
in modern historical practice as it is in theory. Some more radical theorists argue that the West has 
not paid attention to the democratic development of the non-West, and even frequently interrupted 
it to protect their own interests. In fact, there are several cases of western developed countries 
preventing the democratic development of their colonies for the prosperity of the mother countries 
(Alavi, 1972; Frank, 1995; O’Donnell, 1986; Chang, 2007). The influence of colonization has been 
lasting, even after the theoretical independence of post-colonialism (Spivak, 1988). Therefore, 
instead of the forced modernization seen during the Western colonialism period, independent 
development is the key to democracy in non-western countries (Kang, 2009). 
During the 1990s, the Asian value debate raised questions about this issue and it is still worth 
revisiting, particularly in respect to democracy in East Asia. The debates regarding the relationship 
of economic and political development in East Asian and Asian culture involved not just academic 
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theorists but also dominant politicians. Some argued that the success of East Asian was based on 
its distinctive culture from the West. Others claimed that further development necessitated a 
cultural change following a western model, although they acknowledged that some elements of 
Asian culture had contributed to contemporary progress.  
Yet, in this debate, there were two clear weak points. First, many assumed that the conditions 
of development only provided the sufficient conditions for the relationship between the political 
and economic development, not the necessary features of cause and effect between the two. As 
previously noted, since most arguments of the Asian value debate were merely ex post facto reports, 
they did not provide coherent causal explanations. Second, simultaneously, there was no room for 
a normative consideration of the appropriateness of cultural change. Surely before arguing the need 
for cultural change in order to create economic and democratic development, the first step is to 
question whether the change is desirable or even possible. 
For these reasons, this research uses political legitimacy as a means to study the relationship 
between cultural values and democracy. In the sense that every government must secure legitimacy, 
political legitimacy is one of the most fundamental concepts of politics. It is a concept that goes 
beyond democracy and culture. The reason why democracy is the “only game in town” is because 
it is accepted as the most legitimate political system. Nonetheless, there is a need to understand 
what is involved in political legitimacy and why it is granted most highly to Western political 
models. Accordingly, legitimacy is an appropriate means for a conceptual analysis of the 
relationship between democracy and culture. Since the 1960s, many researchers have examined the 
relationship between democracy and culture. However, the radical controversy between the 
different views of relativism and western supremacy is ongoing. Therefore, this research is an 
attempt to mediate these two views through an examination of legitimacy. 
The different views about the relationship between democracy and culture originate from the 
different views of the relationship between democracy and legitimacy. Although democracy is the 
most general and universal value in contemporary politics, it should be understood in relationship 
to the concept of political legitimacy. At this moment, the relationship between political legitimacy 
and culture should also be considered as well. If political legitimacy should be based on an 
immanent ground in each society, democracy must also be developed in accordance with 
indigenous tradition. If certain normative ways of thinking in Confucian culture are compatible 
with political legitimacy, Confucian culture can also be a plausible source for democratic 
development in East Asian communities. In this sense, democracy can attain the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of political legitimacy only when it is in accordance with Asian culture. Thus, 
the relationship between political legitimacy, democratization, and Confucian Asian values is the 
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first concern of this research.13 
The aim of this research is to argue that the tradition of thought regarding political legitimacy 
and the virtues of Confucian Asia could provide positive ideas and conceptions, which could form 
the basis of a coherent normative theory of democracy. In order to support this claim, this research 
will examine whether the Confucian ideas of East Asia, particularly Korea, can accommodate 
democratic values. For two reasons, both the questions of whether it is possible and whether it is 
necessary must be examined. First, the essential characteristics of political legitimacy involve 
indigenous beliefs and morality. Second, there are plausible ideas for democracy in traditional East 
Asian thought, particularly in regards to contemporary representative democracy. In short, this 
research will examine the following three assumptions:  
 
1) If political legitimacy needs to be concerned with indigenous culture, there must be various 
ways of acquiring legitimacy given the diversity of culture in each society  
 
2) In the contemporary world, representation is necessary in legitimate authoritative democracy 
and thus, Confucian political theory is compatible with democracy 
 
3) Historically and theoretically, the traditional political theory of virtuous representation in 
East Asia has given and still provides a suitable source of legitimate and democratic politics 
 
This paper examines these assumptions through the conceptual analysis of legitimacy in a 
comparison of East Asian traditional thought and Western liberal representative democracy. 
Therefore, the main scope of this research is legitimacy, representation, and Confucian virtue, 
particularly the virtue of representatives. 
 
 
3. Methodology and Approach 
 
A. Three steps of conceptual analysis 
 
In this research, conceptual analysis begins with the relationship of political concepts, 
including: legitimacy, democracy, representation, and political virtue. As political legitimacy 
and representation are considered key concepts, an understanding and analysis of these 
                                           
13 In this sense, the concept of political legitimacy is certainly free from short-term economic changes. Even if it 
is long term to the point that it is a normative issue, it does not necessarily undermine the relationship between 
political legitimacy and culture. 
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concepts, as they relate to this research, is first necessary. In addition, since the specific purpose 
of this research is to examine the possibility and necessity of indigenous resources of legitimacy 
in East Asia, an interpretation and comparison of the different conceptions of the West and the 
East is necessary. Accordingly, the conceptual analysis consists of three different steps: 
identification, comparison, and reinterpretation. While these three steps are distinguished 
conceptually, they may appear simultaneously in different parts. This is due to the need for the 
identification of the concepts to be meaningful, as well as the need to understand how they 
compare to each other; this comparison also necessitates a reinterpretation of the concepts. 
In the first stage, identification clarifies the concepts and explores their diverse conceptions. 
More importantly, it presents a proper understanding of the relationship between the different 
conceptions. In this context, the first stage is a conceptual analysis of legitimacy and 
representation. Legitimacy is treated as a problematic issue, particularly in relation to cultural 
diversity. While legitimacy is deemed as a universal criterion, cultural diversity implies its 
relative potentiality. Between the tensions of universality and particularity, I discuss the core 
of legitimacy first.14 
Then, given cultural diversity, the question of how legitimacy is rendered credible will be 
discussed. Here, I suggest “practice and custom” as the essential grounds of legitimacy. 
Although there are different understandings of the concept of practice and custom, all of them 
recognize the indigenous factors in each political community as the fundamental basis of the 
people’s beliefs.15 In this sense, within every society, there exist certain ways of thinking, based 
on religious, legal, conventional and even mythological beliefs. Political legitimation depends 
on connecting to these indigenous ways of thinking. In other words, legitimation depends on 
                                           
14 A full discussion about the grounds of political legitimacy will be presented in chapter 2. There are several 
possibilities, including: social contract, consent, justice, and deliberation. Since the 17th century, classical 
advocacy for the government’s legitimacy based on the social contract theory has existed. Hobbes, Locke, and 
Rousseau may be the forefathers of this theory, and despite the critique of Hume, his is still one of the most 
popular theories in regards to the foundation of government. Beetham (1991) argues that the demonstrable 
expression of consent by the subordinate to the particular power relationship contributes to legitimation. Rawls 
(1971) suggests justice as the goal and foundation of legitimate society and politics. Recently, more theorists 
have been interested in the deliberative justification of governance. Buchanan (2002) and Manin, Stein, and 
Mansbridge (1987) argue that deliberation is not only the means to make present democratic regimes more 
democratic, but also the intrinsic basis of all governments, since deliberation is the genuine feature of consent in 
the procedures of decision-making in both principle and practice. However, following Beetham (1991), Parekh 
(1972, 1981), Oakeshott (1975, 1976), Winch (1990), and Wittgenstein (1953), I do not agree that they are not 
the fundamental grounds of legitimacy. 
15 The concepts of practice and custom are dealt with here as the foundations of political legitimacy. However, it 
will be helpful to briefly introduce the definitions of Oakeshott and MacIntyre. Oakeshott defined practice as a 
set of collective human interactions, which have been structured on a relatively permanent basis and that denote 
obligations and duties (Oakeshott, 1975, p. 55). Similarly, MacIntyre defined practice as coherent and complex 
forms of socially established cooperative human activity used to achieve good goals in realization of the 
members (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 187). On custom, Hume argued that regarding the accumulation of experiences, 
we are only able to exercise reasoning with the guide of custom (Hume, 2007 [1748], pp. 42-5). See more in 
chapter 2. 
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the shared beliefs of the people and these shared beliefs are rooted in a certain belief-system. 
In each political community, the foundation of the belief-system is practice and custom. In 
present politics, as long as the belief-system is in favour of democracy, which is considered 
“the only game in town” in terms of political legitimacy, a government's legitimacy depends 
on the practice and custom of the people who are directly affected by it. 
The view of legitimacy based on practice and custom in relation to a belief-system provides 
an alternative methodological framework. In a sense, it proposes a distinct concept that denies 
the traditional views of the basis of political legitimacy, such as social contract, consent, justice, 
and deliberation, which have long been regarded as the universal bases of political legitimacy 
in modern politics. In contrast, this thesis suggests practice and custom as the more 
fundamental grounds for political legitimacy. In some sense, this constitutes a gap in 
methodology between modern politics and pre-modern politics. Jeremy Waldron (2002) 
methodologically distinguishes the question of ‘the foundation of Locke’s liberalism’ from the 
question of ‘the individual’s foundation of Locke’s liberalism’. Likewise, I distinguish the 
question of ‘the foundation of political legitimacy’ from the question of ‘the individual’s 
foundation of political legitimacy’. In these questions, the latter may exhibit the real features 
of the liberalism and political legitimacy by which the individual acts. In other words, this 
thesis argues that practice and custom are the individual’s foundations for political 
legitimacy.16 
After examining legitimacy, representation must be questioned. In this section, conceptual, 
historical, and comparative research on political representation will show that various 
conceptions and understandings of these concepts exist. The conceptual analysis first focuses 
on the change of the meaning of representation in the West. Through this, the nature of the 
concept of representation and its real features can be seen. Here, I suggest the concept of 
“mandate” as the foundation of all political representation. Thus, because there is a constant 
tension among them, not just in principle but also in practice, it is necessary to understand 
representation as it relates to political authority, democracy, and equality. To this end, I argue 
that Confucian representative theory does not conflict with modern representative democracy. 
Accordingly, a comparison of the conceptions of the roles and virtues of representatives in 
the West and East Asia is necessary. This stage of the argument will contribute to the 
understanding of the similarities and differences found in the diverse conceptions. At this stage, 
the conceptions must first be examined from the perspective of each tradition of political 
thought and each cultural tradition. Then, they can be compared with other ideas from different 
                                           
16 While I agree with the argument of Waldron, that Locke’s teleological liberalism is compatible with the 
concept of human equality, rather than a modern secular basis, some may not. However, whether Waldron’s 
argument itself is right or wrong has nor bearing on its methodological significance. 
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cultural backgrounds. Through such processes, as ancient and medieval wisdom regarding 
modern democracy and representation are can be found, I argue that meaningful indigenous 
normative resources be accepted and understood as necessary to the legitimacy of Asian 
representative democracy. 
Since there is no conceptual equivalence between modern representative democracy and 
Confucian thought, reinterpretation must be undertaken at the same time. Thus, our comparison 
requires the interpretation of Confucian ideas in the context of representation. In some cases, 
this analysis may require a reinterpretation in the context of modern concepts of representation 
regarding the traditional reading of key Confucian tradition and texts. However, this 
reinterpretation should be distinctive, not just an overstatement, distortion, or underestimation, 
but a true reconstruction.17 This is a method of derivation in order to carry out a comparison of 
representative democracy and Confucian thought. To be brief, this requires a developed and 
theoretical version of Kim Daejung’s interpretation of Mencius. 
As main sources of Confucian thought, I will quote Confucius, Mencius, and Jeong 
Yakyong, works that examined the ideal representative concepts within Confucian thought. 
Though Confucius and Mencius are known well as dominant Confucian thinkers, an 
explanation of Jeong Yakyong and his significance seems necessary. Jeong Yakyong (1762–
1836), a Confucian theorist in 18th and 19th century Korea, during the Joseon Dynasty, is 
typically referred to by his pen name, Dasan. He represented the new stream of Korean 
Confucianism, Shilhak (Practical Learning; 실학; 實學) and is known for his criticism of the 
metaphysical interpretation of Confucianism in Korea. Jeong argued that Confucianism should 
focus on developing the practical welfare of the people. In addition, in some of his essays, he 
suggested radical foundations of Confucian representation through conceptual analyses and 
examples. His reinterpretation of Confucius and Mencius changed the understanding of 
Confucianism in Korea and his Sikhak represents the distinctiveness of Korean Confucianism 
from main stream Chinese Confucianism. In fact, Jeong argued that his interpretation is one of 
most coherent, synthesizing the original ideas of Confucius and Mencius.18 
                                           
17 This thesis distinguishes reinterpretation from reconstruction. Many modern Confucian theorists argue that the 
compromise of Confucianism and other western values necessitates reconstruction of the concepts. Certainly, 
this is an ambitious method and has produced many fruitful ideas, such as Confucian democracy, meritocracy, or 
Confucian citizenship. However, this thesis neither challenges general democratic theory nor argues for the 
reconstruction of Confucianism. It does not attempt to alter the foundation of Confucianism and other concepts. 
Instead, it focuses more closely on the features of Confucian thought and contemporary political concepts. 
Therefore, it does not attempt to reconstruct Confucianism, but rather, to reinterpret the present arguments for 
Confucianism. From these existing interpretations, this thesis aims to propose a reasonable meeting point of 
Confucianism and democracy. For details, see chapter 5. 
18 Since 2004, UNESCO has designated anniversaries of global events or great figures that have been deemed as 
in line with the values and spirits of the organization. In October 2012, Jeong's birthday 250th anniversary was 
added to the list, the first time a Korean has been picked. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/events/prizes-
and-celebrations/celebrations/anniversaries-celebrated-by-member-states/2012/ 
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Throughout the comparison and interpretation, the key lies in what these thinkers 
considered a desirable virtue and the proper role of representative, 19  and includes procedures 
for showing the potentiality publicly and recognition process as an authorization. Or to put it 
more explicitly, as Pitkin starts in her work from Hobbes,20 I am attempting to clarify the 
understanding of representation in East Asia from a Confucian maxim and the “Mandate of 
Heaven”, according to Mencius’ interpretation, who claimed, “the mind of the people is the 
mind of Heaven”, To this day, this remains the most popular slogan in Korean elections and an 
important element in Chinese politics as well. In terms of the role and virtue of representatives, 
Confucian “Sagacity” is still a meaningful and influential concept. 21  As I have stressed 
repeatedly, the aim of my research is to find the particular but potentially universal 
characteristics of Korean representation in terms of virtue, which is necessary for a person to 
be a good representative. In order to do so, traditional Confucian political virtue must first be 
identified, in particular, the virtue of Sage in East Asia, since Sage has been the model of both 
a good person and good ruler. Through this exploration, I will attempt to show how the cultural 
diversity of political legitimacy is related to the virtue of representatives in Confucian East 
Asia. Although Confucian thought did not develop modern democratic ideas, it still contains 
positive resources for better representation in regarding the role, virtue, and ethics of 
representatives. This argument constitutes the body of my research. 
Finally, a review of political virtue will be presented. There is a need to examine whether 
comparison and alternative interpretation is helpful for better representative democracy in East 
Asia, specifically: whether the alternative interpretation of political virtue in Confucian and 
western tradition is applicable in present-day democracy; and whether this conception of 
political virtue is sufficiently familiar with enough of the concerned peoples.  
 
B. Conceptual analysis: Skinner, his critics, and Confucian themes 
                                           
19 Of the role and virtue of representative in the West, J.S. Mill (1861), Burke (1774), Pitkin (1967), Manin 
(1997), and other representative thinkers will be examined. Here I briefly draw out interesting and crucial 
conceptual distinctions, such as Mill’s “competence” and “participation” (Thompson, 1976), Pitkin’s “standing 
for” and “acting for”, and Manin’s “resemblance” and “distinctiveness”. 
20 In English etymology, the meaning of having citizens represented by chosen persons was first recorded in 
1628; the opposition to a person appointed or elected to represent others was first recorded in 1635. The 
meaning of a legislative body, as found in representatives, was first recorded in 1694. This period corresponds to 
the time in which Hobbes was living (Dictionary of Etymology, 2003). 
21 Sage (성인: 聖人: Shengren) or Junzi (군자; 君子) was a term that designated an ideal human in Confucianism. 
Junzi literally means “lord's son”. However, thanks to the principles that “a Sage should be a ruler’ (Confucius) 
and “a ruler should be a Sage” (Mencius), the term has been understood as an ideal human since the beginning 
of Confucian beliefs. In addition, according to the principles of Confucius and Mencius, anyone who is 
qualified, can be both a Sage and a ruler. At this stage, the literal meaning of “lord’s son” corresponds exactly 
with a genuine ruler, not with an inherited position. In this sense, this concept is similar to Plato’s “philosopher 
king”. 
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In political theory, conceptual analysis is concerned with interpretation and understanding 
of political thought or set of thoughts, but what are the standards for such academic activities? 
A specific obstacle emerges from the fact that the conceptual analysis of this research concerns 
not just the various political ideas of the history of the West, but also of the Confucian East. In 
addition, the process of interpretation and understanding is only a preparation for the next 
stages of comparison and evaluation, the core of this research. In this regard, it is necessary to 
examine this topic from four different angles: the past and present of the West and the past and 
present of the East. In other words, there is a dual complexity in the conceptual analysis of this 
research.  
In terms of such difficulties in conceptual analysis, particularly in relation to history, the 
significance of the well-known method suggested by Quentin Skinner should be considered. 
In 1969, Skinner argued that scholars must be aware of the danger of prejudice in political 
theory, namely “the reification of doctrine” and “the mythology of coherence”.22 According to 
Skinner, it should not be carelessly assumed that a thinker had a doctrine in his works. This is 
more likely in cases when the ideas related to the doctrine appeared after their works. Secondly, 
there is no reason to assume that one coherent set of ideas lies within a thinker's body of work. 
Nor should it be assumed that the discovery of such is the sole mission of those who study and 
analyze their works. Instead, Skinner argues that the focus should be on what the thinker was 
doing in the context of the period in which they were writing, arguing that the correct 
understanding of such works is only possible without the prejudice or interference of ex post 
facto contexts. Although there is a counter argument that states that it is uncertain whether 
Skinner’s point is concerned with the intention of the writer or with the illocutionary force 
from a broader perspective, Skinner’s clear contribution is his argument that theorists should 
be aware of the limits of analyses that are based solely on locutionary interpretation. 
There are critics of this position since the intention of the authors is uncertain. Accordingly, 
in most cases, interpretation is nothing more than guesswork. While it is necessary to 
understand texts in certain contexts, there is always the danger of placing an arbitrary emphasis 
on context, even when there is no clear standard of what context is appropriate. If we only 
focus on textual context, the economic and social environment in which the text has been 
produced may be easily missed (Black, 1980, pp. 453-5).23 Femia, following Gramsci, argues 
                                           
22 In what follows, I have relied almost entirely on Park Dongchon (2004)’s ‘Introduction’ of the Korean 
translation of Skinner’s The Foundations of Modern Political Thoughts. 
23 Some argue that Skinner could not realize his own methodology. In regards to The Foundations of Modern 
Political Thoughts, Oakeshott pointed out that while Skinner argued that a group of thinkers had set out the idea 
of “state” or “state reason”, in fact, because those ideas of modern state had not existed, this would not have 
been possible (Oakeshott, 1980, p. 452; Park, 2004, p. 29). 
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that theorists should pursue meaning from the present perspective, regardless of original 
meaning (Park, 2004, p. 31). In other words, if we do not question the contemporary 
importance of a text, it is impossible to explain how political ideas influence political 
behaviours (Black, 1980, p. 454). This debate is not particular to politics or history; rather, it 
is already general basis of literature criticism.24 
What are the implications of Skinner’s view in relation to Confucian political thought? 
Even if a Skinnerian method is deemed valid in regards to western political thought, Confucian 
East Asia is another matter. As Jeremy Waldron (2002) points out, there is little continuity 
between the Lockean foundation of political equality and the modern liberal sense of equality. 
There is a gap between the ideas that everyone is equal by the “Providence of God” and that 
everyone is equal by procedural justice or consent. Additionally, it would be difficult to find 
anyone who understands modern government through the perspective of Hobbes. Even though 
there are some characteristics that can be regarded as features of continuity in the liberty, 
equality, and legitimacy of government in the West, the Skinnerian methodology may not be 
suitable in research that focuses on this continuity since Skinner’s approach is generally 
understood as appropriate for the investigation of the original meanings of ideas in specific 
moments in the past, such as Locke’s thought in the 17th century. For this reason, Skinnerian 
methodology is not applicable to research that deals with living tradition. 
In South Korea, although political power is legitimated by the people’s choice, the reason 
it has the authority to grant legitimacy is not in full accordance with modern liberalism or 
democracy. There must be a cultural foundation in which the will of people is understood as 
the legitimate authority. For example, as will be argued in chapter 5, in Confucian East Asia, 
the “Mandate of Heaven” is an indigenous concept that provides a fundamental source of 
legitimacy. The general concept of a virtuous person exhibits an affinity with the political 
concept of a good representative in East Asia. This is not a result of liberal democracy, rather, 
it is a result of traditional thought. In this situation, political leaders are often required to act 
by Confucian principles;25 this is true in many countries of East Asia, such as both North and 
South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, and Vietnam. 
In “A Reply to My Critics”, Skinner suggests “rational acceptability” as a standard of 
methodology for political theory. However, MacIntyre argues that although “rationality is a 
concept with a history, since there are a diversity of traditions of enquiry, with histories, there 
are rationalities rather than rationality” (MacIntyre, 1996, p. 9).26 In other words, there is a 
                                           
24 Black also pointed out a flaw in the Skinnerian method of textual interpretation—the difficulty in 
understanding patterns and the changes of ideas that arose from texts (1980, p. 455). 
25 In a recent example, previous South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) and his close advisors 
were criticized  for not using formal language in discussion. 
26 Rawlsian concept of “reasonable pluralism” (Rawls, 1993) is also consistent with this understanding.  
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problem of boundary around the concept of “rational acceptability”. The question, then, is how 
to confirm the boundary of rationality and the subject who is to accept it. To this question, Park 
(2004), based on the views of Wittgenstein (1953) and Winch (1958), argues that an 
interpretation of a thinker’s set of ideas or texts becomes a rational one when the interpretation 
is generally regarded as acceptable, or at least as debatable, in the community that studies the 
subject. There may be no other standard for rational acceptability. In this case, there are various 
reasons of acceptability that could be called rational. Just as Skinner argued through examples 
and his critics also refuted his theories using their own examples, the best way to examine this 
problem is also through the examples offered in this research. 
In the light of such considerations, the extent to which research within the framework of 
Confucian thought is meaningful and justifiable varies, depending on its concrete subjects and 
questions. This practical approach is applicable not only to research within Confucian thought 
but also to research on Confucian thought. Broadly, Confucian-based research can be 
categorized in three dimensions according to its degree of relevance. 
First, some research deals with radical questions, such as whether Confucianism is 
compatible with modern feminism. Since Confucianism is well known not only for its 
hierarchical ideology but also as a system of thought that embodies exclusive and pre-modern 
ideas about gender, within Confucian research, this subject seems to be one of the least likely 
to yield positive results. However, while it took considerable time to be recognized as a 
worthwhile topic of research, there are now many recognized views on both sides of the 
argument. Many articles continue to be published on this topic and some of them are certainly 
some of them are well-respected within the academic community. 27  Even though the 
intellectual adequacy of such arguments is debatable, the issue is still considered a serious 
academic subject among relevant scholars.28 This modern reinterpretation of Confucianism 
represents a progressive research programme. 
Second, some research examines more the relationship of Confucianism to more general 
themes, such as liberty, rights, and democracy. Theodore de Bary, the dominant American 
scholar of Confucianism, has published significant work on liberty and human rights, in 
particular, The Liberal Tradition in China (1983) and Asian Values and Human Rights (1998). 
Another eminent theorist, Tu Wei-ming, has also presented impressive work on Confucianism 
and human rights in “A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights” (1995). In terms of 
democracy, Daniel Bell suggests an alternative vision supporting Confucianism, rather than 
                                           
27 For example, in a well-structured conceptual analysis, Galia Patt-Shamir (2009)’s “Learning and Women: 
Confucianism Revisited” shows how it is possible to argue for Confucianism’s affinity with feminist views. 
28 For example, in 1999, there was a conference in Korea on “Confucianism and Feminism”, coordinated by 
Confucian theorists and feminist academics. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
１８ 
 
Western Democracy in Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian 
Context (2006). 
Against these studies favourable to Confucian approaches, Fukuyama and Huntington 
argue the negative relationship between Confucianism and democracy in their works 
“Confucianism and Democracy” (1995) and “The Clash of Civilizations” (1993). Such 
research, however, shows that the relationship between modern political thought and Asian 
traditional thought is a valid topic of debate. In addition, research on such topics is still 
flourishing in East Asia, particularly in Hong Kong and Singapore.29 
In China, in order to establish communist social structures, Mao tried to remove the 
Confucian legacy through the famous Cultural Revolution, by criticizing the hierarchical 
characteristics of Confucianism. During those periods, Confucianism was an enemy of the 
communist ideal, in which everyone is equal. However, Mao’s successors restored Confucian 
ideas as the essence of Chinese tradition. Although the Chinese form of socialism used 
Confucianism merely as a means to fight against western liberalism and its influence in China 
during the period of Reform and Opening Policy, the interpretation of Confucianism became 
more controversial in relation to values such as democracy, freedom, and human rights (de 
Bary, 1998, p.6). 
South Korea is not an exception in this regard. Lee Seunghwan (1996, 1998), a leading 
theorist of Confucian philosophy in Korea, has long been interested in the relationship between 
Confucianism and concepts generally known of being of western origin, such as liberty, rights, 
law, and justice. Therefore, it is a plausible conclusion that general political ideas such as 
liberty, [human] rights, and democracy are reasonable themes to be considered within the 
interpretation of Confucian texts. 
Finally, even though some still disagree with the relevance of studies that deal with 
Confucianism in relationship to the concepts of liberty, equality, and rights, the subjects of this 
thesis—legitimacy, representation, mandate, revolution, and political virtue—are less 
problematic. These ideas seem to enjoy a relative advantage in terms of conceptual complexity 
and uncertainty. Although it is not completely certain whether feminism or liberalism is 
compatible with Confucianism, it is clearer that there is a justifiable political system that 
supports representation in principle and practice in Confucian doctrine and society. Therefore, 
it is more fruitful to examine the concepts of the political mandate or limited government than 
                                           
29 Some recent works from East Asia clearly show how research has been developed in many academic 
perspectives. For example, see He, Baogang (2010)’s “Four Models of the Relationship between Confucianism 
and Democracy” in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 37:1 (March 2010) 18–33; Sor-hoon, Tan (2012)’s   
“Democracy in Confucianism” in Philosophy Compass, 7/5 (2012): 293–303; Sungmoon, Kim (2013)’s “To 
Become a Confucian Democratic citizen: Against Meritocratic Elitism” in British Journal of Political Science, 
Vol. 43, No. 3, pp. 579-599. 
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to examine whether Confucianism has an affinity to human rights and feminism. In other 
words, the questions about these concepts are worthy of being explored since even more 
complex and ambiguous ideas are already accepted as reasonable research themes. Thus, the 
aforementioned concepts—legitimacy, representation, mandate, revolution, and political 
virtue—have been selected as the main subjects of examination in this research. 
Identical concepts or terms in Confucian thought and modern representative theories do 
not exist. As Skinner states, the present understanding of consent and Locke’s original 
argument in the Second Treatise of Government must be different. Yet, when a theorist argues 
that a present-day government is illegitimate because the government does not comply with 
the political principle of consent based on Lockean theory, it is problematic in the sense that 
there exits a group in academia that does not agree with Skinner’s argument. There cannot be 
a more truthful or absolutely plausible argument. Of course, Skinner’s contextualist view could 
be one candidate to use in the interpretation such argument. Nonetheless, this does not deny 
the role of other elucidations or understandings. All arguments that are put on the table for 
study and debate are candidates for plausible interpretation. Thus, if certain arguments are 
deemed more plausible than others, opposing viewpoints must also accept them as such. This 
research will take this understanding and methodology into account. 
On this methodological basis, in this thesis, a conceptual analysis will be carried out. 
Political legitimacy, representation, and the virtue of representatives are the key concepts of 
this research, though many other ideas will also be discussed. Principles and examples in 
Confucian texts and practices will be compared with political ideas originated from the West.  
 
C. Doing political theory in Non West 
 
Prominent works, such as Orientalism by Edward Said, criticize cultural distortion from 
the West to the East. From a different perspective, Samuel Huntington’s Civilizations and the 
Remaking of World Order predicted that there would be continuous conflicts between the West 
and the rest of the world. This research is concerned with such conflicts in the realm of political 
theory, or more precisely, democratization in the Non West.  
First, the concept and conceptions of the term “Non West” must be made clear. The 
distinction of the West and the Non West is explicitly identified by both Stuart Hall (1992) and 
Parekh (1992). In his paper, “The West and the Rest: Discourse and Power”, Hall defines “the 
West” as not only a geographical term but also as an idea, a concept that has four main functions. 
First, it characterizes and classifies societies into different categories, western and non-western. 
It is a tool of thinking that sets a certain structure of thought and knowledge in motion. Secondly, 
it is a set of images that function as a set of representations. For example, western = urban = 
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developed; non-western = non-individual = rural = under-developed. Thirdly, it provides a 
standard or model of comparison. Fourthly, it provides criteria for evaluation. For example, the 
West = developed = good = desirable; the Non West = under-developed = bad = undesirable 
(Hall, 1992, p. 277). Hall states that such ideas were first established in the fifteenth century 
and have since functioned as discourse and ideology. 
Parekh’s argument is also crucial because it shows how the idea and concept of the West 
and Non West have been internalized. He opens his paper, “The Poverty of Indian Political 
Theory” (1992), with the statement, “No contemporary non-western society, not even Japan, 
has produced much original political theory” (page number). According to Parekh, political 
theory has practical value and it should correspond to real society. For example, he argues that 
the alien and much-misunderstood secularist Western model that developed in India could not 
solve the problems of Independent India. In addition, he shows how many mainstream political 
theorists have ignored non-western culture, daily life, and values in their studies entirely. 
Finally, he points out the serious problems of teaching political theory in the Non West. Due to 
the dominant influence of the Western theories, the development of original political theory in 
the Non West has been greatly stymied, arguing that few attempts have been made.30 
In politics, there is a cohort of scholars who suggest alternative views about democracy 
and democratization, political development, and the broad historical progress of humankind. 
Bihikhu Parekh (India/UK), Partha Chatterjee (India), Samir Amin (Egypt), Kang Jungin 
(Korea) all claim that generally speaking, many theories of the democratization of the West 
contain a tacit presumption that western civilization and culture is superior to the non-western 
world. In other words, it has been assumed that western culture has an essential affinity with 
democracy, and liberal representative democracy in particular, and that different types of 
democracy, in which alternative virtues of representatives are required by the people, is not 
possible. Following the criticism of these scholars, in each chapter, the affinity of East Asian 
ideas with essential democratic virtues will be examined in empirical and normative aspects. 
When they exhibit differences, explanations as to how and why will be presented. The ultimate 
goal of this research is to examine whether the different East Asian conceptions of the virtue 
of representatives in each essential category of legitimacy can be considered an alternative in 
democracy, or if they are even worth being pursued despite their non-democratic character in 
some cases. 
In this examination, this research focuses on the peculiarity of the Non West in reference 
to the cultural and historical situations that are distinct from the West during the period of 
                                           
30 When he taught modern political thought in Harvard University, Parekh included Ghandi alongside 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. 
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modernisation. Drawing on the different essential features of nationalism between the western 
and eastern world, Chatterjee speaks to the dual characteristics of awareness. According to 
Chatterjee, when Britain and France were the cultural, economic, and political pacesetters, other 
Western countries like Germany and Italy had the awareness that they already had the necessary 
linguistic, educational, and professional skills deemed necessary for a consciously progressive 
civilization, “They had therefore little need to equip themselves culturally by appropriating 
what was alien to them” (Chatterjee, 1986, p.1). By contrast, the Eastern brand of nationalism 
has been accompanied by an effort to re-equip the nation culturally, to transform it. This could 
not be done simply by imitating the alien culture—then the nation would lose its distinctive 
identity. In fact, this becomes a deep dilemma since it involves two strong types of rejection: 
“rejection of the alien intruder and dominator who is nevertheless to be imitated and surpassed 
by his own standards, and rejection of ancestral ways which are seen as obstacles to progress 
and yet also cherished as marks of identity”(Chatterjee ,1986, p. 2).31 
In effect, there is a dual tension. On the one hand, there is tension between external, 
authoritative sources, namely, borrowed political systems and internal existing values. This 
tension emerges from the difference of place. On the other hand, there is conflict between past 
as tradition and present as liberal democratic representation. This tension emerges with the gap 
of time. While other countries in the West suffered only from the difference of time, the Non 
West struggled with both issues of time and place. This difference of place also raises the 
problem of identity.  
A contingent but valuable result can be seen when the external source of legitimacy 
coincides with internal values. Some basic ideas such as liberty, equality, and justice are often 
classified and understood as common to any society. If past tradition is not in conflict with 
modern representative democracy, a time lag would not prove to be so problematic.  
This thesis is based on the assumption that if democracy has a general value as a political 
system, the core idea must be immanent in most human societies. If this proves true, the people 
could take their indigenous political thought into account as the source of contemporary 
democratic development. Accordingly, there is no reason to depend merely on the project of 
catch-up, or on teleological democratization. In fact, these approaches either are unable to bring 
about the purposed end or result in the creation of problems of identity. It is also very likely 
that they do both at the same time. Thus, this thesis argues that Confucian political thought is 
not in conflict with modern representative democracy, but rather, provides fruitful ideas for 
                                           
31 During the period of Japanese colonization, there was a debate among Korean intellectuals regarding similar 
issues. Historian, anarchist, and independent activist, Shin Chaeho, argued that Korean people must seek an 
alternative way against all kinds of imperialism. In contrast, novelist and cooperator with the Japanese 
government, Lee Gwangsoo, claimed that the only, or at least the most effective, way for Korea to develop was 
to copy and learn from the successful Asian modernization model, Japan. 
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democratic development in regards to key concepts such as mandate, limited government, and 
virtuous representation. 
 
 
4. Main Sequence of Thesis 
 
This thesis starts begins with a question regarding the standards by which political legitimacy 
is judged.  As long as political legitimacy cannot be borrowed, the relationship between culture and 
democracy is problematic. Thus, democratic legitimacy should be rooted in the practice and custom 
of the society. The Asian value debate shows that there is an issue between culture and democratic 
legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy is not merely a matter of institutions but of “form of life”. 
In contemporary political society, democracy seems to be a prerequisite for political legitimacy. 
Yet, we should be aware that representation shapes the features of democracy. Without good 
representation, good democracy, good politics, and political legitimacy cannot be guaranteed. 
Representative government is the most general form of legitimate democracy. 
There is a set of indigenous traditions of political thought in East Asia that are consistent with 
representative democracy, which can provide a distinctive theory of political legitimacy. In this 
research, two key concepts of Confucian thought, the “Mandate of Heaven” and “the virtue of 
representatives” are discussed in this context.  
The Mandate of Heaven proposes a framework of political legitimacy in which Confucian 
representation requires representative and limited government. The virtue of representatives 
suggests a practical legitimacy that reflects the traditional view of human beings and political good. 
Both of these views are in accordance with the principles of modern representative democracy.  
Therefore, it can be said that Confucian thought on representation provides a set of ideas that 
are consistent with the normative theory of democracy and that sufficiently constitute political 
legitimacy in contemporary East Asian politics. 
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Ch2. Political Legitimacy 
 
1. Political Legitimacy 
 
A. What is missed in between culture and democracy? 
 
Every government needs to secure legitimacy. The relation between government and 
legitimacy is essential. Intrinsically, government is an entity in a relationship between the 
governors and subordinates, and legitimacy is a necessary concept that links those two groups. 
Without legitimacy, governments cannot be sustainable. The necessity of legitimacy implies 
that there should be a certain type of relationship between the wielding of political power and 
obedience.32 In other words, in the concept of legitimacy, there are distinctive roles of political 
relationship in every community. 
In this understanding of different roles, democracy seems to matter. Democracy is the only 
game in town. However, since legitimacy is necessary for all the governments of human history, 
legitimacy is a broader concept than democratic legitimacy. There can be undemocratic but 
legitimate governments. In fact, most of the legitimate pre-modern governments have been 
those of sacred kingship rather than democratic authority. Even today, democracy is the most 
anticipated political system for the people only because it is understood as the most legitimate 
system. 
Though legitimacy is one of the most fundamental conditions for all government, the 
features of legitimation do not seem identical in each society. They are varied as democracies 
so in contemporary representative politics. Though democracy’s variation appears due to 
different institutions first, fundamentally the diversity seems to emerge from cultures in which 
the people have a certain type of ways of thinking distinctive from others. Therefore, the 
indigenous culture could affect a set of political ideas and system. 
In summary, this chapter will examine three assumptions. Firstly, that legitimacy is 
essential in every government. Secondly, that legitimate government should be rooted in a set 
of people’s beliefs. Thirdly, that if the government is democratic, it is legitimate. In terms of 
the main issue of this thesis, the second and the third assumptions would be considered in 
respect of the matter of cultural diversity. 
From the examination of these assumptions, this chapter argues that political legitimacy 
                                           
32 There are of course different understanding of this relationship such as ‘state and society’ (Urbinati, 2006) and 
‘state and citizens’ (Pettit, 2012). These understandings focus on the substantive subjects of the relationship. 
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can be meaningful only in certain people’s beliefs. Insofar as political legitimacy is a prior 
concept even to democracy and is exclusively concerned with the belief-system in each political 
community, it must be rooted first in practice and custom. Even though there is a common idea 
of political legitimacy, its source, ways of operation and substantive elements vary depending 
on belief-systems. Therefore, it will be a desirable or at least a suitable way if we extract and 
reinforce some useful ideas from indigenous tradition insofar as they are sufficiently applicable 
for present political development. 
 
B. Legitimacy is a concept which is necessary for every government to wield political 
power in a justifiable relationship with the people who have obligation to obey 
 
It seems that there is a broad agreement that political legitimacy is necessary for political 
power to govern. It is a common idea that every government needs justification. Once there is 
political power and its government in a human community, then the necessity of its justification 
follows immediately. There is a necessary relationship of justification between the political 
power and the people who are concerned with the wielding of the power.  
But why is justification necessary for government? The problem of government is always 
about the foundation of the obedience of the people to the government. According to recent 
development of political philosophy, the fundamental reason which provokes obedience is not 
like law, physical power or authority itself but a distinctive concept namely legitimacy (Barker, 
1990, pp. 4-5). 
The exercise of power by one person over others, or by one group over another, is a basic 
and recurrent feature of all societies. This power can be challenged or undermined by other 
power or by subordinates, and in this concept of legitimacy the power is problematic (Beetham, 
1991). Where political power is, legitimacy is demanded. By the concept of legitimacy, political 
power becomes problematic. 
What is an appropriate account of the legitimacy? Apparently, there are empirical accounts 
for power to be legitimate such as basic security of the subordinates according to the theory of 
Hobbes and Locke. However, legitimacy is a concept in which political power is limited by 
justifiability according to normative conditions as well. For example, though the sufficient 
condition of legitimacy of a government seems to be equivalent with problem-solving capacity, 
it is still dependent with the people’s judgment whether the problem is solved or not. Even 
before, there should be a common recognition of what is problem. In this sense, Rehfeld claims 
that political obligation needs normative elements in a concept of legitimacy. According to him, 
“citizens must have good reasons to endorse the particular institutions that govern them, 
whether or not they actually do justify them” (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 16). In this sense, there is a 
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conceptual distinction of ‘having reasons’ and ‘having good reasons’ for legitimacy (Weale, 
2013b). In a similar view, Raz argued that “an authority is legitimate only if there are sufficient 
reasons to accept it” (Raz, 1986, p. 40). In this definition, he distinguished the normal reasons 
from ‘better, sufficient, best, decisive, valid, and primary’ reasons (Raz, 1986, pp. 29-54). In 
addition, Hart, saying that “the role of practical authorities, including law, is to help people to 
conform to what they have reason to do” (Green, 2012, p. x1iii), suggested a concept of ‘good 
reason’ that makes an authority to be legitimate (Hart, 2012 [1961], pp. 54-56).  
Here, though Hart seems to excludes such elements of authority and law from the 
components of legitimacy, if we look at his arguments more deeply, he does not deny that the 
role of authority with legitimacy. He is saying that the role of authorities helps people to do 
something with reasons. Accordingly, we can classify the conditions of legitimacy into 
necessary and sufficient ones and also categorize the former as empirical and the latter as 
normative ones. In this classification, while authority consists of necessary and empirical 
ground of legitimacy with reasons of people’s obedience, good reasons provides sufficient 
ground of legitimacy. In effect, while the people can be satisfied with some reasons, the people 
can also require good reasons. When Beetham argues that insofar as legitimacy is not a matter 
of all or nothing but of a degree (Beetham, 1991), he obviously implies that empirical elements 
is not fully sufficient for a political authority to be legitimate and the normative dimension is 
an important aspect of legitimacy. 
Yet, what bring out the empirical and normative conditions of legitimacy? According to 
Beetham, in terms of legitimacy, the situation of every government can be illustrated that 
“where the societies and the powerful seek to justifiable rules or secure consent, and power is 
acquired and exercised according to justifiable rules, and with evidence of consent, we call it 
rightful or legitimate” (Beetham, 1991, p. 3). Here, the existence of certain justifiable rules in 
a political community can be an empirical evidence of legitimacy. In this case, the government 
has some reasons to wield political power over the people. In contrast, there is a common idea 
that political power should be wield only with consent of the people, this idea provides 
normative ground of legitimacy. Although it is not sure whether it is rule or consent that confers 
legitimacy, it may be true that there should be a sort of recognition of the right to govern by 
some collective and visible human activities. Both empirical and normative conditions only 
can be satisfied with people’s activities. In this approach, by some reasons or good reasons 
there are some meaningful human actions then the actions bring out the recognition of the 
power as legitimate. As a result, this recognition evokes the duty of obligation. In this regard, 
the concept of legitimacy offers a solution to a fundamental political problem, which consists 
in justifying simultaneously political power and obedience (Coicaud, 2002, p. 10). 
One distinctive point from the traditional conception about legitimacy of Hobbes and Kant 
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in modern philosophy is that the objects of obedience are distinguished from the State. Since 
Locke and Rousseau’s advocacy of resistance against the government that violates social 
contract, the object has been understood as limited government not the absolute State. However, 
some argue more radically that the subject of the right to be obeyed is not the governments but 
one’s fellow citizens. In this sense, legitimacy is a matter of not only “whether authorities with 
institutions they believe to be normatively deserving of obedience but also citizens have trust 
in the future compliance of other citizens” (Føllesdal, 2010, p. 28). Here, legitimacy is 
fundamentally a matter of clarifying the origin of political power and its justifiability by the 
citizens themselves. The point is that the relationship within the citizens has become more 
decisive rather than state and government. In modern representative democracy, Føllesdal’s 
argument is that the government as an object of the obligation is legitimate only when it is a 
genuine representative of the citizens. It also shows that the meaning, condition, and 
implication of political legitimacy have continuously been changed according to peoples’ 
minds. 
Therefore, legitimacy can be defined as a concept which is necessary for every government 
to wield political power over the people in a justifiable relationship with the people who have 
obligation to obey. This legitimacy should consist of both empirical and normative elements. 
Those elements can be produced by some collective, visible and meaningful human activities. 
Finally, insofar as these certain human activities confer legitimacy, legitimacy is fundamentally 
related to the mind of the people who act in such a way as to confer legitimacy. Legitimacy is 
the only a concept that could explain political relationship between the people who have right 
to govern and the people who have obligation to obey.  
  
 
2. Legitimacy and Culture 
 
A. Legitimacy depends exclusively on shared beliefs of the people 
 
The first section has discussed the question that whether political legitimacy is essential in 
government. The second section has examined whether democracy is a sufficient condition for 
political legitimacy. The question of this section is that in what necessary conditions democracy 
can work well in terms of political legitimacy. 
In the justification of government, ‘beliefs’ among the people is the essence. Weber defines 
legitimacy as the belief about power among the people. Accordingly, the main task of social 
science becomes making a report about other people’s beliefs too. Beetham also argues that 
legitimacy is justified in terms of shared beliefs, regulated to be understood conventions and 
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confirmed through the expression of consent (Beetham, 1991, p. 31). 
A historical scrutiny promotes and helps this understanding of legitimacy. In his 
magnificent work, The History of Government Samuel Finer (1997, 1999) shows almost all 
the history of governments of human beings from the Sumerian city states to the modern 
European countries require legitimacy. In this work, Finer strongly argues for the relationship 
between a concept of ‘belief-systems’ and political legitimacy. 
 
rulers cannot maintain their authority unless they are legitimated, and they are legitimated by 
belief-systems (Finer, 1999, pp. 28-9). 
 
According to him, every government needs certain congruence between social stratification 
and the political institutions as a precondition for regime stability and survival of the political 
community itself, the binding force being belief-systems. This kind of belief-system starts with 
an unproven and provable axiom. For example, he introduced a maxim that ‘all men are created 
equally’ (Finer 1999. P. 29). Unfortunately, there is not clear definition of belief-system in his 
work. However, it seems possible to reconstruct his argument for the concept and identify its 
meaning and characteristics. 
Belief-system is a set of beliefs which is distinctive from authority, government or power. 
All these political concepts and phenomena only can get their presence and practical utilities 
based on more radical ground of belief-systems in relation to the people. Authority, 
government, and political power cannot exist or meaningful without a concept of people’s 
beliefs and its organised form on which a political relationship of right to rule and obligation 
to obey is possible. For instance, if there is a genuine government, it means that there is a set 
of people’s beliefs in which the people believe that the ruler has a right to rule the people and 
they have an obligation to obey.  
To say this in relation to legitimacy; first, political order depends on shared beliefs of the 
people; second, we can call a set of this beliefs ‘belief-system’; third, this beliefs-systems 
consist of the contents of legitimacy in each political community theoretically though the 
systems’ origins can be varied such as religion, thoughts, or myth. 
Without people and their recognition of the political relationship based on belief-systems, 
any kind of politics is actually impossible. In this context, Weber, Beetham and other theorists 
who study legitimacy understand beliefs among the people as the ground of legitimacy. Yet, 
these beliefs need to be organized in a system in each political community. Without this 
systemization, simply beliefs among the people cannot be a foundation of political system. At 
the moment, it cannot be distinguished from other social factors such as religion, ideas, and 
emotions. There is no stability and continuity. In contrast, as a system, these beliefs should not 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
２８ 
 
be dismissed in a short period, rather it must last for a long time mostly over generations. 
Although the belief-systems could originate from religious background, as a meaningful 
ground of legitimacy in political context, it should take secular hierarchy which is distinctive 
from religious one.  
These belief-systems are stronger than the ruling authorities because it is belief-systems 
that the authorities count on. On these belief-systems, in pre-modern periods, inequality and 
social stratification had been accepted and legitimated gladly in the political communities. In 
the history in Africa, Middle East, and Europe, the belief-system had had a feature of religious 
foundations in a relationship between human beings and cosmos or sublunary world and 
cosmos. Rulers link these relations. Before Luther said that ‘every man is his own priest’, 
belief systems generally have depended on hierarchical religious faith. However, ‘belief-
systems’ goes wider than religion in some cases such as Confucianism. As Finer says, 
Confucianism was not a religion but it was a belief-system as all-encompassing as that of 
medieval Roman Catholicism (Finer, 1999, pp. 28-30). 
Therefore, we can understand legitimacy in terms of shared beliefs confirmed by 
recognition of certain human activities (Beetham, 1991), and in relations with belief-systems 
(Finer, 1999). This is the utility and importance of the concept of legitimacy to be distinctive 
from power, social stratification, and government itself. On account of the concept of 
legitimacy, it would be possible to set out three elements of the relationship between political 
power and obedience. 
First, every political power aims to increase or at least to maintain wielding of authority 
Second, the maintenance of political stability may be an evidence of acceptance of the power 
in a sense of fact. This fact consists of the empirical character of legitimacy. Third, there should 
be reason giving procedures on basis of acceptable religious, legal, traditional, and moral 
foundations. 
In conclusion, although there are more elements to be clear such as validity, still it is sure 
that there is no other foundation of legitimacy except the people’s beliefs. Even problem-
solving capacity is dependent with the beliefs since both recognitions of what is problem and 
of whether it is solved also the people’s mind. About this point, many political theorists, 
sociologists, and historians seems to have a common view. The theorists agree that there should 
be some kinds of beliefs of political power in a political community.  
 
B. Legitimacy is a concept that demands not just descriptive features but also 
normative standards for judgment. This characteristic of legitimacy thus raises a 
controversial issue about cultural diversity because judgment on basis of normative 
criteria should allow only certain moral values in each society 
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In relationship between political power and obedience, if legitimacy is a concept that is 
intrinsically dependent on the people’s beliefs, there are two dimensions with the feature and 
characteristics in terms of legitimacy: the descriptive and the normative.33 According to Peter, 
the first descriptive dimension is one in which legitimacy qualifies political authority as the 
right to rule. In this sense, legitimacy is interpreted to people’s beliefs about how the right to 
rule is exercised. As a result, legitimacy prevails if only the people support the institutions and 
decisions. The second is normative dimension in which the legitimacy gives binding reason and 
force to the people to support certain institutions and decisions. In this light, legitimacy is 
constituted by a set of conditions that the decision-making process must satisfy (Peter, 2009, 
pp. 56-9). 
According to Beetham and Peter, many modern theorists have confused descriptive and 
normative dimensions of legitimacy. In the descriptive dimension, legitimacy prevails if and 
only if the people support the institutions and decisions (Peter, 2009, p. 56). In this sense, 
legitimacy is a capacity to engender and maintain the presence of the beliefs (Beetham, 1991, 
p. 9). It is a view in which there is no room for a distinction of normative and empirical 
resources. This is the Weberian approach to legitimacy and it has been criticized by Beetham. 
According to Beetham’s interpretation, Weber argues that social scientists should be sceptical 
about the possibility of any rational grounding for normative ideas or value systems. Beetham 
argues that Weberians tend not to ask that why and how the people have the belief. They merely 
focus on result and presence of the beliefs. 
Following Weber, most social scientists have thought that judgment is impossible or does 
not need of explanation about the normative relationship between political power and 
legitimacy. Only what they want to report is the beliefs of the people to the power. In this view, 
we cannot and need not know whether the beliefs are just, and whether the procedure of 
establishing the beliefs is morally appropriate. Legitimacy is problem of substantive power 
yielded in real world and there is no room for consideration of morality. Only the capacity to 
engender and maintain the beliefs becomes more important. 
In this case, there may be some reasons but there will not be sufficient (Raz, 1986) and 
good reasons (Hart, 2012 [1961]; Weale, 2013). Beetham more radically calls it divorcing 
people’s beliefs about legitimacy from their reasons. Therefore, Weberian ideas can be 
interpreted as that a given power relationship is legitimate (Beetham, 1991, pp. 6-11). 34 
                                           
33 Fabienne Peter (2009) clearly classifies legitimacy’s character into these two dimensions even in definition. 
34 Beetham (1991) and Pitkin (1972) criticize that Weber’s legitimacy does not have any normative elements. 
Weber classifies legitimate dominion into three categories, charismatic, traditional, and bureaucratic. In this 
classification, he does not mind the characteristics of the contents which compose each category. For the reason, 
however, it seems to be more controversial. First, it is not clear whether Weber explicitly claims that there is no 
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Yet there is a question about the possibility of manipulation by power as Beetham (1991, 
p. 9) points out. In fact, this sort of question is not of concern to Weberian social scientists. 
There is a clear tension whether legitimacy should account for morality. Beetham explains the 
tension through the different approaches which he calls contrast views of social scientists and 
philosophers. Then, he claims that Weberian view is just a wrong interpretation or 
misunderstanding of legitimacy. He asserts that legitimacy involves a normative character 
(Beetham, 1991, pp. 6-10). In this sense, legitimacy is constituted by a set of conditions that 
the decision-making process must satisfy. This procedure implies that judgment is possible and 
necessary for acquiring legitimacy (Peter, 2009, pp. 56-7).  
These theorists, against the Weberian view of modern social science, classify the aspects 
of legitimacy into the two dimensions of the descriptive and the normative, and underline the 
essential character of the normative resources with inevitable necessity of judgment. In other 
words, distinguishing the different characteristics has a methodological importance and at the 
same time it provides a plausible basis for the normative resources as an intrinsic problem in 
study of political legitimacy. 
As Peter Winch says, the concern of social scientists should not be just on a set of causes 
and effects but whether those will be reasonable things to do (Winch, 1990, p. 81). Particularly, 
in terms of legitimacy, we need not just some reasons but good reasons. The belief-systems 
should fully work on basis of good reasons not merely accepted reasons. Though the question 
of what is reasonable may need to be examined further, at least it seems clear that the legitimacy 
stands on the ground of good reasons are stronger, more effective and sustainable than of merely 
some reasons. 
This distinction immediately prompts a second problem. Legitimation of power could be 
possible in two ways, imposed agreement by coercion and voluntary agreement by consent. In 
                                           
need of normative conception in legitimation at all. In fact, he does not classify the sources of legitimacy to 
those two dimensions. In Weber’s classification of three sources of legitimation of power, we cannot find any 
intention and consciousness of classification of normative and empirical sources. Accordingly, Even though the 
lack of carefulness in treatment of the concept could be criticized, it may not correspond to advocacy of useless 
of normative resources within the division. Second, it is obscure whether the point criticized is emerged by 
Weber himself or Weberians. In history of political theory, there is a similar controversy around the ideas of 
Machiavelli. He is well known as a theorist in favour of the vice rather than the good as character of ruler. 
However, it may not be true that he absolutely denies a ruler who really holds some good virtues such as 
generosity and mercifulness. He says that it would be laudable if a ruler actually possess and act on all those 
qualities deemed to be good, and condemns Agathocles on account of his completely vicious character in spite 
of his extraordinary success. In this light, it might be proper to say that he does not deny a good ruler as a 
desirable goal, yet recognizes that it is hard to be (Skinner, 1978, pp. 128-38). In similar context, Weber seems 
to focus on the transformation of main role from the charismatic and traditional resources to rational-legal 
authority in his ages. Finally, it cannot be sure that there is not normative element at all within the sources of 
charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal authority. Rather, there should be some social values and morality 
among the people whatever it is. We cannot imagine a vacuum of morality in human character, traditions of 
communities, and rationality of legal system in societies. 
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this distinction, an imposed order seems to be illegitimate and involves a self-contradiction in 
both categories of descriptive and normative dimensions because the existence of coercion 
itself implies that the subordinates do not support the power. Yet it may be more complex in 
practice because there may be no government that only can rely on coercion exclusively. Rather 
it often accompanies least or sustainable compensations and substitutes. 
Suppose a regime, whether it is medieval dynasty or modern dictatorship which is 
established by arbitrary force, sustains its governance, and provides some substantive interests 
to the people no less than other neighbouring regimes.35 In these countries, interests such as 
economic development are met as a compensation for the relative lack of normative legitimacy. 
Yet it is not merely applicable to the developing countries. According to the Marxist view, all 
governments in capitalism often provide common interests both for the Bourgeois and the 
Labour interests for sustenance of the capitalist states and system. In a broader interpretation 
of the theory of State from the Left view, such redistribution by welfare system is accounted 
merely small and particular compensation for the massive and general exploitation.  
Therefore, a power based on coercion could be meaningfully legitimate only in terms of 
material interests. At the same time there still remains a view that the power seriously lacks 
some essential aspect of legitimacy. We cannot say that a government where most people do 
not agree with the political system and do not support the political leaders is legitimate only 
because the government provide material needs. In addition, we cannot say that a government 
is legitimate only because there is not clear protest movement because of economic 
compensations. Legitimacy has normative grounds. 
Thirdly, although there is a conceptual distinction between imposed agreement and 
voluntary agreement, there would be many cases in which it is hard to distinguish oppressive 
imposition from pure voluntary obedience. Unfortunately, the normative character of 
legitimacy has more complicated aspects. For example, in Finer’s understanding of legitimacy 
in relation to belief-systems, there are various political formulas. Only of the religious types of 
beliefs-systems, he classifies them into five different features; primitive religion, archaic 
religion, historic religion, earlier modern type (European reformation), and modern type 
(separation from formal politics) (Finer, 1999, p. 23). In these cases, we are not sure that in 
what stages there is a reasonable and plausible agreement without coercive imposition 
acceptable to each period.  
Also in the Asian medieval ages, Confucianism was a distinctive non-religious belief-
system. Confucianism was a sort of intellectual belief-system dependent on the educational 
system. In addition, a concept of popular legitimation which is one of the means of legitimation 
                                           
35 For this example, I referred to Coicaud (2002, p. 22) and Beetham (1997, p. 27). 
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suggested by Finer (1999, p. 38), is just not applicable to modern governments. There is a 
paradigmatic instance of pre-modern periods’ popular legitimation in Rome. We can easily 
remind ourselves that how the emperor Augustus had to pretend not to be an emperor but to be 
called himself as Princeps in a meaning of the ‘first citizen’. Probably, most citizens and the 
members of the Roman Senate had known that it was merely a political rhetoric, but they were 
satisfied and accepted it. And, they might support it for many reasons. Although popular 
legitimation is frequently understood as legitimation by free popular election in modern 
democracy, we may recognize that there must be much of legacy of the pre-modern ideas of 
popular legitimation. In many cases of contemporary democratic politics, we are not so free in 
fact enough to agree with government voluntarily as Rousseau points out. In other words, we 
may not sure whether we are doing voluntary agreement in enough conditions even when we 
feel free politically. 
Accordingly, even though we conceptually distinguish voluntary agreement from imposed 
agreement as a normative condition for political legitimacy, the practice is more obscure. 
Perhaps, one of the most complex features in the obscurity of modern political theory is that, 
namely what Antonio Gramsci calls ‘hegemony’ (Gramsci, 1971).36 Indeed, there have been 
some ideas looks similar before Gramsci such as traditional myths, what Burke calls prejudices, 
and what Marx identifies as ideology which can grant legitimate resources for a power between 
coercion and voluntary. Yet hegemony may be more inclusive and systemic concept. It includes 
a complex set of institutional and cultural mobilization system, and also coercive power in cases 
in needs. Ironically to Gramsci, similar but more radical attempts have emerged in socialist 
countries for making socialist human beings. 
Finally, not only empirical but also normative conceptions of legitimacy raise controversial 
issues in relation to cultural diversity because legitimacy includes only certain types of social 
values and morality. The empirical distinctiveness between culturally different societies has 
been easily captured. Yet, insofar as the distinctiveness surely relates to the different values and 
ways of thinking, it is not limited only empirical dimension. Here is an issue of diversity of 
legitimacy in normative sense. If political legitimation does not accommodate ‘moral monism’ 
(Parekh, 1996 and 2000) or ‘moral objectivism’ (Bunting, 1996), the values and morality stand 
on basis of diverse cultures, customs, and conventions in different societies. As Parekh (Parekh, 
1996, p. 134) says, since culturally embedded human beings cannot escape their culture 
altogether, the belief-system for legitimation may not be free from the culture as well. In order 
to understand the role of culture in relation to legitimacy plainly, Beetham’s categorization 
                                           
36 In ancient period, Aristotle’s argument for slavery on account for ‘nature’ was an example of that kind of 
legitimation in broad application (Beetham, 1991. pp. 30-1). 
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would be helpful (Beetham, 1991, p. 72). 
On the one hand, there is a framework of justifiable content of rule for legitimacy; yet on 
the other, there is a following of principles and common interests which are various depend on 
the characteristics of each society. For example, if political legitimacy accommodates a ruler’s 
moral qualification as a necessary normative resource, it will be different between a Christian 
society and a Confucian society. Moreover in Korea the virtue of filial piety is the one of the 
most important standards of morality in evaluating a person’s character and it can be extended 
to considering whether he or she is a proper representative. In effect, there is a belief that a good 
son is more likely to be a good representative. According to this belief, in an election a person 
who is a good son can have more chance to win the election. In addition, the political 
representative is regarded as a model of the represented in Confucian thought, a virtuous person 
must have better chance to be a representative in principle. In Christian society, the filial piety 
may be a considerable element but must be at a different level and position. 
More widely, there would be more diverse of contents of morality, for instance between 
individual and communitarian societies. Even if every society takes some values as necessary 
goals to be secured in common, the problem cannot be solved. In a society, individual freedom 
may be the best value to be secured than others; by contrast, in another society equality may be 
favoured than liberty; and in multicultural society, some other values such as diversity, tolerance, 
and reciprocity could be regarded as essential values. The ways to the goals may be various 
even more.37 
In conclusion, as we can see through all these ideas, the theorists classify the aspects of 
legitimacy across two dimensions of the empirical and the normative, and underline the 
essential character of the normative with inevitable necessity of judgment. In fact, there seems 
to be a continuous tension between presence of power and its validity, and this is the essence 
of legitimacy. 
The distinction is important not only in the definition and understanding of legitimacy but 
also methodology of study of legitimacy. As I noted before already, without the normative 
concept of legitimacy, it is hard to explain the difference between forced agreement and 
voluntary consent. In this sense, two dimensions of legitimacy provide some answers to the 
questions that how the people believe and support a government without enough material 
interest or how the people withdraw their upholding with sufficient compensation. Finally, the 
distinction allows us to consider the diverse moral foundations which are the basis of 
legitimation among the people. 
                                           
37 It may be more controversial how to compromise different values in multicultural society. See the debate 
between Brian Barry (2001, 2002) and Bhikhu Parekh (2002). 
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C. Practice and custom as foundations of political legitimacy need to accommodate 
indigenous values and ideas as a form of life of the people who are concerned with 
the legitimacy 
 
Conceptually, legitimacy consists of a logical structure or framework on the one hand and 
content on the other.38 While the framework is common, the content can vary across different 
communities. There should be a belief-system in most societies, but the belief that consists of 
the system may be distinctive from each other. In fact, there may not be the identical contents 
in different political communities. 
This relationship of frame and content in conceptions of legitimacy can be understood in 
relation to democratic legitimacy in contemporary world. Insofar as democracy is the only game 
in town, democratic government should be established as a system. In this case, the system of 
democracy is a frame of the legitimacy. However, for the frame as democracy to be meaningful, 
it ought to be filled with proper content. The content must be in reference to some values that 
are consistent with democracy but not identical in each society. For example, though democracy 
must accommodate political equality as a necessary condition, there could be not only various 
ways to achieve the equality but also different views of political equality that is not in conflict 
with democracy. In addition, there are diverse forms of representation in modern democratic 
countries. There are many different democratically legitimate party systems, government 
systems, and constitutions. This is the natural plurality of the contents of legitimacy in a 
common framework.39 
Then, what is the substance of the contents of legitimacy? Many theorists agree that 
legitimacy should be assured by expressed collective actions. Whatever it is that provides 
grounds of legitimacy, it is clear that those are evoked and confirmed by certain collective 
human conducts within the society. That is one of the intrinsic characters of legitimacy in a 
concept of belief-system. All the principles of legitimacy in an association, it needs a certain 
type of systemic beliefs among the people. No matter how it is justifiable principle, it would be 
                                           
38 This conceptual structure is from the light of Beetham’s classification of ‘normative structure of legitimacy’ 
(Beetham, 1991, p. 72). He used the terms of ‘authoritative source’ and ‘justifiable content’. Yet, in this thesis, 
in order for distinction of conceptual common foundation and diverse cultural intervention, it is reconstructed by 
the concepts of ‘framework’ and ‘contents’ 
39 It is not only so in a highly abstract level of political idea. In policy, there can be similar examples. For 
instance, while national healthcare system was invented in Germany and may become a common idea, the 
operational systems are very different in many modern countries. Its variety ranges from tax based free system 
like the UK’s NHS to compromising system of tax and self-funding like Korean NHI (national health insurance 
system). In this case, while they have a same frame as a concept of national health care, the contents are 
different depends on the people’s mind about the systems. 
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useless if the people would not believe it as an appropriate resource for political legitimacy. 
This belief fundamentally emerges from collective ideas and actions not individual so that a 
certain formula of procedures of the emergences appears in community. 
In this sense, legitimacy allocates between community and beliefs. A British philosopher 
points out this relationship as a necessary condition of human society. Oakeshott says that, 
 
human beings are endless inventive of societies, communities, and associations, and each such 
invention is a relationship in terms of beliefs, that is, learned conditions of association. And, if one 
seeks a theoretical understanding of any such association, one must enquire into the postulates of 
the conditions (Oakeshott, 1976, p. 358). 
 
According to him, every interpersonal action has several necessary features. When men 
live together and interact on a relatively permanent basis, their relations cannot be episodic or 
transactional and need to be structured in terms of what Oakeshott calls practices. In this sense, 
practice may be identified as a set of considerations, manners, uses, observances, customs, 
standards, canons, maxims, principles, rules, and offices specifying useful procedures or 
denoting obligations or duties which relate to human actions and utterances (Oakeshott, 1975, 
p. 55: Parekh, 1979, pp. 491-2). 
But, why and how does the notion of practice relate to the possibility and necessity of 
indigenous legitimacy? In Oakeshott's view, practice can never entail a specific action, that is, 
require an agent to make a specific substantive choice; it only specifies the conditions or 
considerations which he must take into account in whatever he chooses to say or do (Parekh, 
1979, p. 492). We can find similar definition and its roles in Alasdair MacIntyre’s work. 
 
Practice is any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity 
through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve 
those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of 
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human concepts of the ends 
and goods involved, are systemically extended (MacIntyre, 2007, p. 187; Mulhall & Swift, 1992, p. 
82).  
 
MacIntyre connects practice to cooperative human activity with conceptions of goodness 
that differ in each society for at least two reasons. First, the concept of the good is dependent 
on indigenous values. Second, the ways of expression and procedure of cooperation should 
acquire some meanings in the society. In this case, contents and operational procedure both 
involves traditional culture. Therefore, if certain kinds of actions confer legitimacy and the 
actions should be performed in collective feature in a certain given rule, there should be various 
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types of actions to confer legitimacy on government in different society. The actions must be 
different from each other, as long as the collective actions are a sort of communicative activities 
among the people. 
Here, practice is like a language. Parekh argues that “even as a language does not tell us 
what to say but provides the resources in the light of which we can choose what to say and how, 
a practice can never tell an agent what to do” (Parekh, 1979, p. 492). In other words, in order 
to make a decision on the basis of law, consent, justice, and deliberation, we should use our 
own languages, and that is our indigenous condition. 
When Parekh compares practice to language, he provides another key idea which links the 
practices of Oakeshott with the concept of custom in Wittgenstein’s thought. If all the activities 
in practice are inevitably a sort of language game of human being, the interpretation in 
communication can be problematic. And, as the parable of sign post shows, people’s action 
would be limited in boundary of custom.40 
There seems no reason why the actions confer legitimacy would be excluded from the 
action which Wittgenstein mentioned. In fact, Beetham also mentions that “subsequent 
positions of power come to be derived from the rule, in the same ways as those whose rules 
originate through custom or agreement (Beetham, 1991, p. 57). Indeed, in terms of the 
relationship between Beetham’s rule, Oakeshott’s practice, and his custom, Wittgenstein says 
more clearly that  
 
hence also ‘obeying a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. 
Hence it is not possible to obey a rule privately: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would 
be the same thing as obeying it (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 202). 
 
Therefore, he argues that “human agreement decides what is true and what is false. It is 
what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is 
not agreement in opinions but in forms of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 241). 
In fact, long before Wittgenstein, Hume argued that custom is the only principle of human 
action. He explains the role of custom between human mind, actions, and beliefs. In relationship 
of cause and effect, he says that there may be no reason to infer the existence of on from the 
appearance of the other. Reason is incapable of any such variation. Experience as a result from 
one’s observation of similar events to be constantly conjoined together only infers the existence 
of on from the appearance of the other. He calls the principle of the consequence of this 
                                           
40 In that example, Wittgenstein says that, “Then can whatever I do be brought into accord with the rule? … 
Perhaps, this one; I have been trained to react to this sign in a particular way, and now I do so react to it. … a 
person goes by a sign-post only insofar as there exist a regular use if sign-post, a custom” (Wittgenstein, 1953, 
p. 198). 
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experience custom. In his definition,  
 
… for wherever the repetition of any particular act or operation produces a propensity to renew 
the same act or operation, without being impelled by any reasoning or process of the understanding; 
we always say that this propensity is the effect of custom. Custom is the great guide of human life. 
Without the influence of custom, we should be entirely ignorant of every matter of fact (Hume, 2007 
[1748], pp. 42-5). 
 
Hume also suggests a significant view of the relationship not only between human actions 
and customs but also between customs and beliefs which are the very essential grounds for 
legitimacy claimed by Beetham and Finer as well. Hume argues that custom form the 
experience makes a person believes something. A mind carried by custom is to believe 
something does exist. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in certain 
circumstances.  
For example, such feelings of coldness or the passion of anger are rooted in nothing but 
belief. Belief consists not in peculiar nature or the order of ideas, but in the manner of their 
conception, and in their feeling within the mind. He confessed that it is impossible perfectly to 
explain this feeling or manner of conception, but its true and proper name is belief, which is a 
term that everyone sufficiently understands in common life. Belief is something felt by the 
mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imaginations 
(Hume, 2007 [1748], pp. 45-53). Surely, though he does not say about political legitimacy, 
referring to Hume, it can be arguably claimed that what we need to understand political 
legitimacy fundamentally as people’s mind on a belief-system. At least, the argument for 
conceptual understanding of legitimacy in basis of belief-systems is consistent with Hume’s 
view. By this alternative interpretation of Hume, we can see that why and how it is connected 
with collective human actions based on practice and custom not reasoning free from community. 
Therefore, according to Beetham, Finer, Oakeshott, Wittgenstein, and Hume, legitimacy is 
a sort of agreement and it should be appeared by a feature of visual expressions. It ought to be 
performed in custom of the society to be understood among the members.41 The concept of 
practices and custom provide the foundation of understanding of collective human activities as 
the basis of belief-systems for political legitimacy. This is the universal argument for the 
importance of practice and custom in utterances concerning political legitimacy. 
In summation, the actions of rulers by which they try to promote, preserve and reproduce 
legitimacy can be understood as the efforts to conform a rule in a given society. In this sense, 
                                           
41 It is well drawn by Austin (1962) that why being understood correctly is important in community and how it 
happens. 
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we can say that certain kind of human conducts related to certain rules such as morality, justice, 
deliberation, human right, and consent have a function of reason-giving and  the confirmation 
of legitimacy. In this case, those actions ought to be meaningful behaviours in practice and 
custom. 
Yet, in what conditions are those actions to be meaningful? How do the human actions 
provide legitimacy to government in reference to the rules and values in a society? How do 
practice and custom work with legitimacy?  
Peter Winch (1990) dealt with this problem unintentionally when he studied the nature of 
political philosophy in his book, The Idea of A Social Science, in 1958. From Chapter 1, Section 
8 to Chapter 2, Section 3, following Wittgenstein, he explained that how it is possible that we 
can do language game only with rule and following it. He claimed that “the analysis of 
meaningful behaviour must allot a central role to the notion of a rule; that all behaviour which 
is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-governed.” (Winch, 
1990, pp. 51-2) In effect, concepts are prior to generalization and actions are prior to concepts 
as well. And we do and recognize actions meaningfully based on social context. Winch says 
that meaningful actions of individual are only possible in a certain social context because the 
actions ought to be recognisable as correct or wrong by others. He emphasizes that,  
 
Establishing a standard is not an activity which it makes sense to ascribe to any individual in 
complete isolation from other individuals. For it is contact with other individuals which alone makes 
possible the external check on one’s actions which is inseparable from an established standard 
(Winch, 1990, p. 32). 
 
In order to explain a question, ‘what is something to do to human beings’, Winch supposes 
an example of voting behaviour of an individual. In this example, Winch asserts that the thing 
which grants meaning to behaviour is neither the subjective intention as Weber says nor the 
psychopathological direction in Freud’s idea. Rather, it is possible only where the act in 
question has a relation to a social context. Let us see this example. 
In his example, the possibility of the meaningful behaviour of the voter only rests on two 
presuppositions. In the first place, ‘Voter’ must live in a society which has certain specific 
political institutions - a parliament which is constituted in a certain way and a government 
which is related in a certain way to the parliament. If he lives in a society whose political 
structure is patriarchal, it will clearly make no sense to speak of him as ‘voting’ for a particular 
government, however much his action may resemble in appearance that of a voter in a country 
with an elected government. Secondly, ‘Voter’ must himself have a certain familiarity with 
those institutions. His act must be a participation in the political life of the country, which 
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presupposes that he must be aware of the symbolic relation between what he is doing now and 
the government which comes into power after the election. The force of this condition becomes 
more apparent in relation to cases where ‘democratic institutions’ have been imposed by alien 
administrators on societies to which such ways of conducting political life are foreign [my 
emphasis]. The inhabitants of such a country may perhaps be cajoled into going through the 
motions of marking slips of paper and dropping them into boxes, but, if words are to retain any 
meaning, they cannot be said to be ‘voting’ unless they have some conception of the 
significance of what they are doing. This remains true even if the government which comes into 
power does so in fact as a result of the ‘votes’ cast (Winch, 1990, p. 50). 
Truly, in this concrete description, the hidden weak point of the vulnerable legitimacy was 
revealed in a country in which the legitimacy has been borrowed with the political system. 
Without awareness of what really happens by the behaviour, no matter how is repeated similar 
conduct, there would be no substance of ground of legitimacy. In other words, without genuine 
practice and cultural substance, human behaviours just do not have any meanings within a 
certain institution established by alien. No political binding force emerges from that behaviour 
and institution. 
In a recent work, John Horton (2012) sharply points this out through a study from Hume 
to Winch in relationship between political legitimacy, justice and consent. He argues that ‘the 
affirmation of legitimacy can and does vary, and how it varies depends in part upon the kinds 
of consideration that underpin legitimacy in the state of which a person is a member.’ Therefore, 
“political legitimacy may be based on different criteria in different times and places” (Horton, 
2012, pp. 142-3). If we translate his views according to this thesis’s concepts, it will be that 
there are inevitably many different ways to establish and sustain legitimacy in different political 
communities insofar as legitimacy is a concept that rests on human activities of the people who 
are concerned in a certain belief-system. 
It is clearer where he refers to Hume and Winch. Regarding the political legitimacy of an 
English King, Hume argues that ‘they [English people] consent because they apprehend him to 
be by birth their lawful sovereign.’ Then, Winch makes it clear that ‘this is not the role described 
by social contract theorists. … this is of course rooted in the hereditary institutions which 
belong to their form of life [my emphasis]’ (Hume, 1987, Winch, 1991, p. 227; Horton, 2012, 
p. 142). It is needless to say that this concept, form of life is the correct term that designates the 
nature of practice and custom. There is a clear procedure of recognition that provides good 
reasons for legitimacy. Also this may be the ‘somewhere’ that Wittgenstein says that 
‘explanations come to an end.’ That is, merely forms of life and nothing more. 
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3. Legitimacy and Democracy 
 
A. If democratic, is it legitimate? 
 
Every government needs legitimacy not just for survival but also for its genuine and 
effective government. In this light, legitimation is not only a lofty moral goal but also a practical 
condition for government. Legitimation only depends on empirical resources of incentive and 
sanction is not sufficient for genuine and effective government but also even survival of 
governance itself. Obviously, sometimes, the people seem to be satisfied with just empirical 
elements of legitimacy. Conceptually t is true that there are some reasons to support the 
government. However, it is also clear that that kind of government which only depends on the 
function of empirical incentive and sanction is standing on a vulnerable foundation. In effect, 
the government that is based on some reasons is not as legitimate as the government is rooted 
in good reasons. There should be normative grounds in which the people sufficiently accept the 
government in their belief-systems. 
Human beings in general are not fully satisfied with merely empirical element for 
legitimacy. In nature, human beings are distinguished from other animals in a sense that they 
are inspired and act by moral sentiment. In history, there are numerous events which are not 
understandable without normative reasoning. It is also true that without normative reasons the 
empirical reasons have not been provided for a long period. Accordingly, in both of principle 
and practice, there is a need of normative basis for government. In terms of the normative basis, 
although there could be various grounds and reasons of legitimacy, not all the values may be 
accepted. For instance, human sacrifice will not be allowed for any contribution and any reasons 
in modern society.  
In modern society, there are some values which are deemed as basic, universal and intrinsic 
for every human being such as liberty, equality, and human right in any society. Although these 
values are not necessary condition or contents of legitimacy directly, in political aspect, there 
is a system regarded as a suitable framework to secure those social values, namely democracy. 
In the competition with monarchy, aristocracy, and any kinds of government ruled by minority, 
democracy surely seem to win the position as the most justifiable political system. Democracy 
becomes the only game in politics in the present world.42 
However, it can be doubted that why many regimes of this world would not be democratic 
                                           
42 At this stage, I will not challenge any theories of democracy. Here, this chapter’s interest lies on the 
relationship of legitimacy with democracy in general so that it seems not necessary to define democracy in a 
radical level. Yet, it will be essential for examination of the relationship representation and democracy in later 
chapters. 
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for political democracy. And, how they could survive? The relationship between democracy 
and legitimacy seems to be not so simple to close the study at this moment. Insofar as 
democracy is only a part of legitimacy not the replacement wholly even in the modern politics, 
there is a need of clarification of the relations between the two concepts particularly with 
another relationship with culture in this research. 
First, it can be assumed that there is a non-democratic but legitimate government. One 
possibility for non-democratic government to be legitimate is that the government sets up non-
democratic normative foundations of legitimacy in the mind of the people. While most of this 
kind of government had been in the past, in some period of North Korea must belong to this 
case. The second is to provide enough empirical resources to set off the relative lack of the 
normative dimension of legitimacy. In fact, many non-democratic governments have exercised 
both strategies at the same time for survival. 
On the one hand, they have sought to argue that the non-democratic regime is inevitable in 
some political circumstances such as during the earlier days of state building or independence 
from colonization. Some leaders also have claimed that authoritarian politics is necessary for 
more efficient economic development in under-developed countries. On the other hand, in 
fewer cases, some governments actually have tried to provide empirical resources such as 
economic compensation or social welfare. And it has been done sometimes. 
For example, we can consider North Korea's situation from the late 1950s to early 1970s 
and South Korea from the early 1970s until 1987. Both the communist government in the North 
and the military authoritative government in the South seem to have achieved meaningful 
economic development. During the time, surely there had been a sort of recognition of 
legitimacy by voluntary acceptance of the non-democratic political system. Despite of the 
oppressive mechanisms in social and political realms, there had been some reasons for the 
people to ignore the normative problems whether the reasons depends on plausibility of the 
propaganda or material and welfare compensation. This may be the modern case of non-
democratic but legitimate. 
Of course, most attempts have failed eventually. There seem at least two reasons for this. 
Firstly, we are not sure of the effectiveness of the oppressive mechanism and ideological 
manipulation. If human beings are the entities that can be satisfied by material compensation, 
there would be much simpler way for the government to be legitimate in history. In addition, 
there is a practical difficulty of distinction between voluntary and imposed agreement. Though 
the people under dictatorship seem to endure well and even enjoy sometimes the government, 
we can see they immediately have become revolutionary actors when some conditions have 
been given. For this reason, it is almost impossible to secure the stability of the non-democratic 
government even in the case of North Korea. No one, even Kim Jungen himself may not be 
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able to assure of their hegemony project at this moment. The merit of hegemony project is that 
it conceals the government project, whereas, it also could deceive the ruling people. 
Secondly, thanks to the nature of non-democratic regimes, the empirical resources can 
easily be declined as time goes on. When the decline happens once, the people sooner or later 
come to recognize the lack of normative reasons of legitimacy, and the mechanism of empirical 
resources tend to be inefficient immediately. To sum, in general non-democratic government 
became illegitimate finally though it seems to be legitimate for a while.43 Yet, it is worth to note 
that it is not impossible for a regime to be legitimate without democracy in some circumstances. 
Democratic but illegitimate government is deemed to be exceptional. However, it is not so 
bizarre. Rather it happens often in many underdeveloped countries which actually consist of 
most of the world. It can be explained by another period of South Korea. After the Korean War, 
in 1960, there was a great student protest against the dictatorship of the first president that lasted 
12 years and was marked by illegitimate elections and corruption. As a result, before the 
military coup of two years later, from 1960 to 1962, the state had been governed by a democratic 
regime. Given its origin and feature, it was a democratic government that was established by 
the will of enough number of South Korean people who favour the democratic movement. Yet, 
the government did not have necessary problem-solving capacity at the moment. In the earlier 
1960s, in South Korea, the government was in charge of some tasks such as economic 
development, stability of the society, and most importantly national security in relationship with 
North Korea. However, the government seemed to fail in most of the missions to the people 
and it immediately called out a military coup. The regime apparently satisfied normative 
standard of legitimacy as a democratic government but failed to provide basic needs of 
empirical source of legitimacy. The cost was expensive. Just after the two years democratic but 
incapable government, the followed military dictatorship had lasted for 25 years by two 
generals. During the period of dictatorship, many people had an idea in their minds that 
incapable democracy was worse than efficient non-democratic government. 
In sum, the anticipation for democracy can be explained by a set of logical arguments as 
followed. If democracy is the political system that is preferred by the people to others in a 
political association, at least it satisfies a normative condition of legitimacy. Then, the 
legitimacy tends to promote efficient governance and the efficiency provides again more 
empirical legitimacy such as problem-solving capacity in general. Second, the reliability of 
democratic legitimacy is consistent with the empirical evidences in history. For example, if a 
regime of democratic and illegitimate is transformed to other cases, there may not be many 
                                           
43 Unfortunately, many authoritarian leaders would not accept the ultimate consequences or actually have no 
choice because of the desire to power. 
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possibilities to case non-democratic and legitimate. In fact, modern political history shows that 
it is hard to find out kind of transition. More frequently it tends to be the worst case of non-
democratic and illegitimate. Even though some government could be successful to transfer to 
the case of non-democratic and legitimate for a while, they are easily prone to be the worst case 
of non-democratic and illegitimate. Accordingly, here we can say that in both normative and 
empirical senses, in the relationship of democracy and legitimacy there are affinities between 
democratic government and political legitimacy. 
However, we are still not clearly sure of the necessary or sufficient relationship between 
democracy and legitimacy. It seems depend on the people’s judgment and practical situations. 
To be honest, the relationship seems to be just contingent sometimes. Surely, there is a way to 
avoid this confusion and many researchers have taken these means; redefining democracy or 
using certain limited meanings of democracy in their studies. There are many different views 
of democracy in principle, and varied understandings of democracy in practices. For example, 
there may be a pure concept of democracy which needs equal participation of all the members 
of a political community in principle. In contrast, modern representative democracy not just 
anticipates rule by few but also demands some qualifications of the representatives. However, 
both may be justified in different situations. In other words, while democracy is only game in 
town, democratic legitimacy is problematic. The is the reason why we need to think of 
democracy in reference to legitimacy. 
In conclusion, in order to be a legitimate government one needs to secure democracy as its 
political system or at least aim to be a democratic government. Non-democratic legitimate 
regime is not impossible in principle. Yet it is sure that it is only possible in some exceptional 
circumstances such as North Korea in the cold war period. In addition, in most cases, it would 
not be sustainable for the long term. Non-democratic government is illegitimate not only with 
normative sense but also easily tends to become empirically illegitimate. 
Therefore, in Beetham’s words, while there should be established rule and the rules can be 
justified by reference to beliefs shared by both dominant and subordinate in general (Beetham, 
1991, p. 16), in the present the rules ought to include democratic elements somehow for being 
legitimate. In Finer's terms, since the modern period, democracy became a necessary part of the 
belief-system. Accordingly, it may be true that a belief-system for legitimacy must root in 
democracy. 
At this stage, democracy seems to have an exclusive and universal significance. Even 
though there are necessarily some diverse characters of normative resources in political 
legitimacy, it is hard to imagine a legitimate government without democracy in the present 
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world.44 In this sense, finally we can say that democracy has become the only game and rule to 
acquire legitimate political power in modern world. However, it is not the end but only a 
beginning of the discussion about the relationship democracy and legitimacy. 
 
B. Legitimacy and of North Korea’s government 
 
In terms of democracy, legitimacy, and diversity, North Korea’s case is an interesting and 
useful example. Is North Korea’s regime legitimate? The answer seems too obvious so that the 
question is deemed inappropriate. But why and how the regime is not legitimate? Do we have 
any common and manifest standards of political legitimacy? If we have something, is it clear 
enough to the first question about North Korea’s regime? 
Presumably we can raise some candidates on the stage and they might be related to some 
important values including democracy, liberty and equality. There would be also more 
principles enough to be qualified as standards such as justice, welfare and human right. To be 
sure, these values and principles consist of severe parts of legitimacy in modern politics. For 
example, according to these standards, it can be said that the regime of North Korea is not 
legitimate because there is not enough democracy, liberty and equality. There is genuinely no 
democratic election and representation. It seems that North Korean people have enjoyed least 
social, economic, and political freedom at the moment in the world. Most people are equal but 
in a sense that they have nothing. In addition, quite a few people of the communist party are 
enjoying great unfair advantages. Therefore, it seems to be fair to say that North Korea’s 
regime is not legitimate. 
However, political legitimacy is a concept beyond those values and principles. Political 
legitimacy cannot be identical or replaced by other social and political values mentioned above. 
It is a concept which cannot be independent from the people’s mind. For instance, how should 
we judge if enough of the North Korean people believe their politics is sufficiently democratic? 
How about if they have different criteria about basic freedom and voluntarily agree with a 
narrow conception of liberty? What about if they prefer more equality of most people despite 
of relatively or even extremely low level of life? Most of all, how can we say if the people are 
really enthusiastic with their own political system and values? Also they could criticise the 
problems of western liberal democracy and its inequality. In fact, these are the arguments that 
the regime have claimed for more than 50 years. 
Although it is no more than a propaganda or ideological manipulation, we are not sure of 
                                           
44 For example, while Parekh claims the needs of various alternatives to western competitive party system in an 
ethically and religiously diverse society lacking shared values, he does not deny that the alternatives are also for 
the goal of the better democracy in the societies (Parekh, 1993, pp. 170-1).  
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the fallacy of the claim as long as we cannot have enough information in our hands about real 
attitude to the regime of the North Korean people. Instead, we could see the scene that a number 
of people mourned and wept at the death of Kim Il-sung. Whether it is emerged from 
indoctrination or not, it was undeniably true that enough people have supported their regime 
for a long time in North Korea particularly before 1980s. 
Surely, for a considerable period, there have been voluntary agreements for the hereditary 
succession of power as a result of repeated ideological infusion with various educational and 
media systems, and meaningful economical compensation.45 Before 1980s, North Korea surely 
had provided relatively enough material support to the people. It includes meaningful and 
substantive incentives. In this circumstance, according to the rational choice approach, there 
may not be serious attempts to protest and a revolution except extreme situations or contingent 
momentum.46 In fact, this may be real situations in many developing countries.  
Some could point out that there have happened tragic and unacceptable events in recent 
decades such as millions death of starvation. It must be a crucial evidence to argue that the 
regime is not legitimate at all if we consider basic welfare as an essential condition of political 
legitimacy. However, though the degree of strength has declined with drastic decrease of basic 
welfare, still there seems to be relatively strong beliefs and support in the people’s minds for 
the power on account of the function of hegemony. That is why the country has been survived 
in spite of the extremely low satisfaction of welfare. 
In the country, the core function of hegemony is to create an extremely solid identity of 
each individual. Many people still believe or at least make themselves believe that their 
difficulties are not caused by absurdity of the internal system but by an unjust external pressure 
of capitalist countries represented by the USA. Because of the identification, if they accept the 
present as an unbearable condition or wrong result of bad politics, it may draw a collapse of the 
regime but also bring an absolute destroy of self-identity as well. No one might want to destroy 
their identity totally, and the past period of prosperity surely inspires a confidence or some kind 
of hope even though it seems not so liable at present.  
If North Korea’s leaders only relied on oppressive means, the survival of the regime would 
be impossible. To say truly, the still overwhelming majority of the people seem to have a strong 
confidence with their Own Socialist System (they call it so). There is no sufficient evidence that 
the regime rely on only economic resources for legitimation and its survival, rather there seems 
to be some unique normative reasons. This example suggests that normative character of 
                                           
45 Until late nineteen-seventies, economic standard of living and social welfare in North Korea had been higher 
than South Korea. Whether it did not come up to a absolute level, it was literally and fully meaningful in 
contrast with South Korea. 
46 Also refer to the Adam Przeworski (1991)’s explanation why socialist revolution is so uncommon even if it 
seems to guarantee better future for the Labour. 
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legitimate resources is a complex set beyond some aspects whether voluntary or not, and 
whether covered by empirical compensation or not. 
Similarly, we could also imagine a religious community where the people endure 
economic poverty for their faith. They could have different and more severe standards 
regarding equality rather than democracy and liberty even in the West. They can be a very 
small group or a great community such as the Quakers and they enjoy almost absolute self-
government in their community. If they consist of one nation state, can we condemn them 
because it is now a political community? Is the government not legitimate in that sense? 
In general, it is acceptable to say that the present South Korea’s regime is relatively 
legitimate when set beside North Korea’s. There have been regular elections and peaceful 
regime changes since 1987. The constitution guarantees basic human rights and freedom since 
the memorial democratization. Only the government supported by enough numbers of people 
can survive and rule the state effectively. Surely, we can say on account of these factors that 
South Korea’s government is more legitimate than the North Korea’s.  
However, it can be another issue to the North Korean people if they do not consider liberal 
and democratic values as consistent with legitimacy. The values would be only meaningful 
when they are recognized as relevant by the people in some degrees in North Korea. It can be 
a possible situation where some foreign countries invade and establish a new government 
which provides different goods and values to the people. However, though it is justifiable with 
the ex post facto result, it is doubt whether the interference is legitimate on what account. 
The problem is that political legitimacy is a concept which cannot be excluded by the 
people who are concerned. Not only the regime but also the people of North Korea might not 
agree with the same standard of legitimacy recognized as reasonable by South Korean people. 
Most North Koreans even might have no idea about the liberal democracy in a genuine or 
neutral sense. In addition, by the nature of political legitimacy, we cannot enforce the standard 
of South Korea into North Korea. Therefore, even in the case of South and North Koreas, we 
have no common criteria about political legitimacy. 
Here I do not intend to argue that the North Korea’s regime is legitimate enough or there 
is no way to say that the regime is not legitimate. Yet, it is not liberal democracy that we count 
on. Political legitimacy is not a concept which can be replaced by democracy or liberalism 
itself. We could and should say that North Korea’s regime is not legitimate not only depending 
on liberal democracy but also through many alternative ways which are accepted as 
appropriate and reasonable in each community. 
Let us suppose some common grounds of legitimacy between South and North Korea. The 
ground is coincident with tradition and political culture in both countries. Whether it is 
democracy or communism, the government should stand on the common ground. The ground 
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should reflect the immanent values of the societies. It is Confucian political thought that we 
could take into account in this case. 
If we understand political legitimacy in three stages as source, operation and substance, 
North Korea’s regime does not satisfy any of them. According to the Confucian political 
thought of legitimacy, the mandate of government must be conditional, the mandate should be 
operated by mind of the people, and the politics must satisfy a certain level of welfare and 
cultivation of the people. Taking into account these standards in the case of North Korea’s 
regime, we can see firstly that there is almost nothing of conditional limit with mandate of the 
government at any senses of politics. Secondly, there seems no meaningful institution or 
practical procedure of participation of the people in political decision makings. Thirdly, the 
regime has not provided even a very basic level of welfare of the people particularly in recent 
periods. In contrast, South Korea’s regime shows relatively better performances by all these 
standards. These three criteria do not originate from communist democracy or liberal 
democracy but Confucian political thought which has been a dominant traditional foundation 
of politics in East Asia including North and South Korea. 
The most fundamental concept of Confucian political thought, the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, 
makes it clear that the right to rule is given from Heaven and that the right cannot be absolute 
for this reason. If Heaven does not grant or withdraws the right to govern, the government 
becomes illegitimate. In short, government is conditional. Mencius’s interpretation, that 
‘Heaven’s mind is people’s mind’ proposes a practical procedure to determine the Mandate of 
Heaven. The ruler should hear public opinions and respect the will of the people. Finally, the 
ruler must care for the interests and virtue of the people. In other words, both of material and 
moral level of the people consist of substances of standard of judgment for political legitimacy. 
From this point of view, North Korea’s regime would not be legitimate. 
 
  
4. Conclusion 
 
Although the system of democracy has been borrowed, political legitimacy cannot be 
borrowed. It has to be rooted in the customary tradition of societies in some ways. In this sense, I 
have argued for the possibility and necessity of practice and custom as essential ground of 
legitimacy. On that basis, all the logical contents of democratic legitimation can be meaningful. 
If so, are there any certain particular types of political systems in favour of practice and custom 
in terms of legitimacy? In Oakeshott’s idea, rule does not require even democratic participation. It 
does not postulate any particular procedure for making law. In addition, there is no particular 
constitution for rule-making authority. There is only a certain constitution which reflects contingent 
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beliefs about what is to be recognized as authoritative (Oakeshott, 1976, p. 356). 
This is a severe argument in a situation where liberal democracy is regarded as not just 
universal but desirable political system in people’s beliefs and among academics as well. Probably, 
Oakeshott also would not deny its usefulness and contribution for human community. However, he 
may not accept it as an absolute value because the presumption of ‘unconditional’ is impossible by 
itself as a standard of human actions (Oakeshott, 1976, p. 358). To some extent, it may only depend 
on whether the society accepts it and how it is absorbed with sufficient awareness. In addition, if it 
is not the matter of all or nothing, some aspects can be settled easily and others can hardly be 
accepted. 
In this context, Parekh shows possibility and necessity of the relationship between indigenous 
life of form and democratic legitimacy dramatically when he separates democracy from liberalism 
in western liberal democracy and implies that there can be possibility of different democracies not 
‘liberal.’ According to him, the liberal cannot be considered a degenerate form of ‘true’ democracy, 
but neither a model nor even a standard of judgment. For example, even in the concept of 
democracy, there have been severe changes of the conceptions between ancient democracy and 
liberal democracy. Each arose within a specific historical context and culture. In addition, because 
in liberal democracy liberalism is the dominant partner, no liberal democracy is or has ever been 
without tensions (Parekh, 1992, pp. 165-6). 
Therefore, if we do not fall for the fallacy of blind faith and devotion to liberal democracy, we 
may find that political system can be democratically liberal rather liberally democratic. It might 
define individual rights in social terms and establish a healthier balance between the individual and 
the community. It also may aim at a fairer distribution of the opportunities required for full 
citizenship, extend participation to the major area of economic and political life, and open up new 
centres of power. Parekh asserts that there is no obvious reason why a political system may not 
combine them differently. And, the way of combination depends on its history, tradition, values, 
problems, and needs (Parekh, 1992, pp. 167-8). That is practice and custom, in other words, 
political culture. 
In conclusion, if the borrowed system is found out to be imperfect and its borrowed legitimacy 
is also incompatible with the practices and customs of the people concerned, it can be modified or 
ought to be adjusted. This is not an argument that all non-democratic regimes can be justified by 
this reasoning. Rather, it is an assumption that not all ‘non-liberal’ democratic regimes are 
illegitimate. 
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Ch3. Asian Value Debate 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A. Is western culture necessary for democracy? Huntington: yes, Lew Kwan Yew: not 
at all, and Bell: maybe not 
 
This thesis is concerned with the relationship of culture and democracy. It takes as its 
starting point the debate about Asian values and democratic government. In the 1990s, against 
the background of economic success in Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, a number of 
theorists started to raise important questions about the relationship between Confucian culture, 
development, and democracy. 
In 1993, Samuel Huntington published a paper titled ‘The Clash of Civilization?’ in 
Foreign Affairs. In this essay, while he confirmed the economic and political success of East 
Asia, he emphasized that the success would soon be faced with difficulties in Confucian culture. 
One year later, in 1994, Lee Kwan Yew, the Singapore prime minister, criticized Huntington’s 
view in an article named ‘Culture is Destiny’ in the same journal. Then, in the same year and 
same journal, against Lew Kwan Yew, the leader of opposition party and later president of South 
Korea in 1998-2002, Kim Daejung contributed ‘Is Culture Destiny?’47 This was the beginning 
of ‘Asian Value’ debate. 
Huntington’s argument was that the causes of development emerged from contingent links 
between Confucian and Western culture, and there need to be more accommodation of western 
modern values for further development. This argument originated from modernization theory. 
Since Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba theorized modernization theory in relationship 
between culture and political development in their book, The Civic Culture in 1963, there have 
been exclusive debates about the relevance of culture and democracy. In 1970s, that idea 
seemed to have been declined, but in the end of 20th century, it was resurrected dramatically by 
‘a famous western theorist’, 48  Huntington (1991, 1996, and 2000) and many others. 49 
                                           
47 Formally the term includes whole Asia, but normally it has been accepted as designating East Asia or 
Confucian Asia in the debate and studies afterwards. 
48 In this context, it is important that he is recognized as not one of the political theorists but a ‘famous’ one in 
the East. There appear two different but related characters in accepting western theory. First, a famous theorist in 
the West has been received more hospitable treatment in the Non West because he or she is a western theorist. 
Second, even more when he or she is interested in the non-western issues, it becomes another reason to respect 
him or her because the western theorist hospitably favours non-western issues. 
49 See Huntington, Samuel and Harrison, Lawrence ed. (2000), Culture Matters, Basic Books. 
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According to Huntington’s cultural explanation, more modernization and westernization or 
growth of westernized civil society based on modern capitalism is necessary condition for 
development of democracy in the Non West. The book, Cultural Matters edited by Huntington 
shows explicitly what the modernization theorists have assumed for the argument. 
This book is a collection of essays addressed in a symposium sponsored by the Harvard 
Academy for International and Area Studies in 1999. In this book, which included contributions 
from Ronald Inglehart, Francis Fukuyama, and Seymour Martin Lipset, twenty two theorists 
claimed that there is a certain type of culture which clearly has more affinity to democracy and 
development. In the introduction of the book, titled ‘Why Culture Matters?’, Harrison 
outspokenly criticized cultural relativism and its denial of the universality of western type 
development. Then he defended their view that 
 
… progress in the western sense has become a virtually universal aspiration. … If some cultural 
values are fundamental obstacles to progress … then there is no alternative to the promotion of 
cultural change (Harrison, 2000, p. xxvi and xxxi). 
 
In this book, there is a strong premise that western value and culture are superior to other 
cultures. Therefore, most countries in Africa, Latin America, and Asia ought to change and 
adjust their tradition, culture, and convention for economic, political, and social development.50 
Just as in the 1960s and 1970s, there have been counter attacks. Against Huntington’s 
argument, Lee Kwan Yew and other Asian political leaders of People's Republic of China, 
Malaysia, and Indonesia sought to justify their authoritarian regimes. They claimed that a 
distinctive set of institutions and political ideologies which reflected Asian region's culture and 
history were only viable in Asia, in their countries. According to them, western type of 
democracy is intrinsically incompatible with Asian culture so that it causes various negative 
social results in Asian societies. As a result, defenders of Asian values have claimed that 
Western-style liberal democracy is neither suitable for nor compatible with Confucian East Asia, 
where collective welfare, social duty, and other principles of Confucian moral philosophy are 
deeply rooted (Chong-Min and Doh Chull, 2006, p. 341). 
Lee Kwan Yew (Zakaria, 1994) particularly criticised western individualism treating it as 
a view about maximum expansion of individual freedom. He pointed out many problems of the 
western society such as drugs, gun crime and vagrancy as results of the extreme of freedom. 
Instead, he emphasized moral values and ‘rectification of individuals’ through the order of 
society. The main goals of the government are political stability, a well-ordered society, the 
                                           
50 These theorists argue that even in America the culture of the Black and the Hispanic have to be changed for 
social achievement. 
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maintenance of family values, and economic development not the maximizing of individual 
freedom. For these goals, he argued that ‘soft authoritarian system’ would be suitable for Asian 
countries. In this sense, he said that there were fundamental differences between the Western 
concepts of society and government and the East Asian concepts.51 
What Lee Kwan Yew argued for was the importance of culture or value systems. He did 
not deny the factors that there have been change of life style, religion trends, and technology in 
recent centuries. However, he emphasized that there had been a clear difference of certain basic 
cultural patterns. And these basic patterns must be prior to other political values such as 
democracy. In this context, democracy which is condemned by him is Western type of liberal 
democracy and the culture means Confucianism in the East Asia. 
Critiques to Lew Kwan Yew’s argument have followed from the western theorists who 
stand on the side of Huntington. For instance, Hood (1998) calls Lee Kwan Yew’s regime 
‘Asian type democracy’. He understands the concept of ‘soft authoritarianism’ as ‘limited 
democracy’, or combination of ‘part-democracy and part authoritarianism.’ Like Huntington, 
he asserts that there is no democratic element in Confucian thought because there is no idea of 
human rights or the independent individual necessary for western type democracy.52 
In the Asian values debate, there appeared another interesting but noticeable view that 
western type of democracy could be rich with adding Asian communitarian values not just in 
Asian but also in the West (Kang, 2002, pp. 58-9). Daniel A. Bell, a professor at Tsinghua 
University in China is the theorist who argued for a strong affinity between Confucianism and 
democracy in his Beyond Liberal Democracy (Bell, 2006) and many other articles (Bell, 1995, 
1996 and 2000). According to him, Confucian way is not just a complement for democracy but 
an alternative of western liberal democracy (Bell, 1995; Chong-Min and Doh Chull, 2006, p. 
342). He says that a Confucian tradition of respect for ruling intellectual elites and the 
responsibility and competence correspondent with the respect would complement modern 
representative democracy (Bell, 1999).  This idea has been developed into a modern justified 
model of Confucian political system seen as a meritocracy. Political meritocracy is an idea that 
Bell recently suggested as a political system which is designed for electing political leaders 
with above average ability to make morally informed political judgments. According to Bell, 
meritocracy has two key components: (1) political leaders are to have above average ability 
and virtue and (2) the selection mechanism should be designed to choose such leaders (Bell, 
2012). 
                                           
51 For example, he suggested the principle of ‘one-person one-vote’ which is deemed as very basic in democracy 
could be reformed into one-person two-votes between 40 and 65 ages. When Lee Kwan Yew denied the 
principle of equal right to vote, he clearly downplayed the importance of democracy rather than culture. 
52 In a later chapter, I shall argue that how his understanding of Confucianism, for example, ‘Confucianism does 
indeed teach loyalty over morality’ (Hong, p. 858) is distorted. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
５２ 
 
There have been a number of counter arguments about this meritocracy, of course. First, 
meritocracy seems a sort of elitism and far away democracy in principle at any extent. Second, 
as a result of the first the idea the theory of meritocracy could be used to defend authoritarian 
regimes. Third, Bell’s view denies a fundamental modern political values such as equality in a 
sense that meritocracy premises the differences of capacity making a political decision 
(Dallmayr, Li, and Tan, 2009). 53 
Against these critics, Bell argued that what he denied was not democracy in general but 
the western type of electoral democracy. At this point, he said that western electoral democracy 
should be reconsidered whether it is successful to choose good representative as expected. In 
terms of the second, he made it clear that in his argument the persons who are suitable for 
political leaders are not authoritarian. In other words, the political competence that Bell 
remised includes non-authoritarian character. In third, while he accepted some critiques, the 
acceptance is not as fair but as controversial with the critiques in itself (Bell, 2009, pp. 555-7). 
Here, he suggested a very interesting example;  
 
Who really believes that everybody has the equal capacity to make competent and morally 
justifiable political judgments? I love my mother, and I will be very upset if anybody questions her 
honour, but I'm not sure if her capacity to make political judgments equals that of my friends doing 
political theory (Bell, 2009, p. 557). 
 
Certainly, Bell’s theory provides significant contributions not just for Asian value debate 
but also for theory of democracy. The present research has been stimulated in many aspects by 
Bell’s view. However, it doubts whether Bell’ responses are sufficiently reasonable counter 
arguments to the critiques. As Hume and James Mill argued that we should assume the worst 
of those who hold power (Weale, 2007, p. 56), though the leaders of the government in Bell’s 
meritocracy are not so authoritarian in their personal character, there may always be a practical 
danger without appropriate means of restraint of the power. At this point, it is not necessary to 
remind a maxim that ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely.’ 
In terms of equality, there could be two reasonable different views at the same time. First, 
it is unacceptable to argue that everyone is equal denying equal capability to participate in 
political decision-making procedure. Second, it is though true that there must and should be 
distinction of who are more suitable for serious political roles in politics. In effect, on the one 
hand, Bell’s idea looks dangerous in relation to democratic principle of equal participation 
which is essential for every government to be legitimate in contemporary politics. On the other 
                                           
53 One of the serious debates about Bell’s argument was ‘the twenty-second World Congress of Philosophy’ and 
it was held in Seoul, Korea, from July 29 to August 5, 2008. 
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hand, it also implies some truth that no one wants something important to be decided by 
incompetent persons.54 It seems that Bell’s argument grasps this dilemma of equality in modern 
democracy. 
However, Bell’s arguments themselves seem to have some weak points in both 
methodology and goal. In terms of method, it is too modest; in terms of goal, it is too ambitious. 
In method, Bell’s idea might still belongs to the negative attempt in a sense that it puts 
democracy on the central position of discourse, and then tries to find out affinitive aspects in 
Asian culture. In this sense Bell’s analysis is clearly limited within democratic legitimacy so 
that it is hard to discuss more fundamental issue of political legitimacy that could be beyond 
democracy to some extent. For this reason, though he denied any singular way of political 
development only through western type of liberal democracy, he seems fail to suggest an 
appropriate explanation of why meritocracy can be a reasonable alternative and why it is 
necessary in East Asia. He did not have an argument for the fundamental foundation of validity 
and plausibility of meritocracy such as the concept of legitimacy. In this sense, Bell’s theory 
still does not overcome western-centrism in method. In terms of goal, it is too ambitious because 
it anticipates an adaptation of Confucian idea in relation to democracy not just in East Asia but 
also in the West where the people has not been familiar with Confucian culture or even has been 
hostile with it. Nevertheless, while he claims for defence of a certain Asian type of government 
by meritocracy as this moment, he also does not hesitate to argue that the system can be an 
alternative to liberal democracy in general. 
 
B. Kim Daejung suggests an alternative way that we can find same ideas from Locke 
and Mencius. And Korean political theorists began to ask what Korean politics is 
 
In Korea, before Lee Kwan Yew’s claim for the existence of distinctive Asian values, there 
was an assertion by a military dictator, Park Chunghee in 1970s. He called his explicit 
dictatorial regime ‘Korean democracy’ to distinguish from western democracy. 55 However it 
was clear that there was almost nothing can be called democratic. The President of South Korea 
and the winner of Nobel Peace Prize in 2000, Kim Daejung criticised the conception of ‘Korean 
democracy’ in recognition of his distinguished contribution for democratization under Park 
                                           
54 This view implies a concept of competence of a political leader and it must be one of the most controversial 
issues in modern representative democracy. In later chapters of this thesis I shall deal with representative’s 
qualification as important condition for legitimate government. 
55 Park Chunghee’s daughter, Park Geonhae won the presidential election in December 2012. Now she is the 
President from 2013 to 2017. It is analysed that many voters supported her in nostalgia to her father’s 
charismatic government. In this sense, it can be said that the debate about ‘Korean type of democracy’ is still 
going on in these days. Precisely, Ms. Park’s winning and her government may bring some bad influence on the 
argument for the concept of the ‘Korean type of Democracy’. 
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Chunghee’s dictatorship in 1970s. In 1990s, he did not agree with Lee Kwan Yew. Nevertheless, 
his critical view was clearly different from the Huntington’s. He would not agree with the idea 
that there is a need for culture change in order to secure democratic development. Instead, he 
argued that democracy is a universal value and it does not necessarily require certain types of 
culture. Kim Daejung suggested two reasons. 
First, he argued that there have been some beliefs in orthodox which are coincident with 
democratic principles and we have to understand the democratic movements as its practices in 
long history of the principles. That is to say, the democratic movements in Asia are not results 
of western democracy’s influence but reflection of immanent values. This argument is rooted 
in a view that, if democratic principle is universal and common in the modern West, the idea 
would be found in the Non West too. 
In his argument, Kim Daejung cited Mencius’ saying in ancient China and explained its 
relations with Dong-hak movement which was a Korean peasant revolution in the end of 19th 
century. In the chapter named ‘Long before Locke’, he explained democratic ideals as follows;  
 
It is widely accepted that English political philosopher John Locke laid the foundation for 
modern democracy. According to Locke, sovereign rights reside with the people and, based on a 
contract with the people, leaders are given a mandate to govern, which the people can withdraw. 
But almost two millennia before Locke, Chinese philosopher Mencius preached similar ideas. 
According to his "Politics of Royal Ways," the king is the "Son of Heaven," and heaven bestowed 
on its son a mandate to provide good government, that is, to provide good for the people. If he did 
not govern righteously, the people had the right to rise up and overthrow his government in the name 
of heaven. A native religion of Korea, Dong-hak, went even further, advocating that "man is heaven" 
and that one must serve man as one does heaven. These ideas inspired and motivated nearly half a 
million peasants in 1894 to revolt against exploitation by feudalistic government internally and 
imperialistic forces externally. There are no ideas more fundamental to democracy than the 
teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Dong-hak. Clearly, Asia has democratic philosophies as 
profound as those of the West (Kim, 1994, p. 191). 
 
Second, the argument that democracy is unsuitable for Asian countries or incompatible 
with Asian culture is not true in reflection of history. He noted that there have been numerous 
democratic movements in most Asian countries. Those movements showed that the 
authoritarian leaders overlooked the historical factors. He said that if only we do not ignore 
those numerous democratic movements in Asia, we could not but face to the true that Asian 
culture has affinity with democracy. He said that 
 
the best proof that democracy can work in Asia is the fact that, despite the stubborn resistance 
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of authoritarian rulers like Lee [Kwan Yew], Asia has made great strides toward democracy. In fact, 
Asia has achieved the most remarkable record of democratization of any region since 1974. By 1990 
a majority of Asian countries were democracies, compared to a 45 per cent democratization rate 
worldwide. This achievement has been overshadowed by Asia's tremendous economic success (Kim, 
1994, p. 192). 56 
 
Kim Daejung’s argument is distinct from the arguments of Lee Kwan Yew and Daniel Bell. 
The former view does not provide enough plausible explanations of the reason why the 
maintenance of the cultural tradition is so important. In other words, the reason why culture is 
destiny is that culture is destiny. The later argument is either too modest or too ambitious. In 
contrast, Kim Daejung’s argument is a radical challenge to these two dominant but opposed 
views of the relationship between western culture and democracy. He said that we could find 
same ideas from the West and the East, and they are consistent with democracy. 
Including Kim Daejung’s position, if we see the relationship between Asian culture and 
democracy, there appear two different standpoints. Ironically, in this classification, the enemies 
are bound in one category. 
On the one hand, there is a negative and sceptical view. It consists of the two different ideas 
which are in fact opposed to each other. The first has been developed by modernization theorists 
such as Huntington, and the second by defenders of Asian authoritative leaders represented by 
Lee Kwan Yew. The former argues that Asian culture is not compatible with democracy so that 
a transplant of western culture is necessary for democratic development in Asia. The later also 
accept the Asian culture lacks affinity with democracy. Yet as long as culture is destiny, modern 
democracy developed in the West cannot be acceptable or possible in Asia. 
On the other hand, there is a positive view of the compatibility, and it consists of two 
different ideas as well. First, some theorists such as Bell do not think that western democracy 
and Asian culture cannot be harmonized either as a matter of political principle or as a matter 
of a functioning system. They propose ways of understanding democracy rooted in Asian 
tradition. Yet, it is not sure that the ways and goals suggested are consistent with basic 
conditions for political values which are regarded as necessary for legitimacy not by the western 
people but most people of the rest at all. Second, there seems a view that in Asian tradition we 
could discover some ideas and values which are compatible with democracy. Therefore, as Kim 
Daejung said, the ideas must be a great starting point and foundation of democratic development 
in Asian countries.  
In sum, in Asian value debate, there are four different views of the relationship between 
                                           
56 Interestingly, here, in order for supporting this argument, he refers to the data studied by Huntington (1991)’s 
The Third Wave. 
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democracy and culture in two categories of negative and positive:  
 
1) Negative  
a) Huntington: Westernization and modernization is necessary for democracy  
b) Lew Kwan Yew: Culture is destiny and it is prior to democracy 
 
2) Positive 
a) Bell: Meritocracy is a modern Asian [Chinese] type of democratic system and it is 
superior to western type of democracy 
b) Kim Daejung: Asian culture is compatible with democracy including western type 
 
Unfortunately, the intensity of the Asian value debate declined in late 1990s not because 
of any satisfactory academic resolution but as a result of economic change. As it occupied the 
attention thanks to the unexpected economic success, the downfall resulted from an economic 
crisis in 1997. An economist Paul Krugman (2006) has well described this dramatic declination 
that “Asian values began to lose currency after the Asian financial crisis weakened the 
economies of many Asian countries, leading to the collapse of the Suharto regime in Indonesia. 
Some consider these values to have contributed to the crisis. When the crisis spread worldwide, 
the blame subsided.” 
In fact, that was the weak point of Asian value debate particularly with the background of 
the discussion. That is to say, it was just an ex post facto report about the unpredicted (by 
western scholars) economic development in East Asia. In this sense, most arguments of Asian 
value debate have been casual explanations about the economic success.57 That is the reason 
why the debate has been declined so dramatically since Asian financial crisis in 1997. There 
was not enough consideration about plausible and theoretical demonstration. At least, the 
arguments for and against the relationship between Asian culture and economic growth still 
seem to be vulnerable at this point.58 
For this reason, the Asian value debate and the Asian values could not gain attention from 
economic scholars any longer. Instead, most western theorists turned their attention into other 
subjects such as global democracy or multiculturalism. It is deemed because the political 
                                           
57 One of the typical examples is the argument for a concept of ‘Confucian Labour Ethics’ named by David 
Aikman (1986, pp. 5-6). 
58 A Korean economist of Cambridge University, Chang (2007) argues that cultural change does not lead 
economic development, rather vice versa. He refers to the much of literature in modern ages in which the 
Germans and the Japanese had been described as lazy and untruthful people so that they could not achieve any 
economic development. He says that we could read a book about a relationship between African culture and 
economic growth when African countries make a rapid progress. 
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development of the non-western countries itself is not a serious issue to western societies. By 
contrast, global democracy is related to the security of the developed countries and 
multiculturalism is the very problem emerged throughout most western countries. In fact, there 
was no need for the most western theorists to study Asian value intensively. 
However, the debate has raised some important political questions in East Asian theorists. 
In fact, when Kim Daejung criticized Lee Kwan Yew and Huntington, he transferred the core 
issue of the debate from economy to politics. Economic crisis does not affect critically the 
questions about normative political conditions for legitimacy. Though the questions raised in 
Asian value debate have lost the attraction to western researchers, it explicitly has awaked a 
cohort of political theorists in Korea. They started to ask ‘what are Korean politics and political 
thought?’59 
 
 
2. Modernization theory and Its Critics 
 
A. Combination of Orientalism, modernization theory, and comparative political 
science 
 
Asian value debate is not a new discussion about the relationship among culture, 
development and democracy. It must be understood in a context of the meaning of 
modernization and westernization in the west. In politics, modernization theory explains that 
modern democracy is an invention of the West. In particular, three modern revolutions in 
England, America, and France since the 17th century have taken the initiative of modern 
democratization. Since the revolutions, certain phenomena such as the growth of the 
bourgeoisie, industrialization, capitalism, and modern society seem to be necessary condition 
of democracy. It has become a common idea that democratization must be associated with 
modernization, and it means no more than westernization. 
In fact, even before modernization theory, there had been a long term idea called 
Orientalism which is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between “the Orient” and (most of the time) “the Occident” (Said, 1977, pp. 
2-3). Edward Said, in his book Orientalism, unveiled how the West had distorted the features 
of the Orient in the prejudices. Thanks to modernization theory, however, its revisited version 
                                           
59 Since late 1990s, there have been numerous literatures about this subject in South Korea. It may be impossible 
to introduce them all here, but there is a clear argument that the Korean scholars should have their own then 
view in issue-raising and have to evaluate the external theories whether it is applicable to Korea or not before 
applying them into the researches. 
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of cultural explanation about democracy justified the under-development and failure of 
democracy as a destiny of non-modern and non-western countries.  
The propaganda of modernization theory immediately has been internalized among the 
non-western people themselves. As a result, there has been an internalized belief that there must 
be unavoidable contradictions between democracy and the non-western cultures. In the 
countries newly born After the Second World War, democracy and its development does not 
seem to be so successful in most cases, whether they genuinely successful or not. Most of all, 
it is so clear that the political practices of the countries look quite different from ways of the 
first modern democratic countries such as England, France, and America. 
In order to measure the gap, many comparative political scholars have suggested standards 
to evaluate degrees of democracy and democratization, and they have been accepted generally 
in political science. Ironically, those evaluations have encouraged both sides of the politics in 
non-western countries, the democrats and dictators and disappointed them at the same time as 
well. Sometimes it suggested relatively league table, but also occasionally has given many 
wrong information. Still, the political scientists make an effort to develop and amend the 
standards to improve the measures and results. In some senses, those efforts must be valuable 
and meaningful attempts to promote democracy in the World. What the problem is that the 
scientists rarely ask what kind of democracy is. It may be because the question is deemed too 
silly since Fukuyama declared that history is end with the victory of liberal democracy.60 
Theoretically, most comparative political researches might have no intention to provide 
ultimate standards and criteria on basis of fairness and common views or on behalf of the people 
all over the world. Many political scientists would say that they merely try to work out the 
empirical conditions for democracy. Certainly, throughout the 20th century, there have been also 
many theoretical studies about the fundamental issues and history of liberal representative 
democracy in the West. In contrast, most analyses which treat its application or dependent 
development of democracy in developing countries obviously belong to comparative Politics. 
In sum, first, there was an idea of Orientalism. Although Edward Said unveiled its entity, 
another idea which is better theorized than Orientalism but based on similar views appeared, 
namely modernization theory. Finally, modern comparative politics established many 
qualitative and quantitative indexes to measure the gap of difference between the West and the 
rest. 
As a result, modern political studies seem to imply a strong tacit assumption that there is a 
single development path to democracy, precisely to western type liberal democracy. The 
                                           
60 His view has been slightly changed since Iraq War as seen in After the Neocons (Fukuyama, 2006). However, 
it is clear that his concern has exclusively been about the spread of liberal democracy necessarily involved with 
US’s foreign policies in the world. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
５９ 
 
academic tendency that theoretical researches mainly treat of western democracy and many 
comparative researches tend to pay attention to the rest itself reveals that there is a tacit 
presumption of single way to better politics. That is to say, there is already a model of 
democracy and it has been developed in the West first. Then, the mission left is only its adoption 
to the rest of the world. The fact that most standards of the comparative political science have 
been established on basis of comparison of political differences between the West and the rest 
shows that there is a solid prejudice of singular way of political development. In this 
comparison, frequently the present of the West is supposed a destiny or goal of the rest. And 
this combination of Orientalism, modernization theory and modern comparative theory seem 
to have dominated from the earlier modern period to present day. 
 
B. Economic and political critics based on practical studies of colonization, dependent 
development, and democratic betrayal 
 
Nevertheless, it will be worth to reflect the arguments of the dominated side as long as if 
this issue is deemed still controversial at least in the Non West. Like the background of 
modernization theory and political democracy, the objection first was emerged from economic 
study such as ‘World System Theory’, and ‘Dependency theory.’ In addition, many critical 
historical studies inspired from the perspective of Fernand Braudel (1984) and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1974) followed in a standing point against the Eurocentric or Euro-exceptional 
view of capitalist development (Frank, 1995). For instance, Abu-Lugghod (1989) described a 
13th century Eurasian world system Before European Hegemony and Chaudhuri (1990) 
analysed world economic history from distinctive view in Asia Before Europe (Frank, 1995, p. 
163). Presumably, it may be Wallerstein’s saying that explains most clearly the view against 
modernization theory. 
 
… many of these [previous] historical systems had what we might call proto-capitalist elements. 
… It is of course a matter of degree (Wallerstein, 1992, p. 587, 575).  
 
In other words, there is no such a thing as ‘European Exceptionalism’ even in capitalist 
economic development. 
Frank (1995), who had examined this agenda for many years, says that the implication of 
the past unexceptionality of Europe or of the West is that development today and tomorrow - 
for example, in East Asia - need and perhaps should not copy Western ways. He emphasized 
that one’s development is a function of one’s shifting place and changing role in the world 
economy system rather than of a particular Western way of doing things (Frank, 1995, p, 186). 
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According to this theory, despite an admission to the world economic system and interchange 
with wealthy western countries, the developing countries hardly escape from the positions of 
poor dependent partners. They need their own ways or alternative strategy free from the 
dependent relationship. 
Second, in term of the political relationship between the developed democratic western 
countries and the under-developed undemocratic non-western countries, there is crucial and 
paradigmatic explanation that the West has a severe responsibility of the underdevelopment of 
the rest directly and continuously. One of these theories is ‘over-developed state theory’ 
addressed by Pakistan political theorist Hamza Alavi (1972). He claims that it is authoritarian 
superstructure of political and administrative institutions as a legacy of colonization and relative 
under-development of civil society that caused underdevelopment of democracy in the Non 
West. In the examples of Pakistan and Bangladesh, he argues that military-bureaucratic 
oligarchy has become a phenomenon in post-colonial societies, but it is a result of coercive 
super structure of state relatively too massive to oppress the protest movement in colonial 
periods. 
According to this explanation, the reason of frequent appearances of authoritarian 
governments in non-western countries is not because of their indigenous culture but rather due 
to western colonial governance and its legacy. It is clear that the colonial period was a time of 
westernization and modernization in the countries, but modernization and westernization did 
not bring democratization. Even after independence, the colonial legacy has influenced for 
democratization for a long time. In those situations, regardless of the cultural character, the 
developed countries have no chance to be democratic and legitimate. In other words, even if 
the culture has no affinities to democracy at all, it cannot be proved at this stage. Therefore, 
there is a need to premise that modernization and westernization are not deemed as main 
independent variables in the Non West. There could be more decisive elements. This explains 
why some democratic researchers in the Non West are interested in national movements in the 
colonial period to find out the initiative of democratization instead of westernization. 
Third, the economic counter arguments provide one plausible explanation the under-
development of democracy in those dependent countries and it motivated political counter 
argument. In political aspects, most of all, most wealthy countries have not been interested in 
establishing democratic systems in the dependent partners throughout the modern history. In 
fact, they would not mind any kinds of regime only if the government is helpful for their own 
prosperity. Moreover, often they disturbed democratic transition or even supported oppressive 
dictatorial governments on account of political and economic reasons. As a result, in many post-
colonial developing countries, there remain certain types of coercive and undemocratic regimes. 
Even if it is not the case of colonization, because of the economic condition of dependent 
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development and the enjoyable political situation of authoritarian regimes, there have been 
close relationship between the non-democratic governments of the Non West and democratic 
regimes in the West since the Second World War. O’Donnell (1986) theorized it as ‘Bureaucratic 
Authoritarianism’.61 
Recently, a Korean economist at Cambridge University, Chang Hajoon (2007) has 
supported this argument more generally criticizing Neo-liberalism in his book, Bad Samaritans: 
The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism. In a section entitled ‘When 
democracies undermine democracy’, he argues that democratic countries try to depoliticize the 
economy of the under-developed countries, and it undermines democracy of the under-
developed countries. He says that the consequence has been particularly damaging in 
developing countries, where the Bad Samaritans (wealthy western countries) have been able to 
push through ‘anti-democratic’ actions well beyond what would be acceptable in rich countries 
(Chang, 2007, pp. 174-7). In political term, this can be called as ‘democratic betrayal’. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Asian value debate was raised in earlier 1990s and disappeared in ten years. However, it left a 
legacy of the diverse views about the Asian culture and democracy. Huntington argued that the 
Asian countries should change their culture for more development and democracy. Lee Kwan Yew 
denied this argument directly, arguing instead that culture is more important than democracy. He 
even said that Asian type of democracy is superior to western liberal democracy in many ways. 
Bell also supported this view by the concept of Meritocracy. According to them, this merit basis 
system is better government than democracy. 
When there were clear conflicts between western and eastern values, the former South Korea’s 
President Kim Daejung suggested an alternative way. Namely that Asian values are not in conflict 
with democracy. In addition, he argued that Asian tradition and political thought has enough 
affinities with democracy in both principle and practices. 
In fact, this Asian value debate is rooted in a long controversy with modernization and 
westernization. Asian value debate is well understood in this context. Unlike the prejudice, the 
counter-arguments to modernization theory have suggested not cultural relativism but practical 
evidences how the modernization and westernization is not helpful for economic and political 
development. This thesis would also take this approach. It does not rely on cultural relativism, but 
                                           
61 This relationship could be easily understood in a Franklin Roosevelt’s famous comment on the Nicaragua’s 
dictator, Anastasio Somoza. “He may be a son of a bitch, but he is our son of a bitch” (Chang, 2007, p. 171). 
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instead, following President Kim’s view, it argues that democratic development in a genuine sense 
is not possible without culture due to the nature of political legitimacy. 
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Ch4. Representation, Authority, and 
Equality 
 
1. Introduction 
 
It is often alleged that there are serious deficits of democratic legitimacy in traditional political 
thought in East Asia, in particular Confucianism. First, it is said to be authoritarian in a way that is 
incompatible with some fundamental assumptions in modern politics. Second, since Confucian 
thought defends minority government by educated gentlemen rather than the majority of ordinary 
people, it is incompatible with democracy. This criticism is strengthened by the claim that 
Confucian systems of political roles lack extensive political participation. Third, Confucian 
government tends to depend on the virtue of the small number of people who actually rule not on 
the virtue of the people as a whole. All these principles seem to be unacceptable in modern 
democracy. 
These doubts are problems connected with legitimacy, democracy, and cultural diversity. If 
these doubts can be maintained, these deficiencies are plausible enough for Confucianism to be 
denied as a source of legitimacy in modern democracy, and East Asian politics should find 
alternative resources of legitimacy. However, this thesis argues that those deficits originate from a 
misunderstanding not just of Confucianism and but also of modern democracy. 
This chapter aims to examine representation in relation to legitimacy, democracy and cultural 
diversity. It consists of four conceptual analyses, and arguments based on the analyses. First, this 
will argue that representation is necessary in relationship between legitimacy and democracy in 
modern politics in general and especially outside the West. Second, the concept of mandate is the 
key to a specific authorization in representative politics in the sense that it is the basis of the idea 
of limited government according to the normative relationship between the representative and the 
represented. That is to say, mandate is a particular form of authorization which has a special binding 
force in a normative sense that confers legitimate representative government by virtue of a certain 
belief-system. Third, in this relationship, the idea of a qualified representative in the traditional 
thought of East Asia, Confucianism is not incompatible with modern representative democracy. If 
we understand both Confucian representative theory and modern representative democracy 
correctly, it can be seen that the principle of the Confucian representative is compatible with modern 
representative democracy. From these arguments, finally, the ultimate goal of the chapter is to open 
the door for Confucianism to be an eligible candidate of sources of legitimacy in East Asian 
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democracy. 
This chapter will discuss three specific relationships particularly; Confucianism and democracy, 
democracy and representation, and finally political authority and equality. These are not parallel 
but a series of conceptual analyses. However, representation is the key through the whole chapter. 
It consists of three stages. First, some methodological and specific reasons will be drawn of why 
this thesis takes the concept of representation as the important theme in understanding of democracy 
in relation to Confucianism and legitimacy. In this part, different approaches in the study of 
Confucianism, democracy and representation will be examined and an alternative one will be 
suggested. Second, while this chapter traces the various aspects of representation, it focuses on 
some problematic and essential elements in the conceptual development of representation, mandate 
and the virtue of a representative. Finally, a deeper and radical conceptual analysis will follow about 
representative democracy in reference to political authority and equality between the West and the 
Confucian East. 
 
 
2. Representation, Democracy and Legitimacy 
  
In the review of political legitimacy in the previous chapter, it has been revealed that every 
government needs to secure legitimacy. It is a political issue that has existed not just in the modern 
world but through the whole history of government. Sources of legitimation, its ways of operation, 
and substantive values mainly depend on the form of life which formulates belief-systems. 
At the same time in the modern world, legitimacy takes the form of democratic government. 
Democracy is the only game in contemporary politics. If there is a necessary and plausible 
relationship between legitimacy and democracy, the next question is what kind of democracy is 
necessary for legitimacy. In the modern world, there seem to be some necessary conditions for 
political legitimacy such as liberty, equality, and human rights. Accordingly, if we consider these 
values in democracy, there may be some candidates such as liberal democracy, republican 
democracy, and social democracy. Representation seems not to belong those necessary political 
values of legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, this thesis will take representation as a main theme. Here, democracy is defined 
as a system where representation is necessarily involved. This research would argue that good 
representation is a necessary condition and only a possible feature of good politics in modern 
democracy. First, theoretically representative democracy is the conceptual linking point in which 
the different political theorists who identify democracy in different ways meet together.62 Second, 
                                           
62 It is not only important in general but also severe in this research that deals with non-western democracy. It is 
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present day legitimate democracies are representative democracies. In other words, this is a matter 
of presence. In addition, representation is a particularly crucial concept to examine and understand 
the democracy legitimacy in Confucian East Asia in many ways. 
 
A. Representative democracy 
 
In any study about democracy, the question to be examined first may be that what kind or 
what level of democracy would be appropriate in the study. This question is particularly 
important because this research aims to examine the relationship between democratic 
legitimacy and political culture. That is to say, the whole research could be alternated by the 
conceptual limitation of democracy. Accordingly, this is not just a matter of defining or limiting 
the meanings of democracy for efficiency but the substance of the thesis. 
In this research, I suppose that democracy is political contestation on a broad basis of the 
representation of interests or opinions of the citizens. Conceptually it can be called ‘contestation 
open to participation’ (Dahl, 1971; Przeworski, 1991, p. 10), and namely representative 
democracy.63 
In democracy, the very basic categorization about defining democracy may be the 
distinction of the minimalist and non-minimalist view.64 On the one hand, there seems an 
understanding that competition to get support from voters is a necessary and sufficient condition. 
On the other hand, others argue that democracy must correspond to meaningful participation. 
These different conceptions of democracy could arouse different views of democracy. 
Przeworski clarified this difference into contestationist and participationist views. He 
identified the former as analytical and the latter normative. In this distinction, he concludes that 
except for South Africa, broad restrictions of political rights are inconceivable under present 
conditions so that a focus on contestation is sufficient to study the current transition to 
democracy. This is a minimalist conception of democracy (Przeworski, 1991, 1999). 
According to the minimalist view, in order to achieve democracy, one of the decisive 
                                           
because this positive view provides a conceptual foundation on which non-liberal or non-western types of 
democracy could be legitimate easily if only it is within the concept of representative democracy. This will be 
drawn out fully in later dealing with its particular grounds. 
63 It is not only a plausible understanding of representative democracy but also applicable to deliberative 
democracy. Insofar as deliberation as a space where different ideas are contested to be chosen, compromised, or 
which stimulate some alternative determinations, deliberative democracy is a good model of democracy based 
on this principle, contestation open to participation. 
64 Arendt Lijphart (1999, p. 2) suggests a similar distinction between a majoritarian model and a consensual 
model. There must be more diverse classifications by David Owen (2003). He suggests five different 
conceptions of contemporary democracies; minimalist view of democracy, interest-aggregating model, 
deliberative model, contestatory democracy, and globalization democracy. However, as he says, the basic 
division of understanding of contemporary democracies still lies between the minimalist view and the others. 
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conditions for legitimate democracy is politicians’ competition for votes as the principle of 
competition in a market. It is not a limited but an efficient representation in the view. There 
must be governmental outputs of policies as an exchange for votes. This competition-based 
representation is also supported by party politics where ideally parties challenge each other to 
get power by suggesting and performing good policies. In a word, this is an institutionalized 
political market system. In theory, this is an idea which Schumpter (1942) modifies classical 
democracy in a market price competition and Przeworski (1991, 1999) adapts in comparative 
political studies (Shapiro and Hacker-Cordon, 1999). This view seems to have become one of 
the most popular conceptions in political science particularly in comparative politics. 
Nevertheless, this research may not be satisfied with this minimalist view since it does not 
aim to analyse particularly a theory on the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. To 
be precise, this research does not take a minimalist conception because it concerns a normative 
theory of democracy too. This research focuses on normative characteristics of the relationship 
between legitimacy and cultural diversity. Therefore, though the contestationist view can be a 
necessary condition of democracy in some senses, it may not be fully sufficient in a normative 
understanding of democracy. 
There must be a traditional view of representative democracy that is distinctive from the 
minimalist in the West too. This view anticipates more active participation of the people in a 
decision-making procedure. In theory, Rousseau may be the strongest protagonist of a radical 
concept of democracy in his idea of ‘general will’. As a representative-embedded system, a 
state can be seen as an ancient Athens model where most citizens have an equal right to govern 
by lot or by turns as a representative. In modern democracy, this idea has promoted ideas of 
universal suffrage, regular election, is and more deeply related to the issue of substantive 
political equality including the influence of economic, social and classical conditions. 
In Rousseau’s and in Athenian understanding, the principle of democracy is equal 
participation and self-rule. There is almost nothing about competition. According to this view, 
unlike the market system, democratic participation is decisive for achieving representative 
democracy. The representative body should be a miniature of all those represented. This view 
of representative democracy has become the ground of important arguments of the character of 
a representative that the representative should have some similarity with the represented. 
In fact, there is a deeper conceptual gap about human nature in relation to politics. While 
the contestationist view supposes negative attitudes and desires of human beings as members 
of a political community in terms of public decision-making procedure, the positive view is a 
distinctive argument in the sense that it assumes that there is a strong motivation of participation 
in political procedure. For example, from this view, Aristotle suggests a form of mixed 
government opposed to Plato’s philosopher king’s government. Although he was not a thinker 
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who advocated democracy, it may be true that he reckoned that the democratic passion of the 
people is hardly reversible. John Dunn (1999, 2005) supports the claim by historical approach, 
and Hanna Pitkin (1981) argues political participation provides a person self-realization,65 and 
Robert Dahl (2006) shows the strong human desire for the achievement of political equality. 
However, this participationist view based on maximizing an equal right to participate is 
also not appropriate in this research. If the participationist view is accepted fully, it will be so 
hard to find a legitimate government in the present world. Therefore, the real features of 
democracy of in contemporary politics must be between the extremes. In this sense, Dahl 
confesses that 
 
although the political institutions of actual democracies may be necessary in order for a political 
system to attain a relatively high level of democracy, they may not be, indeed almost certainly will 
not be, sufficient to achieve anything like perfect to ideal (Dahl, 2006, pp. 10). 
 
In effect, in concept and conceptions of democracy there are different views such as 
minimalist and beyond minimalist views and a set of inconsistent elements such as contestation 
and participation. Nevertheless, it is also true that those different views and conceptions are 
essential and legitimate to some extent. The conflicts seem to be inevitable in the actual features 
of democracy. This ‘self-contradiction’ demands a conceptual appropriateness of democracy in 
a legitimacy study, and the concept of representative democracy as a system of contestation 
open to participation is a meeting point of different views of democracy. This is the first 
argument for representation study between democracy and legitimacy. 
Representative democracy contains both the minimalist and the beyond minimalist views 
of democracy. Also, it embraces diverse or even conflicting elements of modern politics in both 
principle and practice. In this sense, representative democracy may be the theoretically 
comprehensive and practically appropriate concept in a study of the relationship between 
legitimacy and culture. 
 
B. Representation has a key role as a standard of judgment of democratic legitimacy  
 
It may be true that representative democracy is not just a popular but also a legitimate 
political system in contemporary politics. Though democracy becomes the only game in politics, 
there are few countries where institutions of direct democracy have been operated as their main 
                                           
65 This is an argument in the sense of Marx’s maxim that the identity of a person is determined by his relation to 
society (Kang, 1997, p. 187), and more fundamentally Aristotle’s that all human beings have telos and it only 
can be accomplished sufficiently in community. 
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political system and practice. In this situation, in democratic theory, particularly in comparative 
politics, representative factors have been understood as the standard of legitimate democracy 
in government in many cases. 
There are, of course, certain particular institutions deemed as factors of direct democracy 
such as referendum, recall, and initiative. However, in most democratic countries those 
institutions are merely complementary means for amendment of the weakness of representation 
from the perspective of democracy in some exceptional circumstances. In effect, direct 
democracy is nominal.66  In addition, in recent days, there will not be the reverse of change 
from representative democracy to direct democracy (Beyme, 2011, pp. 68-70). In this sense, it 
can be said that representative democracy becomes a form of legitimate government. In modern 
politics, representation shapes democracy. 
For the present, representation is regarded as one of the most suitable ways to understand 
the diversity of democratic legitimacy in the Non West. When we talk about democratic 
legitimacy, we should consider not just its conceptual definition in general but also its 
institutional characters. In addition, in most cases, this institutional diversity originates from 
the variety of representative systems. This priority of representation appears more expressively 
in the Non West because the legitimacy of democracies of these regions rest on an institutional 
foundation rather than a normative one compared to the West. For this reason, when a 
democratic study is being carried out in non-western countries, in many cases, the research may 
focus on representative systems in general rather than the deeper implications of the democratic 
representation in the countries. 
In fact, there have been controversial points with its diversity of representative institutions. 
Its varied institutions and different ways of operation are sometimes beyond our common sense 
in the daily politics around us. In terms of this characteristic of diversity, it is needless to say 
how many different institutions are established and operated in many contemporary democratic 
countries, and they are all called representative democracy in legitimate senses.67 
Even in the West, for example, it may be impossible to say that the British parliamentary 
                                           
66 Recently, there have appeared some arguments for radical embracement of direct democratic means such as 
electronic voting thanks to the development of network technology. But it would not be done so easily not 
because of practical but theoretical difficulties. See Robert F. Wolff (1998)’s In Defense of Anarchism, 
particularly pp. 34-6. 
67 Lijphart (1999)’s Patterns of Democracy is a one of the most useful works to understand its practical variety. 
For theoretical diversity, see Pitkin (1967), Bogdanor (ed. 1985), Manin (1997), Urbinati (2006), Weale (2007, 
pp. 132-154) and many other theoretical comparative studies in which political institutions, party systems, and 
elections and voting systems in different countries are drawn. For example, as a microscopic observation implies 
massive diversity, Albert Weale (2007, pp. 6-13) deals with the matter of compulsory voting in representation 
and its various principles and practices in terms of two conflict views of participation and equality and the ideal 
of individual freedom. Diversity not just in institutions but also in ideas about representation can be found in all 
developed democratic western countries. 
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system is more democratic than the American federal presidential system. For another example, 
we also could not say that the two round system of a French presidential election is a better 
electoral system than the British first past the post system. Furthermore, it is sure that all these 
systems are undoubtedly legitimate liberal democracy, theoretically, and practically. In this 
sense, there is a diversity or clear relativism in representative political system within democracy. 
In addition, there have been theoretical debates and political propaganda whether the 
present systems are democratic enough or whether there is a need for change. In 2004, there 
were serious debates about the American federal election for president due to the controversy 
in Florida State. In the UK, there was a referendum about a change in the election system in 
2011. The two-round system is often regarded as a system where the will of the people tends 
to be reflected more democratically than in the first past the post system. In addition, it is also 
clear that those different institutions would not be changed easily and shortly. Certain 
institutions are tied up with the people’s mind and preference. That is the reason why we will 
not or cannot regard a country that has an alternative vote system as more democratic than the 
UK even though the UK decided to change its system to an alternative vote system.68 Here is 
an obvious diversity of electoral systems. 
This diverse institutional character between representation and democracy implies that 
there is a connection of legitimacy based on people’s beliefs and political culture. If we 
appropriately analyse the diverse character in representation and its connection to democracy 
and political culture, it could be a clue to explain the relationship between cultural diversity 
and political legitimacy. 
This diversity immediately involves a methodological issue in the study of democratic 
legitimacy. This issue is related to contemporary political science in general and particularly to 
comparative researches. Because of the condition that direct democracy is not adopted in 
political systems and practice broadly, fair representation is generally understood as the 
standard to judge whether the democracy is successful in terms of legitimacy. It may not be 
necessary to say that many comparative and empirical researches which aim to examine the 
degree of democracy in each country have focused on representative factors such as regular 
elections, procedural fairness in elections, and an impartial representative system. 
For example, the repeated peaceful change of regimes by election has been regarded as an 
important indicator of democratic development by comparative researchers.69 In general, when 
                                           
68 The Irish single transferable vote system is a proportional version of the alternative vote system, and Ireland 
has kept this system for more than 80 years. Generally, it is regarded as more democratic than many other 
simple electoral systems. But we do not put the country as the top democratic country only because of this 
reason. 
69 Robert Dahl (2000) understands that a country’s democracy has passed a critical stage of crisis when there is 
the second exchange of regimes by election. 
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we are discussing the degree of legitimacy in a country, first we tend to look at the degree of 
democracy through by the fairness and stability of the representative institution and its exercise 
than other values such as economic development and social welfare. When we talk about the 
degree or quality of democracy, the question is immediately switched over to what kind of 
representative institution has been established in the country and how it works. All the factors 
about representation such as inclusive suffrage, regularity of elections, multi-party systems and 
their practical applications have become the most important standards for democracy. For 
instance, when we classify democracy into formal and informal dimensions, while fair and 
meaningful representation occupies a decisive part of the former, broader deliberation in a 
representative body and the responsiveness of the representative government would be also 
main issues of the legitimacy of democracy. 
In sum, this thesis takes representation as its main subject of research for the relationship 
between legitimacy and democracy with for three reasons. First, legitimate democracy is only 
possible in a form of representation in the modern world. Second, the conceptual combination 
of representation and democracy is generally understood as a neutral and common definition in 
different views of legitimate democracies. Third, in an academic view, representative factors 
have been used as a standard in evaluating democracy in modern comparative politics and this 
can confer neutrality or fairness of judgment of democratic legitimacy in relation to cultural 
diversity. 
 
 
3. The Concept of Representation 
 
A. The concept of representation in the West: it means ‘to act on behalf of some 
other(s)’ and has developed from the symbolic to the substantive and from standing 
for to acting for 
 
There have been numerous conceptual analyses of representation or representative 
democracy. Yet, it may be true that most of them focus on democracy rather than representation. 
However, as seen before, democracy is also just one of the necessary conditions for legitimacy 
and it is impossible to have a legitimate representative regime without democracy. Therefore, 
though representation needs democracy to be legitimate in modern politics, it seems to 
worthwhile examining representation free from democracy in order to apprehend the concept 
of representation radically.  
Most cases of all democratic government appeared at a much later stage in political history 
than in ancient Athens. The conceptual gap of the two ideas is actually caused by the time gap. 
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Accordingly, one of the best ways to learn representation free from democracy is to see the 
word in history before democracy.70 In fact, this approach is coincident with not just the 
historical scenes of the relationship between democracy and representation but also the nature 
of representation. Birch explains this characteristics of representation that 
 
the nature of political representation is a complex matter which cannot be understood by 
formulating a definition, but only by examining the debates about representation that have taken 
place in various historical situations (Birch, 1972, p. 21). 
 
Accordingly, in order to understand the gradual change of the concept in the realms of 
agency and political activity, it is also necessary to understand the historical development of 
institutions and the thinking behind them (Pitkin, 1967, p. 4). In other words, like many other 
conceptual analyses, the study of the concept of representation needs practical examination in 
history first, then, the meaning of the concept will be revealed. 
The development of the concept of representation in the West can be summarized in two 
categories; the changes of the context from the religious to the political, and the conceptual 
conversion from ‘standing for’ to ‘acting for’ in the political. 
There is a broad agreement that the idea of modern representation originates from the 
Christian tradition in the Middle Ages.71 When the Pope is often said to represent the people 
of Christ, the word had acquired a meaning in which a kind of mystical embodiment applied 
to the Christian community in the sense of ‘standing for.’72 In 1509, according to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, when the word ‘represent’ implies a symbolic ‘standing for’ conception, 
it was still a religious medieval and mystical concept (Pitkin, 1967, p. 241-4). 
The religious conception had been extended to the political context. It was in the 16th 
century in which some particular peoples had appeared in the sense that they had been regarded 
as ‘standing for’ their communities (Finer, 1999, pp. 1029-1031).73 In England, this political 
conception had become consolidated during the period of Civil War of the 17th century with 
recognition of the importance of Parliament as a political representative body.74 In this change 
                                           
70 Most of this section almost entirely depends on Pitkin (1967) and Finer (1999). 
71 Before the Middle Ages, though some say that in Roman law, there might be a notion that the prince or 
emperor acts for the Roman people, standing in their place, looking after their welfare, it is clear that the Roman 
notion has no influence on the word ‘representation’ (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 241-2). 
72 Even the notion of election has been stimulated from the origin of the church hierarchy in which, for example, 
the bishops were elected by their congregations. It is noticeable that the Pope himself was elected by the chapter 
and the congregation of Rome (Finer, 1999, p. 1031). 
73 Finer illustrates this that ‘the range of those who were to give aid, counsel, and consent to the Crown had 
widened from military magnates to proxies of the new sectors such as towns, counties, and shires’ (Finer, 1999, 
pp. 1030). 
74 It is understandable that the Parliament was symbolized or mystically embodied with the nation itself in the 
idea of king-in-Parliament because the medieval kingship was literally recognized as the church in Christ or in 
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from the religious to the political, ‘represent’ and various related words became political terms 
(Pitkin, 1967, pp. 246-7).75 Yet, it is clear that the concept of representation still had been 
restrained within a ‘standing for’ conception. 
There has been another conceptual conversion from ‘standing for’ to ‘acting for’ within the 
political realm. Since the 17th century, this change had been forced by the development of the 
parliamentary system. In this period, clearly there was a transfer of the right to rule from the 
absolute power of the king to the limited government controlled by the representatives of the 
people. Without the consent of the members of Parliament who represented the opinion and 
interests of the people, the government could not wield legitimate power. In other words, at 
the time when Parliament replaced the position of the king as a genuine ruler, representative 
and legislator, ‘representation’ began to secure the idea of ‘acting for.’76 
This political development of the concept of Parliament in terms of representative 
government can be understood in a set of three steps. First, the term ‘represent’ was applied to 
the Parliament as an image of the whole nation. Second, once Parliament was regarded as the 
representative body of the whole kingdom, the application was expanded to individual 
members. Finally, the individual members’ behaviour came to be called ‘represent’ only when 
they were thought to be ‘acting for’ the represented. 
In this set of three stages, Pitkin infers two significant conceptions of representation are 
already repeatedly mentioned. The first and general conception of representation is obviously 
‘standing for’. Then, the ‘acting for’ conception has been developed in the demands of the 
represented.77 The first stage of ‘standing for’ was abstract, mystical and symbolic, and slowly 
but surely it became more practical due to the practice of the representatives and the claims of 
the represented from the 13th century to the 17th century. As a result, through this development, 
an idea had appeared that representation should correspond to the opinions and interests of 
those who are represented, and members of Parliament and Parliament itself can be legitimate 
as a body of representatives only when they act for the people. 
From this development of the concept of representation, three simple important elements 
of representation can be inferred. First, thanks to the meaning of ‘re’, it premises a subject 
                                           
the Pope (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 246-7). 
75 In 1583, in work of Sir Thomas Smith, he uses only once but crucially that “the Parliament of Englande, 
which representeth and hath the power of the whole realme.” Twelve years after Smith’s usage, the first instance 
in the Oxford English Dictionary of application of ‘represent’ emerged in 1595 (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 246-7). 
76 It was Thomas Hobbes who called a sovereign legislature ‘a representative’ and that was the turning point that 
‘acting for’ emerged from the mystic and symbolic ‘standing for’. Until 1651, there was no one who talks about 
democratic or any responsibility to the people or about duty of acting for the people as an agent who represents 
his client (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 248-252). 
77 In the dictionary, there are many possible ‘standing for’, but I would like to limit the term within political 
representation. For general understanding of representation, see Jen Webb’s (2009) Understanding 
Representation. 
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which represents the represented. It means that there is an actor or a group of actors who do 
represent the represented. Second, there are some objects to be represented whether it is 
interest, will, sovereignty or anything. Third, not only for descriptive representation but also 
for substantive representation, a representative or representative body needs to be not just 
standing for but also acting for the represented. In this framework, six elements make up the 
concept of political representation - authorization, accountability, substantive, descriptive, and 
symbolic representation, and responsiveness (Weale, 2007; Pitkin, 1967). Of course, not all 
political representations is limited to the six conditions, and also there are many different ideas 
in which theorists emphasize certain elements more than others. That is the cause of the 
diversity of conceptions of representation (Weale, 2007, pp. 132-6). 
Another important conceptual issue of representation in modern politics is its relationship 
with democracy. As seen in the beginning of this chapter, the concept of representative 
democracy, the two political concepts, representation and democracy consist of the foundation 
of legitimacy in modern politics. In modern politics, in most cases, representation is the only 
legitimate form of democratic governments. While representation seems to conflict with 
democracy in principle in the sense that in the system not all the people participate in decision-
making procedure and the representatives are required some sort of competence, it has been 
accepted as reasonable in modern representative democracy by the people. 
Surely, these conflict and linking show the characteristics of double-sidedness of 
representation and this double-sidedness emerges from the conceptual nature of representation 
in politics; representation of people’s interests and will. In modern politics, there should be a 
strong tradition of understanding of representation as ‘representing people’s will’ in dominant 
influence of democratic revolution. Although it has not been so strong in real history and in 
republican theory and constitutions of modern democratic states, it seems clear that the thing 
should be represented is the concept of Rousseau, general will or will of people. Without this 
view, any representation cannot acquire democratic legitimacy. Representation of will has been 
recognised as a necessary condition for the representation to be legitimate democratically. In 
this representation, the will should be represented equally among the people. Accordingly, equal 
representation of the will of the people appears essence of democratic legitimacy in modern 
representative democracy. 
However, while representation of will seems to be the intrinsic element in democratic 
principle of equality, representation of people’s interests is also important in democracy. 
According to the Utilitarian view and J. S. Mill and Sieyes’ argument for good government, the 
ultimate goal of good politics is welfare of the people. Whether it can be identified as individual 
or common interests, or social development for increase of welfare, it seems true that 
democratic principles such as equal participation or self-rule are not the final goals of the 
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theorists. Although democracy has intrinsic values and should be an important foundation of 
good government, it does not satisfy sufficient condition. For these theorists, democracy and 
representation are both necessary conditions for good politics, and the results of the politics 
provide the sufficient reasons for good government. In this sense, the representation of interests 
is distinctive from the representation of will thought they are closely connected in the Utilitarian 
view and many democratic theories. While the former is mainly about the outcome, the latter 
is primarily about the procedure. For this reason, Mill and Sieyes accepted that the preservation 
of people’s interests cannot be guaranteed only by the participation of the people themselves. 
Many fore-fathers of American Revolution had been anxious that representation of will could 
not representation of interests. Some elements such as enlightenment, self-realisation, and 
competence are required as necessary conditions of good representation and these factors are 
also claimed by the dominant theorists of modern representative democracy. 
As a result, though there are clearly different two principles of representation and they are 
not identical but often contradictable in process of decision-making and its consequence as seen 
in history, not one of them can be abandoned in representative democracy in reference to 
legitimacy. There is an ambiguity of concept of representation between what should be 
represented in representation as a political system in relationship with democratic legitimacy. 
The democratic decision-making needs two different elements of legitimacy, democratic justice 
in procedure and good decisions for the people. Actually, this is the linking point where modern 
representation meets democracy legitimately.78 
In conclusion, the development of the meanings in Western history shows the clear progress 
of the concept of political representation. First, representation means ‘to act on behalf of some 
other(s) (Nordlinger, 1968, p. 109; Sobolewski, 1968, p. 95; Birch, 1972, p. 15)’ in any sense 
from the Middle Ages. Second, the meanings have changed from the symbolic and abstract to 
the substantive and concrete. Third, conceptually, the change was a movement from ‘standing 
for’ to ‘acting for’ in the relationship between the representative and the represented. Finally, 
in modern representation, there is a conceptual ambiguity of the object of representation 
between will and interests of people. On the one hand, it seems the origin of the problems 
emerged representation democracy, on the other hand, that is the point where the principles of 
representation and democracy meet together. 
Yet, there still remain questions. In the concept of representation, what makes 
representation? What is the empirical and normative foundation of political representation? 
What brought out the changes and developments of the meanings of representation in history? 
                                           
78 According to this view of representative democracy, this thesis will argue that Confucian representative theory 
in which only good people should be good representatives is not in conflict with modern representative democracy. 
See later part of this chapter. 
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In what kind of frame has the meaning been progressed? 
 
B. The concept of mandate: certain human activities by which some people are granted 
power to govern others by reference to a belief-system 
 
In order for a representative government to be a legitimate regime, it should satisfy some 
conditions. Yet, the conditions that this research bears on are not such thing as election, 
representative constitution or even equal and substantive participation. Surely, they consist of 
major issues of modern representative politics in many political associations. However, they 
are only involved with features of democracy or representation, not its ground. They cannot be 
equivalent to the political legitimacy of representation particularly at the level of source. Here 
I am inclined to suggest the most fundamental resource of legitimacy of political representation. 
It is mandate. 
Mandate is assumed in this research as a certain type of form which grants authority in a 
representative system. This assumption is related to two aspects of representation; on the one 
side with the procedure of authorization, on the other side to the actions of representing.  More 
precisely, it lies in between them because the authorization procedure determines the guide 
lines of the representing. It is also because this procedure of political mandate necessarily 
requires certain conditions. In effect, the mandate binds the representing activities.  
Mandate is distinctive from representation, authority, and even politics while it is surely a 
part of representation or politics. Insofar as representation is considered as a political system 
of government, there should be some procedures for transferring the right or power to rule from 
the represented to the representative. This procedure of granting produces in general political 
authority in a representative system. 
As some representations do not need to be authorized or accountable to the represented 
(Weale, 2007, 133), not all authorization may need mandate. It can be seen in both theory and 
practice. Though it is clear that Hobbesian sovereignty has a representative authority in both 
conceptions of ‘standing for’ and ‘acting for’, there is no plausible procedure of mandate. Pitkin 
(1967) does not accept the Hobbesian sovereign as a representative of the people because there 
is no procedure to remove the ruler based on mandate theory. According to her, Hobbes was 
simply “wrong” about representation (Runciman, 2009. p. 16). 
Yet, Rehfeld claims that it is not hypocrisy to call the sovereign a representative. While the 
ruler’s activities are restricted on an account of legitimacy, this legitimate issue is not enough 
to deny the representative authority and authorization (Rehfeld, 2005, p. 185). In other words, 
while it can be seen an authoritarian, it may still be an authoritative power (Runciman, 2009, 
p. 16). For instance, it is clear that the Hobbesian political ruler does not only stand for the 
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people in some reasonable senses but also provides good reasons such as security and 
protection of property to be a representative in authority without mandate. 
This may be a reasonable argument in practices in history. Before the modern period, and 
in many occasions in the present world, male adults have been likely to be regarded as the 
leaders of a family. When we understand this representation as legitimate in some senses, it is 
not because of mandate procedure from other members to the male adults. Still, in general, the 
right and duty of parents to the children or of some adults to other family members are not 
problematic even though there is not clear consent or a deliberate procedure to conform to a 
certain concept of mandate. 
It is not the case only of domestic representation. In the present world, some authorization 
can be justified without mandate. Many international and domestic associations claim that they 
are representing a group of people who are not represented properly. The associations argue 
for, some values which are deemed as reasonable, right does not represent only the members 
who agree with the activities of the associations but also a broader group of people and entities. 
For example, it will be reasonably accepted that ‘Greenpeace’ represents not just the members 
but also the idea of the preservation of nature and the ordinary people who are not members 
but agree with the idea. In this kind of representation, though there are not clear mandate in 
most cases, it is regarded in general that the activities of the associations can be understood as 
legitimate representation if they represent the will or interest of the represented to some extent. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that representation by mandate almost always has more 
normative reasonableness in terms of legitimacy. In addition, this research would deal with 
mandate only within political representation in a form of government. In the modern world, we 
can see that political authorization should correspond to legitimate representation and it must 
accommodate legitimate mandate. Accordingly, though there are many features of legitimate 
representation without clear mandate, it must be true that most representative governments 
want to be legitimate or more legitimate by mandate. In this light, it can be said that legitimate 
representation necessarily requires mandate. 
In effect, every representative government needs a justification in the relationship between 
the representative and the represented. And, in this justification, mandate is the most 
fundamental and necessary procedure. In modern politics, legitimate government needs to be 
justified by mandate as a certain political procedure in representative theory. 
It is Hobbes again who argues for the concept of mandate as a normative condition of 
legitimate representative government. Since Hobbesian theory in Leviathan was generally 
interpreted as anti-democratic but responsible representative government, Runciman (2009) 
suggests a concept of ‘collective mandate’ arguing that Hobbes does not deny a democratic 
form of representation. According to Runciman, it is hard to understand how it is possible for 
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the government to be responsible without a right to judge the individuals in Hobbesian theory. 
Runciman argues that Hobbes must presuppose a state which is intuitively necessary for human 
beings and it is a state that is represented in representation. Runciman admits that Hobbes does 
not offer any explanation of the ways by which individuals are involved in the process of 
making the representation of the state work. For this, he presents a sophisticated analysis about 
the distinction between individual mandate and collective mandate by using the concepts of 
‘Membership responsibilities’ and ‘Membership rights’ between state and citizens (Runciman, 
2009, pp. 26-31). 
Here, what I emphasize is not that Runciman’s argument is reasonable to overcome the 
previous interpretations but that his argument for Hobbes depend on a concept of mandate. 
That is to say, for vindicating Hobbesian representative theory in normative senses of 
responsiveness, accountability and ultimately democracy, it is necessary to bring out the 
concept of mandate. In this sense, it can be said, mandate is the strongest idea and the procedure 
which evokes the concept of limited government in representative theory. 
In fact, mandate always has been a core idea of legitimate representative government since 
the recognition that the relationship between the representative and the represented is 
problematic. Since Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau to most present theorists who have studied 
party politics, electoral and government systems have conceived that mandate has been the 
salient issue in their theories, and have been devoted to making clear the radical foundation.  
Nevertheless, there is a relative a lack of conceptual examination about the foundation of 
mandate in the West. It is because mandate has been regarded as sub-concept of representation 
and just different features of representation. Except a few thinkers such as Finer who 
acknowledges government in relation to political legitimacy and theorizes it as a belief-system, 
many others have no clear idea that the concept of mandate is a foundational procedure of 
representation. While many theorists have been interested in the history of representation, 
characters of the representative, and institutions such as election or organization of government, 
there seems no clear distinction between representation and mandate. In this understanding, 
mandate is just a concept which is related to the present forms of representation but not a 
concept which consist of the foundation of representation. 
Conceptually, mandate has been the debatable concept in relation to ‘representing’ and 
‘being represented’ in its forms in general in the West. Sometimes, more reliable mandate 
guarantees more autonomy in the representative’s activities. For this reason, many debates 
about the nature of activity of the representative have been concerned with this issue. In the 
French Revolution the major problem that the National Assembly faced with was whether the 
representatives elected should act based on an imperative mandate or free mandate 
(Fitzsimmons, 1994, pp. 45-9). In America, it may be needless to refer to the debate about the 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
７８ 
 
characteristic of the representative between the Federalist and Anti-federalist (Manin, 1997). In 
England, Burke must be a leading advocate of free mandate (Pitkin, 1967, ch. 8). 
However, mandate is distinctive from representation itself. Mandate is not a source of 
representation but an authorization procedure for representation as a foundational ground of 
representative government. This character of mandate makes representation conditional. This 
can be demonstrated by a logical scrutiny. Let us suppose that all political representation is 
limited government. Presumably this definition could get support from some historical studies 
of Finer, Pitkin, and Urbinati. For example, the extreme absolute power of French monarchy in 
the 16th century was limited by some religious and cultural conditions even though they were 
so conservative (Finer, 1999). Pitkin (1967) admits that it is impossible to define perfect 
representation when she says that there is a constant tension in representation in itself without 
democratic interference. When Urbinati (2008) criticizes Pitkin and Manin that they fail to 
notice the democratic nature of representation, she clearly anticipates more limitation with 
representative government.  
Accordingly, all political representation is conditional since there are some conditions. It 
sounds tautological but it is so in their arguments. These conditions emerge not from 
representation but from a prior procedure of it, mandate. Mandate is not a concept that only 
distinguish different features and forms of representation though it has been a general 
understanding in the West. It is rather a concept where we can find out the foundation of 
legitimacy of representation and the origin of limited government. And this characteristics of 
mandate is shown more clearly in the Confucian representative theory and the concept of 
‘Mandate of Heaven’.79 
Here, I do not suggest mandate as a situation of delegation, trust, or guardianship but certain 
human activities by which some people are granted power to govern others by reference to a 
belief-system. In this sense, mandating is a specific procedure of political authorization. And, 
this authorization is necessary in modern representative democracy. In this sense, mandate is 
not a concept that can be replaced or confused with representation itself. For this reason, in this 
understanding of mandate, there is no room for the distinction between imperative or free.  
There is only mandate and the mandate is conditional in any case. Not all legitimate 
representation rests on mandate, but representation based on mandate is legitimate because it is 
conditional. Only in this sense, the representation is limited. That is to say, if representation is 
conditional, it is because the mandate is conditional. In fact, when we say imperative and free 
mandate in order to designate two different types of activities of the representative in relation 
                                           
79 See more details in later part of this chapter where I deal with Confucian mandate theory explaining the concept 
of ‘Mandate of Heaven’. 
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to the represented, it becomes a correct usage of the terms to call them ‘imperative’ and ‘free’ 
representing. This kind of mistake seems to be committed by almost all the modern theorists. 
In addition, mandate is a procedure in which the majority grants the power to govern to 
minority. In a political community, if a person or a group of people is representative, it means 
that they have a right to govern all the members of the community. Pitkin (1967) makes it clear, 
that ‘representing’ does not and cannot be equivalent with ‘present’. By definition, if all the 
people govern themselves virtually, it is hard to call it a representative system. Therefore, as 
Manin (1997) points out, representation is a system where a minority governs the majority by 
definition. It will not be changed easily regardless of how Urbinati (2008) emphasizes the 
normative democratic characteristics of a representative. Therefore, it is the procedure of 
mandate that makes representation distinctive from presentation. 
Some particular characteristics of political mandate have been revealed. First, it is a concept 
that denotes a certain political authorization procedure in which a number of people grant the 
right to rule to a person or a small number of people. This conception of mandate has appeared 
in history through both representative activities first and institutions where the activities are 
performed as time goes on. Second, mandate is distinctive from representing itself. While it 
must be a part of representation as a concept and a system, it is clearly different from 
representing or representation. If representing is a set of activities which represents the will of 
the interest of the represented, mandate is a foundation of political representation in a sense that 
the legitimacy of the government rests on mandate exclusively. In this sense, it can be said that 
mandate is the source of legitimacy in representative government. Therefore, finally, only with 
mandate as a specific authorization procedure in representative political systems, representing 
and representative accommodate legitimate accountability. In this case, the mandate should be 
legitimate normatively. If not so, representation based on the mandate becomes meaningless. 
To say it more correctly, that is not mandate. 
Yet, although mandate is the ground of legitimacy in representative government, the ways 
of legitimation will be diverse in each society as discussed in previous chapters. In other words, 
while it is easy to regard an electoral system or constitution80 as a valid institution for mandate 
to be legitimate, it may be impossible to confirm an absolute criterion for these various ways. 
There might be many different ways of legitimate mandate in history before democracy and 
even after democracy.81 In fact, a certain institution such as an election or constitution cannot 
                                           
80 In modern democracy, sometimes the constitution becomes the foundation of mandate. It happens when there 
is no mandatory representative between revolution and the first election for a legal representative body such as 
France and America (Arendt, 1963). In addition, in most newly born democratic countries after the Second 
World War like South Korea, in order for establishment of a state and government body such as a president and 
a national assembly, the constitution should be prior to the mandate by election. 
81 About the English case, just look at Mark Knights (2009). For a particular period in an earlier time of 
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be a radical foundation for mandate. Rather, they can only be a process of reconfirmation of the 
mandate which must be prior to those repeated means of follow-up.82 
At this point, the concern about the first mandate of social contract theorists was correct. 
According to the social contract theory, mandate deserves to be called a foundation of all human 
government. Even though Rousseau does not agree any mandate of politics, he should have to 
argue for the first contract of all human societies in the sense of mandate. If there is a political 
community where all the members always participate directly in decision-making standing on 
equal positions, mandate will not be necessary in the political decision-making procedure. In 
this case, as Rousseau suggested, representation is limited in operation to performances of the 
determined decisions. However, in all other cases where the government is not fully satisfied 
with the conditions of participation of all the individuals, political legitimacy would depend on 
mandate. 
Without mandate, there is no representation, no government and no politics. Thus, the 
ground of mandate is one of the most radical foundations of politics. In addition, since every 
government need to secure the political legitimacy, ‘belief system’ or ‘form of life’ on the basis 
of ‘practice and culture’ as the foundation of legitimacy could only be a candidate of right 
answer. 
 
 
4. Political Authority, Equality, and Competence in Democracy 
 
The concept of representation was defined as ‘to act on behalf of some other(s)’ and has 
developed from the symbolic to the substantive and from standing for to acting for. This 
representation is operated on the basis of an authorization procedure. Mandate is the concept of 
certain human activities by which some people are granted power to govern others by reference to 
a belief-system. 
Yet, there seems a tension between political authorization and democracy. Although, 
representative democracy is accepted as the legitimate system of a government empirically, we need 
more. This representative authorization should not be conflict with democracy normatively. If 
representative democracy is not a reluctant compromising of modern democracy where 
representation is inevitable because of the size of the country, this normative legitimation is 
necessary. Therefore, this representative authorization should be examined, most of all, in terms of 
the basic democratic principle, equality. 
                                           
representation in democratic England, see Hirst (1975). 
82 Here what is in my mind is the words of Jeremy Waldron again that we should distinguish the surface of a 
subject and the deeper issue in political theory. 
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A. Two Conceptions of political equality 
 
If political authority is a right to others and democracy means self-rule, in these definitions, 
there is simply a zero-sum relationship between political authority and democracy. Rule by 
others and rule by oneself cannot be compatible at all. 
If we understand political authority is as the right to rule others, there should be an 
equivalent concept that the ruled are duty bound to obey whether they agree with it or not (Raz, 
1990, p.4). Here, political authority is a prior concept to consent. While political authority is 
based on the agreement of the ruled in some senses, it is not the only necessary foundation. 
There can be many institutional or informal ways to make political authority legitimate. If the 
government does not violate the standard of legitimacy, it is justifiable to say that there is a duty 
for the people to obey the government. However, insofar as we understand democracy is self-
rule and this is a necessary condition for legitimate political authority, there will be a dead lock. 
There is a simple solution only if we suppose a community where political authority is not 
necessary. In this society, democracy necessarily demands political equality and this does not 
allow any political authority. Hence, any political entity may not have political authority over 
the people. Although there may be some sort of political power among the members, no one 
can recognize or confer its political authority. However, this radical view should be called 
anarchy rather than democracy (Wolff, 1988). 
Within the understanding of democracy as self-rule, the only way to reconcile these two 
conflicting concepts is to destroy the difference of the ruler and the ruled. It was Rousseau who 
suggested this view on the basis of social contract theory and government by ‘general will.’ He 
recognized that democracy necessarily demands not just political equality but also political 
authority. In order to take the two necessary conditions altogether, he suggested general will as 
the exclusive resource of political authority. In this theory, the political authority is legitimate 
without conflict with political equality because people obey only themselves, the ‘general will’. 
As it is known well, however, there is a problem between the ‘general will’ and the ‘will of 
all.’ In Rousseau’s society, disagreement among the different opinions is merely regarded as 
wrong. As it is wrong, the difference should be corrected rather than be harmonized or even be 
compromised. In other words, there is a problem of pluralism. For this reason, while ‘rule by 
all’ or ‘rule by the general will’ can be an ideal of democracy, it can be a form of totalitarianism 
too. There is surely political equality but the people are equal in a sense that all people have the 
same idea of public affairs. 
If it is possible to escape from the exclusive interpretation of democracy as self-rule and 
the Rousseau’s doctrine of ‘rule by all’ or ‘rule by the general will’, there is a way to reconcile 
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political authority and equality within democracy. In this second solution, democracy is 
understood as rule by political authority which is legitimate from the people’s ability to 
influence decision-making procedure with the same degree. Though political authority is 
necessary in this understanding of democracy, it does not allow the different influence of each 
member on public policy.  
This principle clearly seems consistent with the basic rule of democracy; one person one 
vote. This simple principle of modern democracy implies that every member of the political 
community should basically be equal in influence on the decision-making process of public 
policy. This can be called the ‘equal influence conception of political equality’ and it seems the 
general understanding of political equality in democracy.83 In this maxim, no one has more 
political right and this is the first principle for legitimacy of the aggregative concept of 
democracy. There seems no room for disparity between political equality and political 
competence. 
In addition, this principle is equivalent to not only the aggregative concept of democracy 
but also to deliberative democracy. If ability in deliberation is quite various, it is hard to suppose 
an active and meaningful deliberation only with participation of the people in decision-making 
procedure. At least, there should be an assumption that most people are in a similar position to 
persuade and to be persuaded in deliberation.84  
The theories of deliberative democracy such as public sphere, equal and free speech are 
preoccupied with this principle. For example, the ‘equal saying’ principle of democratic 
deliberation is only meaningful in this equilibrium of ability (Manin, Stein, and Mansbridge, 
1987). In sum, it can be summarized as; yes! political authority as a legitimate authoritative 
consequence by deliberative procedure; no! interference by competence that can wrongly affect 
the deliberative consequence in democracy. 
However, this thesis will not take this equal influence conception of political equality. It is 
not because this conception is not sufficient to be legitimate but because much of modern liberal 
democratic thinking does not rest on this conception of equality in both practice and principle. 
In other words, while the equal influence conception raises awareness of the equal natural status, 
this does not seem to fit the practice of liberal and representative democracy. It is clear that 
most people do have not influence to the same degree in modern politics. Some have more, 
                                           
83 Dworkin more sharply distinguished this equality into two dimensions: equality of impact and equality of 
influence (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 191-4). Impact is defined as the power to engage in the decision-making 
procedure, and influence is to lead or induce others’ opinions. Yet, the concept of ‘influence’ in this thesis 
implies both conceptions of Dworkin’s because roles of the representative in general include those two almost at 
the same time. In the case of a Confucian representative who is not only a decision maker but also a moral and 
ethical model, it is hard to distinguish the difference of impact and influence. 
84 Though it is not intellectual but physical, Rousseau suggested an equivalent condition as a premise of first 
social contract amongst the individuals. 
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some have less. 
Some could say that until the earlier 20th century the violation of political equality such as 
discrimination of voting right based on social status had been a feature of political systems, but 
now in most countries they have been and are being abolished. It seems so when we see the 
achievement of universal suffrage. The resolute movement of universal suffrage seems to have 
removed completely all the links between political equality and difference of competence. Yet, 
it is only irrelevant elements that are removed. 
For example, even though universal suffrage dismisses the discrimination of irrelevant 
issues such as race, gender, wealth, and literacy, there is still disfranchisement by age, 
nationality and imprisonment. As seen in the debates on the voting rights of prisoners between 
the EU supreme court and the UK government, it is controversial whether these 
disfranchisements are sufficiently legitimate. Certainly, there could be various standards for 
these issues and the standards are changeable according to time as well. Yet, if disfranchisement 
is justified in a society, the only plausible reason for the justification is that the exclusion is 
deemed as relevant. In other words, it is legitimate to exclude some people from this basic 
political right for some particular relevant reasons. It cannot be denied that we are living in a 
democratic world where some irrelevant elements are dismissed but some relevant ones remain. 
Not all the people enjoy equal rights not because of practical inevitability but based on the 
robust principle of disqualification for relevant reasons. 
Some could say that there may be a broad and general consensus or at least common sense 
about it. However, this is not so. In the UK, one of the most democratic countries, not only 
competence but even social status has been directly involved in the parliamentary system. 
While the Queen has no political power officially, there may be no one who disagrees that she 
has more political influence than ordinary people only because she is the Queen. There is the 
House of Lords where many members are not chosen by election. Some inherit their positions 
and others are recommended. This implies that election is not the only democratic device in 
this country. Although there have been many controversial debates about the reform of the 
House of Lords, it is also a reasonable argument that its deliberative role is not just compatible 
with democracy but also fruitful to British politics. 
Therefore, this thesis will argue that there can be an alternative understanding which is 
consistent with liberal democracy and the reinterpretation of Confucianism. That is a 
conception of relevance in relation to competence. In this ‘relevant competence conception of 
political equality’, the disparity of competence in democratic decision-making procedure is 
compatible with political equality in some relevant aspects. In short, it endorses ‘competence 
embedded political equality.’ 
From the perspective of the equal influence conception, this relevant competence 
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conception seems obviously anti-democratic in the sense that this view tolerates relevant 
reasons to limit same degree of influence legitimately. The community involved with this 
conception seems no longer democratic since the political equality can be limited by disparity 
of competence. However, this is not simply so. This conception of equality sets the limit of the 
embedment within some relevant aspects. 
 
B. Principle of competence as a relevant reason of qualification in representative 
democracy 
 
Some could say that though the principle of disqualification can be justified, most qualified 
people should have ability of influence to the same degree in democracy. They would argue 
that if this principle is denied, it is not a democracy any longer. Unfortunately, however, it is 
also not so at least in contemporary liberal democracy. There is another relevant reasons namely 
better qualification.  
In liberal democracy, everyone is equal but some are “more equal”. 85  For instance, 
representatives have more chance to participate in the decision-making procedure. Unless the 
representatives are forced to act only to deliver the will of the represented in a pure delegation 
concept without any interference, they will have more ability to influence public policy in 
general. The conception of equal influence is demolished at this moment. 86 If equal influence 
is the only normative basis of political equality, this representative system cannot be a 
democratic government. Dworkin accepts this. 
 
a representative structure is necessarily one in which impact is sharply different. … So 
long as politics is collectively reflective, … , it is inevitable that some citizens will have 
more influence than others. (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 192-7)87 
 
However, in the present world this type of representative system is not just a popular but 
also a legitimate form of ‘democracy’. Not just practical difficulties but some normative 
requirements justify this imbalance of influence. This is not an inevitable result but a well-
organized and intended consequence from the beginning of modern democracy. This 
                                           
85 Surely, this expression comes from Animal Farm. 
86 It can be controversial whether this dismissal also violates the principle of ‘equal concern and respect’ of 
equality. However, though some abilities connected with participation are arbitrary and they should not affect 
who is entitled to participate in the decision-making procedure, if it is justified by reasonable democratic ways 
of authorization, the principle of equal concern and respect seems still not broken. 
87 One interesting point is that Dworkin refers to ‘representation’ or the ‘representative character of politics’ 
when he writes about the inevitability of inequality of impact and influence. The way of solution for Dworkin is 
namely democratic authorization based on equal participation in representation (Dworkin, 2002, pp. 192-3). 
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representative system is justified by democratic authorization and the justification depends on 
some relevant standards. The most general one is to win an election. 
The meaning of winning an election as a relevant reason can be interpreted in two ways. 
First, the fact that one is chosen by democratic election can itself be understood as a certain 
distinctiveness to be granted political authority in democracy. One can say that it cannot be 
interpreted as genuine distinctiveness. However, there is an assumption that the selected deserve 
to be respected as qualified representatives and that this is not in conflict with the idea of liberal 
democracy. It can be understood in the example of the European song contest where the winner 
by public votes is respected as the best singer.  
The second may be closer to the pure concept of better qualification. By this interpretation, 
the chosen is genuinely likely to be the more competent one amongst the candidates. Or, the 
winner should be the superior one in role and character as a good representative normatively. It 
also can be understood in the example of a European song contest where the people hope and 
at least suppose that the best singer would and should be the winner. According to Fearon’s 
(1999) study of election and the empirical researches that were referred to in his work, modern 
democracy is not a system to choose anyone but a good type of representative.88 It is also 
supported by the concept of the distinctive principle rather than the resemblance principle in 
selection of representative (Manin, 1997). 
In fact, this idea originates from the very beginning of liberal democracy. According to J.S. 
Mill, some sort of competence must be linked with graded political rights. While he was a 
protagonist of universal suffrage including that of women, he was a supporter of weighted votes 
at the same time. In Mill’s view, universal votes and weighted votes are not in conflict with 
each other. In addition, he was the most important advocate of liberty, whereas he disagreed 
with the independence of Ireland and India. To Mill, competence and participation are both 
necessary conditions for good government (Thompson, 1976), and these are still important and 
plausible conditions of liberal democracy. In sum, while everyone is eligible to have a political 
right, the right should be distributed in relation to political prudence. In the tradition of 
utilitarianism, he advocated that everyone is the best guardian of self-interest, but he was also 
conscious that it was meaningful only when the individuals understood what their interests were 
                                           
88 Mansbridge understands this good type only as an individual character and distinguishes this from descriptive 
characteristics such as party identification (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 521). However, there seems not enough reason 
to understand Fearon’s conception as so narrow. Most of all, when Fearon suggests the three characteristics of 
(1) having similar policy preferences to the voter, (2) being honest and principled, and (3) being sufficiently 
skilled, all these characteristics also can be applied a party identification within individual identification. In 
modern politics, it is absurd that an individual candidate’s character is not connected with her party. Preference, 
honesty (particularly with policy), and political skill are clearly a virtue of parties in modern politics rather than 
of separated individual candidates. For this reason, when the thesis refers to the virtue of a representative or the 
characteristics of a representative, it is a concept that embraces not only personal but also all other factors that 
can affect the political virtue of a representative. 
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and what they were doing.89 While the 19th century’s weighted vote system has been dismissed, 
the legitimate institution of the House of Lords shows that Mill’s ideas are still accepted as 
plausible in the UK in some senses. 
To express it radically, representative democracy takes minority government by nature. It 
does not mean that there is an inevitable practical character like the ‘Iron law of oligarchy’. In 
contrast, it implies that representative democracy is a system where the concept of competence 
is coincident with democracy not just in practice but also in principle. As long as the 
competence is regarded as relevant in the people’s mind and belief, competence embedded 
equality is not in conflict with democratic authority. Therefore, the problem is what is relevant 
or not.  
Here, I am not inclined to argue that certain aristocratic parliament systems should be 
supported by Confucianism. Instead, I would argue that there are some relevant elements of 
competence in contemporary democratic systems that allow and even promote the unequal 
influence of the citizens on public policy. In this understanding of liberal democracy, it may not 
be justifiable to criticize Confucian thought as anti-democratic only because Confucianism 
endorses politics by certain good people. If the criticism rests on the equal influence conception, 
not only Confucianism but also liberal democracy cannot satisfy the condition. This 
dissatisfaction emerges not just in practice but also in principle. 
Therefore, what is to be argued here is that there are relevant reasons with qualification that 
can be legitimate in democratic participation and these do not violate the principle of equality. 
The issue of relevance may depend on the form of life and belief-systems which are exclusively 
radical foundations of legitimacy in each society. That is the way for the British people to 
recognise the legitimacy of the UK’s monarchic system and this recognition is not in conflict 
with liberal democracy. 
In representative democracy, everyone has an equal right to choose, but most are not equal 
in respect of being chosen. It would be a violation of the democratic principle if there is an 
inequality of being representative by gender, wealth, or education. They should be dismissed 
because they are regarded as irrelevant. However, some relevant reasons are still influential and 
powerful in the selection process. Though it is varied in each society, it may be true that there 
are almost always some sort of competence that have been considered as a decisive condition 
for being a representative. In other words, not all but some competent individuals are chosen as 
representatives and they have enjoyed more ability to influence public policy. Surely this is a 
distinctive idea from the lottery system of ancient Greece where most male citizens had an 
                                           
89 This is an idea that is consistent with Peter Winch who distinguishes meaningful voting from a behaviour of 
marking and putting a voting card in a ballot box. See chapter 2 in this thesis. 
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equal right to serve as a representative. In addition, this competence embed representative 
democracy denies an idea that more participation means more democracy. 
Of course, it does not mean that only distinctive people could deliver a better consequence. 
Rather, as it is discovered both in Aristotle’s ancient argument for mixed government and 
collective intelligence theory in cyber space (Levy, 1999), participation to a certain degree is 
essential not just for political equality but also for better decision-making. Participation cannot 
be excluded in democracy. Yet, what is now problematic is that it is controversial whether 
participation should be equal in any circumstances regardless of any relevant reasons. 
There should be some relevant reasons that legitimately distinguish some arguments and 
the people who hold the arguments from others in democratic procedure as necessary elements 
in modern democracy. Even in deliberation in ‘equal-saying’ condition, the relevance principle 
should work in order to make a decision by the enlightenment of individuals. If participation is 
a principle and condition for equality, contestation is for the best decision (Dahl, 1990). This 
makes democracy good sense for the people. In this sense, according to Pzeworski, modern 
democracy embraces the contestationist concept of representation as its partner rather than the 
participationist, and this representative democracy evokes a legitimate political authority in the 
present world. 
In sum, democracy does not need to take a concept of political equality that all members 
have equal influence in public decision-making to the same degree. In fact, any liberal 
democracy cannot and would not fully satisfy this principle. Instead, liberal democracy that 
takes representation as its legitimate form always excludes some people for relevant reasons. 
There is a principle of disqualification. In addition, some have plainly more chance to 
participate in decision-making by principle of superior qualification. This superiority has been 
embraced by both the system and electoral behaviour. However, this competence embedded 
representative democracy does not conflict with legitimate democratic authority. This can be 
revealed more clearly in following sections. 
 
 
5. Representation and Confucian political thought 
 
A. Representation is necessary in legitimate authoritative democracy in the present 
world and this character enables Confucian political theory to be compatible with 
democracy 
 
It is often alleged that Confucianism is unsuitable for democracy and democratic 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
８８ 
 
development because it is a set of ideas of the authoritarian and hierarchical. On this authority 
issue of political representation, there has been a very strong and long term argument for the 
authoritarian characteristics or nature of Confucianism and it is still influential to the negative 
view of the compatibility between Confucianism and democracy. In this sense, it is quite 
important that representation is a legitimate authoritative and hierarchical system justifiable in 
contemporary democracy theoretically and practically. This has a specific significance 
particularly in relation to Confucianism. To be sure, this is one of the main reasons that 
representative democracy can be a key to recall Confucianism as a reasonable application in 
contemporary politics. 
In fact, the misunderstanding of Confucian representation has emerged from the confusion 
of ‘in authority’ and ‘an authority’. This also can be understood as a confusion of ‘authoritative’ 
and ‘authoritarian’. Clearly, there is an enormous gap between authoritative representation and 
authoritarian representation. Confucian thought has frequently been understood as the latter. 
Not all hierarchical systems are undemocratic or authoritarian. Many, in fact, almost all, 
governments are hierarchical but they could be legitimate and authoritative not authoritarian. 
Then, this view provides the ground of an idea that Confucian representation is anti-democratic 
and may not be acceptable in modern democracy. 
However, not only representation but also democracy is an authoritative concept in politics 
in both principle and practice. Hence, it may be absurd if we reject some traditional ideas which 
are intimately related to the belief-systems if what Confucian thought rests on is authoritative 
legitimacy not authoritarian power. In other words, according to the context of the character of 
the government, it may be unreasonable if someone argues that Confucian idea must be 
dismissed from modern politics only because of this ‘authority’ issue. 
Clearly modern representation is also an authoritative system to be justified in democracy. 
In addition, many legitimate democratic representations are also compatible with some 
hierarchical systems in government in the present world. In that case, the point is that those 
conceptions of representative democracy are the only legitimate hierarchical systems justified 
by the people. In other words, representative democracy is merely one of the models of 
legitimate government depending on the peoples’ mind based on each belief-system. 
Accordingly, if Confucian political thought is consistent with the principles of representative 
democracy, whether it is authoritative or even partly hierarchical, there would be no reasonable 
objection. 
Some could argue that representative democracy does not allow any hierarchical 
representation based on social class, wealth, or any other discrimination. It only permits 
division of roles among the people with equality of state. If this is democratic in principle, 
traditional Confucian thought is exactly identical to this conception of representation. 
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Confucians do not mind anything but the virtue of a person for being a qualified representative. 
Moreover, everyone has an equal chance to be the representative since they have an equal 
chance to be a sage by the same degree of nature in morality. At this point, what we have to see 
is that Confucian thinkers regard only relevant elements as standards of qualification for a good 
representative. In this standpoint, the person holds the very basic and most important virtue of 
Confucianism, Renji (인자:仁者) which can be translated as ‘authoritative person’ (Ames and 
Rosemont, 1998, p.48; Tan, 2002, p. 170). 
Here we need to distinguish carefully ‘equal respect to the all people’ as a democratic 
principle from ‘equal respect to the people’s ability’ to judge between good and bad. At the 
same time, equal respect should be distinguished from equal virtue. Estlund makes it clear that  
 
“The view that people are owed equal respect is never meant to deny that people’s ability to 
judge of good and bad, right and wrong, can be differentially affected by upbringing, education, 
social environment, and so on. The right to equal respect is said to be owed to people in spite of the 
differences in capacity for good moral judgment produced by these factors.  … First, an equal 
capacity for virtue is not equal virtue. Second, ... The knowledge tenet does not apparently conflict 
with any of the traditional grounds for the thesis of the equality of persons” (Estlund, 2008, p. 33). 
 
Here, knowledge tenet is that some (relatively few) people know those normative standard 
better than others and Estlund argues that it is very difficult to demy this tenet (Estlund, 2008, 
p. 30). He calls this characteristics epistemic values in democracy in which democracy acquire 
authority from the people with the result of better decisions beyond procedural justice. He 
claims that if democracy bring out worse outcomes than other systems, it may be quite difficult 
to depend democracy just with procedural justification. Surely, this argument follows an idea 
of epistemic proceduralism in which democracy could and should better decisions based on 
better knowledge and epistemic deliberation (Estlund, 2008, pp. 168-179).  
There can be another argument that even though the Confucian maxim about the equal 
chance of human nature for virtue is justifiable in democratic principle in some senses, it is just 
a doctrine and not so practical. However, if the Confucian idea is not true in practice, it may be 
the same in modern representative democracy as well. There has always been a gap between 
the ideal type of representative as a good and competent person and reality as only wealthy, 
lucky or even corrupted politicians. The point is that it must be true that at least the concept of 
virtuous representative is not just compatible but also helpful to make present modern 
representative democracy more fruitful. 
In terms of the superiority of the representative, there was a well-known debate between 
the Federalist and the Anti-federalist in America in the 18th century. The one view is that the 
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superiors ‘tend to be’ elected as representatives or there is a long belief that the superiors ‘ought 
to be’ elected. Manin calls it ‘the principle of distinction’. The other idea is that representation 
should be a ‘true picture’ of the people and the Anti-Federalist called it ‘the principle of likeness’ 
(Manin, 1997, pp. 94-109). 
In effect, if modern democracy accepts distinctiveness as a necessary principle, it may be 
the same with Confucian idea. If the phenomenon is inevitable in practice, Confucian political 
thought in which they only focus on virtue rather than anything else would be worth re-
introducing in certain political communities where the ideas are familiar with the people for the 
development of representative democracy. 
In conclusion, there is no reasonable evidence which can reject the Confucian 
representative theory only because it is hierarchical or authoritative. The point is whether the 
hierarchical or authoritative elements are reasonable or not in reference to the people’s mind.  
In a radical view representation as political system is anti-democratic by nature in a sense that 
it does not embrace equal participation of all the members of a community in decision-making 
procedure. In addition, there are some qualifications of representatives. In this sense, modern 
representative democracy is neither desirable nor democratic system in terms of democratic 
principles. Instead, to be precise, it can be said that representative democracy is a reasonable 
and legitimate system in spite of its non-democratic principles. Therefore, in modern politics, 
the authoritative character of Confucianism itself may not be a crucial obstacle in compatibility 
with democracy if it is regarded as reasonable and acceptable in legitimacy. 
 
B. ‘Why representative democracy?’ in the study of democracy and legitimacy in the 
Non West 
 
Representation seems one of the most suitable and reasonable means of analysis in study 
of legitimacy in the Non West. While other ideologies such as liberalism, republicanism, or 
even democracy is not developed in many non-western countries, representation is a concept 
which is familiar to people of the non-western countries not just in modern political practice 
but also in indigenous traditional culture. Particularly, representation as a political concept is 
the most crucial in East Asian political culture. It implies that representation is one of the most 
neutral means of analysis of legitimacy theory in Confucian East Asia. This research aims to 
contribute to contemporary Korean politics or Confucian East Asian politics rather than 
political theory in general. In this limited challenge, representation is a concept that has a 
particular merit to study of legitimacy and democracy in newly born countries where 
democracy has been imported with representative institutions simultaneously. In this procedure 
of transplant, there has not been much support based on an ideological understanding of 
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democracy like in the West or resistance against representative system on account of its anti-
democratic nature. In addition, representation is a system which has been indwelled in the 
traditional political thought already. 
In Korea, there has not been a long tradition of modern liberalism or democracy. Even 
before most people in this country recognized and understood what democracy really meant, 
the western political systems have been established by political aliens, the western states. At 
that time, there had only been abstract conceptions about the western understanding of rights, 
liberty, equality, and political participation. After the state building, like many other developing 
countries born in the 20th century, the goal of liberal and democratic movements under 
authoritarian regimes has been just fair elections. In those countries, democratization, 
liberalization and protection of human rights have meant no more than fair elections. The people 
have understood those political values through representation. In the West, such values as 
liberty and equality have become the foundation of representative constitutions by the means 
of fair elections. In contrast, in many non-western countries such as South Korea, the system 
of representation has embraced the ideas of liberty, equality, and human rights. It does not mean 
that those values have not been written in the constitution and contained in laws. Rather it shows 
that those written values and rights have no meaning without fair elections and legitimate 
representation. While the issue in the West was unwritten rights, in the Non West these were 
written but meaningless. Therefore, it can be said, while the West has developed representation 
on the basis of liberalism and democracy, the rest has to adopt liberalism and democracy on the 
basis of representation. Hence, representation is not only specific and pragmatic but also clearly 
fundamental issue in modern democracy if we consider it not just in western developed 
countries but also in all non-western underdeveloped and developing countries. In this sense, it 
is also a pragmatic and familiar subject for non-western people to understand politics in their 
countries.90 
In addition, representation is not such a modern alien concept to the Korean people like 
many other non-western countries’. In the influence of Confucian political thought, there have 
been representative political ideas such as the mandate of Heaven and the mandate of the people. 
The rulers and officials in general have been regarded as agents or trustees of Heaven and 
whether they are genuine or not depends on the judgment of the people. If the ruler is not 
deemed as a representative of Heaven, they could be replaced or must be removed. In this sense, 
representation was not a strange political idea to the Korean people when it is introduced with 
                                           
90 Many theorists have defined representative democracy within liberal democracy or they have understood the 
two concepts as equivalent. For example, Saward says that “it [representative democracy] overlaps closely with 
liberal democracy; indeed, some would see these as interchangeable labels” (Saward, 2003, p. 150). Though it is 
hard to argue that this kind of understanding is inappropriate, it is worth noting that in many non-western 
countries those two concepts could not or should not be identical in both principle and practice. 
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democracy. Or it may also be possible that the people easily understand and accept democracy 
thanks to the representative system.  In this sense, representation seems to be an appropriate 
concept to study democracy in relation to culture in Confucian East Asia. 
 
C. Summary 
 
There are four particular reasons for study of representation in this research. First, 
representative democracy is the conceptual meeting point of different democracies. Second, 
while democracy pursues equality, representation is naturally authoritative and hierarchical 
system. Yet it is also deemed as legitimate in modern democracy. For this reason, representation 
opens the door for Confucian political thought to be adopted in modern politics insofar as it is 
compatible with democracy. Third, the concept of representation has been broadly used as one 
of the most important and common standards in evaluation of democracy in modern politics. 
This neutrality or fairness of judgment of democratic legitimacy through the concept of 
representation has a specific advantage in studying political legitimacy in relation to cultural 
diversity. Finally, since representation is a familiar and neutral concept rather than other 
ideologies in the non-western countries which have borrowed democracy with representation 
at the same time, it is suitable for study of East Asian politics and its relationship with legitimacy, 
democracy and traditional thoughts, particularly in Korea.91 
 
 
6. Confucianism and Democracy 
 
A. Two approaches to the relationship between Confucianism and democracy: 
‘Confucian democracy model’ and ‘Confucian citizenship model’ 
 
In the recent period, particularly since the Asian value debate, there have been two different 
approaches in the study of pro-democratic Confucian virtue. 
The first strategy is to argue that there is a certain Confucian type of democracy which is 
distinctive from a general understanding of democracy. For example, Bell (1995) argues that 
                                           
91 One finally reason can be added. Fortunately, the researcher of this research has a privilege to study 
representation in particular in Confucian East Asia  The researcher has practical experience of representation. I 
have working experience as a legislative assistance and speech writer for members of Korean National 
Assembly for five years. During the period, there have been fruitful opportunities to work together, observe, and 
communicate with MPs, and it caused me to think and doubt about the relationship between representation in 
democracy and culture. And, the questions and curiosity have been converged to the role of representative and 
the qualified virtue for it. 
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meritocracy is a modern Asian [Chinese] type of democratic system and it is an alternative to 
the western type of democracy. This view can be called the ‘Confucian democracy model’. The 
claims contained in this approach can be classified into two. First, some argue that Confucian 
democracy is a different type of democracy from western liberal democracy. Second, it is 
claimed more radically that the Confucian idea of government is a superior political 
organization to democracy. These theories had been the main stream of Confucian study in the 
1990s in the Asian value debate. However, this approach often has been criticized in that it does 
not overcome the anti-democratic element which is inherent in Confucianism. In particular, 
there is no or not enough room for the participation of the people in the concept of Meritocracy. 
Therefore, such an approach seems closer to authoritarian than to democratic government. 
The second approach focuses on the Confucian emphasis on the cultivation of the people. 
While the general understanding of Confucianism is that it highlights the personal cultivation 
mainly of the ruling class, the arguments based on this approach claim that in modern 
democracy there is no reason to consider such self-cultivation merely within the narrow 
conception of the pre-modern period. In fact, earlier Confucians such as Confucius and Mencius 
did not exclude common people as the subject and object of cultivation. Though Confucius did 
not clearly mention about human nature, he firmly held that everyone could be cultivated by 
education. In practice, there was absolutely no discrimination in recruiting and teaching in 
Confucius school. Mencius argued more explicitly that everyone has a good immanent nature 
saying that “there is not man who is not good” (Mencius, 6A: 2). He also declared that there 
was no difference of degree of the good nature in an answer “how should I be different from 
other people? [The legendary kings] Yao and Shun were the same as other people” (Mencius, 
4B: 32).92  According to this view of Mencius, all people have same potentiality of self-
cultivation. The reason why this similar degree of immanent nature to be a good man is that it 
implies that the people also have a similar chance to be a ruler and officials as a representative 
of others. In this sense, equality in moral and intellectual ability embraces the possibility of 
equal governmental capacity in each person.93 
In modern democracy, the subjects of government are in principle the people. Hence, the 
discipline of cultivation should be extended to the people at large in modern democracy. In this 
light, modern theorists construct a concept of Confucian civility (Kim, 2013) or moral 
community by education (Tan, 2012) in which democratic citizenship inspired by Confucian 
cultivation is regarded as decisive factors in the political decision-making procedure. Let us 
                                           
92 Of the Mencius view of human nature, see Irene Bloom (2002)’s ‘Mengzian Arguments on Human Nature’. 
93 Compared to the Rousseau’s account of human equality in a sense that even the weakest person can kill the 
strongest person in state of nature in Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men, this 
Confucian basis of equality seem to be far more civilised, reasonable, and democratic understanding of human 
nature. In fact, the Confucian account was more than 1,500 years ahead of Rousseau’s. 
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call this approach the ‘Confucian citizenship model’ in democracy. This is an approach that is 
conscious of the criticism that Confucianism is too authoritarian or hierarchical to be 
compatible with democracy. This citizenship model does not deny this allegation of 
Confucianism that there are anti-democratic elements. Yet it claims that there are also some 
pro-democratic elements applicable in modern democracy. 
In sum, the first, Confucian democracy model suggests an alternative to western liberal 
democracy. The question is whether the elitist principles of the model are compatible with 
modern democracy. It is because the Confucian democracy conception seems not coincident 
with the very basic principle of democracy, equality. For this reason, Bell’s concept of 
‘Meritocracy’ can be understood both as a different model of democracy on the one hand, and 
as a better system on the other hand. The second, Confucian citizenship model seems a safer 
and more rational strategy in a sense that it does not challenge the allegation about the 
authoritarian character of Confucianism. Yet, it is sure that this citizenship model does not claim 
that there is compatibility between Confucian representation and modern democracy in theory. 
  
B. The third way: the Confucian reinterpretation of democracy 
 
This research suggests the third way of Confucian reinterpretation of democracy between 
the two previous approaches for at least two reasons. First, the compatibility between 
Confucianism and democracy should and could be verified as reasonable according to the 
understandings of democracy. Second, Confucian reinterpretation does not need to limit itself 
to some narrow conceptions of democracy such as citizenship or some specific understandings 
of democracy like a moral ideal community. 
Since the Asian value debate, there is a dominant methodology that many theorists who 
have been interested in linking Confucianism and democracy in modern politics have taken. 
They have tried to alter the definitions of the concepts or to reconstruct the concepts. For 
example, Tan says that “Confucian democracy requires not only reconstruction of 
Confucianism. It also requires the reconstruction of democracy.” (Tan, 2003, p. 9) Surely, this 
reconstruction method may be a radical approach of study about political theory and culture. 
There is no reason to restrain this creative way and it may work when the reconstruction is 
entitled to recognition by the scholars of the academic realm. 
However, in interpretations of Confucianism the two main streams may go too far from 
democracy or from Confucianism. While the former seems to fall into the danger of being anti-
democratic, the latter may not need Confucian reflection in its own theory. This result originates 
in the fact that the former only focuses on the difference of space and culture between the East 
and the West, and the later concentrates on the alteration of time and context between ancient 
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Chinese monarchy and modern democracy. Yet, in order for interpretation to be reasonable in 
the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, the approach should take both factors 
of time and space. And this thesis will do so. 
In contrast to the two previous main methods, this thesis will take a confrontational way. It 
does not challenge general democratic theory nor raise an argument for the reconstruction of 
Confucianism. It does not attempt to alter the foundation of both the concepts of Confucianism 
and democracy. It does not dare to name some new ideas or concepts such as Confucian 
democracy, meritocracy, or Confucian citizenship education. 
Instead, it only tries to look at the relationship between Confucian thought and 
contemporary democracy theory more deeply. It aims to apply Confucian representation ideas 
to modern democratic development within the present interpretations. This research is standing 
at a position that the authoritative character of Confucianism cannot be alienated from its 
original idea. Likewise, this thesis also argues that there are essentially authoritative and 
hierarchical elements in modern representative democracy not just in practice but also in 
principle. From these existing interpretations, this thesis aims to propose a reasonable meeting 
point for Confucianism and democracy by reinterpretation not reconstruction. 
In this light, this thesis will argue that representation is a necessary form of legitimate 
democracy in contemporary politics and there are some fruitful elements that can be inspired 
and developed from Confucian traditions. According to a theory of modern representative 
democracy, modern democracy is a system in which voters select not anyone but good type of 
persons as representatives (Fearon, 1999). In this view of modern representative government, 
there are some meritocratic elements which are consistent with democratic principles regarded 
as reasonable. 
Virtue-based Confucian authority is consistent with the concept of a good type of 
representative and it is not in conflict with democratic political equality. Political equality does 
not just mean equal influence but also reasonable competition and exclusion in deliberation. In 
other words, in representative democracy, the concept of the good type of representative is 
understood as a relevant competence that allows certain persons to take part in decision-making 
procedures legitimately. Thus, Confucian reinterpretation is consistent with political equality 
in representative democracy. 
Here, the final issue seems whether Confucian reinterpretation conflicts with liberty. It is 
because there is a traditional western anxiety that the virtue or competence based Confucian 
authority suppresses the freedom of expression. If there is not enough liberty of expression, this 
Confucian reinterpretation must be inconsistent with modern representative democracy and 
equality as well in reference to legitimacy. However, it seems not so. 
At least, there are three ways in which individual freedoms would be guaranteed in 
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Confucian regime. First, as long as self-cultivation in practical ways of education is the main 
means and goal of Confucianism, free debate and deliberation is necessary for the people in 
Confucianism. Second, without free speech, the Confucian ruler cannot recruit good 
representatives and cannot get good advices from the representatives. Before the national 
examination which is known well as the main means of selection of officials in Confucian world, 
and still in principle after the institution of examination, recommendation had been the 
important way of picking up officials. Free speech must be the very basic foundation of this 
system of recruitment of officials, and without liberty of expression, the ideal of cooperative 
government by a good ruler and good Confucian officials may be impossible. Third, most 
fundamentally, in Confucianism there is an idea that equal respect to all the people which is 
surely distinctive from equal respect to all the people’s ability. This basic equal respect to all 
the people must be the ground of equal respect of individual freedom in modern liberal 
democracy and this is also distinctive from the recognition of the difference of the people’s 
ability. At this moment, in Confucian reinterpretation of representative theory, it seems hard to 
find out reasonable ways to deny the compatibility with the notion of liberl democracy. 
In sum, the assumption of this thesis is that good type of representative is a conception that 
is coincident with both Confucian thought and modern democracy. In this understanding of 
representation, Confucianism, democracy, political authority and equality meet each other in 
relevant principles. This ‘relevance’ principle operates legitimately in democratic decision-
making procedure. The contents of competence consist of the substance of legitimacy in each 
society, and it is virtue in Confucian tradition. If the concept of virtue is interpreted as a relevant 
reason in democratic deliberation, there will be no reasons to refuse Confucian political thought 
as a good foundation for the development of representative democracy in some societies. 
 
 
7. Democracy, mandate and Confucian mandate 
 
A. Confucian mandate theory: ‘Mandate of Heaven’ 
 
In the belief-system of Confucianism, ancient Confucians declared that the right to govern 
is granted by the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. 94 This maxim was interpreted by Mencius that the 
                                           
94 In this research, the term ‘Heaven’ that begins with a capital letter denotes a specific concept of Tian (천: 天) in 
the context of Confucianism and it is distinguished from the general meaning of heaven in English. One 
dominant reference book about the main terms of Chinese philosophy explains that “it should be noted that it is 
never as stark as the Western opposition between a transcendent God and a purely scientific view of sky. … It 
comprises two aspects; on one hand it is an objective infinite reality, the ‘sky’; on the other it is ‘God,’ or the 
supreme concept (Dainian, 2002, pp. 3-4, Ames and Rosemont, 1998, pp. 46-48). 
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Mandate of Heaven the means mandate of people because Heaven hears only from the people.95  
When Confucius says that legitimate political power is based on the Mandate of Heaven, 
the political power became a divine authority because it is granted from Heaven. It made 
political authority as the binding power in a relationship between Heaven, the ruler, and the 
people. In the context of divine power, this authority is not just political but also moral concept. 
It means that the presence of a physical or material source of force does not fully satisfy the 
requirement of the Mandate of Heaven. 
Of course, there have been many divine authorities that have been deemed as granted from 
a super-human power like Heaven or nature. However, one distinctive point is that the 
Confucian concept of political power based on the Mandate of Heaven is conditional not 
absolute in contrast that many other divine authorities have argued so. The government by the 
Mandate of Heaven is a limited government. 
Governments have some definite conditions in relation to the people as long as Heaven 
hears from the people. If the people do not want to support a regime any longer, the mandate 
will be dismissed because Heaven, the subject of the mandate hears from the people. In this 
sense, Confucian political power is divine but also conditional. For this reason, Heaven is an 
object of both respect and fear to the ruler, the representative of Heaven and the people. For the 
same reason, revolutions in East Asia always have been led by the name of the Mandate of 
Heaven from the very beginning of Chinese history of government to the Dong-hak 
movement,96 the last peasant rebellion in the late 19th century in Korea. 
Of course, this concept of the Mandate of Heaven did not exist in the same way before 
democracy. There may be few people who regard the Mandate of Heaven as the ground of 
legitimacy of the present government in South Korea. As it clearly appeared in the first chapter 
of the National Constitution, sovereignty is given to the people not to Heaven.  
However, still most politicians of South Korean are happy to quote Mencius words, ‘mind 
of Heaven is mind of the people’ in electoral campaigns. Particularly the opposite parties enjoy 
this mandate concept advocating regime change against the government party. It is because 
when the phrase is expressed it immediately reminds the people of a concept of limited 
government. At this stage, Heaven is not regarded as a holy or divine subject but a metaphor of 
the absolute source of political legitimacy in representative democracy. 
In this sense, it is a theory of government that has a practical function to awake the people 
by an idea that the government is always conditional due to the concept of mandate. It had been 
                                           
95 The study of the concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ will be discussed in earnest in the next chapter. Here, the 
Confucian mandate will be simply introduced in the relationship only with the political representation. 
96 This peasant revolution was already introduced in Kim Daejung’s article which was against to Lee Kwan 
Yew’s argument in the first chapter. The leaders of this revolutionary movement argued radically that "man is 
heaven." 
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conditional even in the monarchical system by the concept of the Mandate of Heaven. The idea 
that Heaven only hears the voice of the people consists of the practicality of the concept of the 
Mandate of Heaven as a basis of limited government in a representative system. Therefore, it 
can be said that the idea of limited representative government based on the Mandate of Heaven 
has become a form of life in political practices in Confucian East Asia. 
 
B. Democratic mandate and Confucian mandate 
 
Since the Middle Ages, the core idea of modern democratic representation has been 
developed from symbolic to substantive representation. Not just the ‘standing for’ but also the 
‘acting for’ concept has become a necessary condition for genuine representation between the 
relationship of the representative and the represented. 
The concept of mandate has been the foundation of representative government and this 
representative government becomes the basis of most theories of limited government in modern 
democracy. Every government is limited under the will of the people under democratic system. 
The greatness of democracy is that it binds the rule of government by the people and this 
binding force originates from the concept of mandate. In this sense, the concepts of 
accountability and responsibility are also not the core of democracy; rather those concepts 
emerge from the relationship between political leaders and the people. It was representation 
that brought out the idea of conditional government between the representative and the 
represented.  
It may be undoubtedly true that democracy has had the function of expanding the category 
of who is eligible to be represented or who has the right to vote in the perspective of 
representation. In fact, in principle, democracy means participation of all demos in the political 
decision-making procedure. Certainly, however, that kind of participation has rarely occurred 
or in fact has been replaced by indirect participation by election where the demos only can be 
candidates or voters. In addition, even in elections, though no one should be denied an 
opportunity to be a representative in principle, in many cases, the chance to win the election 
has been restricted to some distinctive talented, educated or mainly good background originated 
people. In this sense, it can be said that modern representative democracy is surely a system ‘of 
the people’ but not ‘by the people’. It is rule by public opinion but not rule by the public. It is 
operated by open competition not by lot or rotation.  
If so, is modern representative democracy not democratic? Is it totally a manipulation that 
people believe the electoral system is democratic? It seems not so. Modern representative 
democracy does not dismiss the essence of democracy, insofar as democracy is a system of 
good procedure to make good collective decision. In other words, if democracy is a means to 
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deliver good decisions rather than any decisions by participation, the representation procedure 
can be justified as long as it contributes to the goal by competition. 
Dahl makes this view understood by arguing that “democracy means rule by public opinion” 
(Dahl, 1990, p. 370). In representative democracy, contestation is inevitable. Yet for making 
meaningful the rule by public opinion, the contestation should be open participation (Dahl, 
1971). In order for contestation for to be open participation, political equality must be the 
fundamental condition (Dahl, 2006). In sum, this understanding of democracy is supported by 
contestation in participation. And this is the principle of representative democracy. On this basis, 
between the ruling and the public opinion, it appears a concept of mandate which has two main 
functions; first it grants authoritative power to rule to other(s), second, it binds the yield of the 
power in the sense of limited government. 
One distinctive point we should note here is that this public opinion is not such a thing raw. 
According to Estlund (2008) and Dahl (1990), the public opinions should be the best for the 
people and that is the goal of democracy. When the Utilitarians argue that the individual is the 
best guardian of self-interest, they are suggesting that the goal of the principle of self-control is 
to achieve good decision. Self-control is not the goal itself. If we accept the view of Estlund, 
Dahl, and Utilitarians, epistemic understanding of democracy and the procedure of 
enlightenment are necessary for representative democracy. Surely this democracy is compatible 
with equality insofar as the contestation is only involved with the relevant requirement of 
representative. On this epistemic conception, democracy is a political contestation on the broad 
basis of the representation of interests or opinions of the citizens. By this, democracy embraces 
representation as a legitimate authoritative system. 
Yet, how can this epistemic conception of democracy or rule by public opinion be 
meaningfully understood as democracy? How could this system be equivalent with by the 
people in principle? What makes representation into democracy? It is responsiveness in which 
representation becomes democratic in the content of law and politics. Where accountability 
does or need not work, responsiveness is required. If political representatives are not responsive 
to the constituents, it cannot be called democratic representation (Weale, 2007, pp. 131-144). 
Whether the representation is substantive or descriptive, or standing for or acting for, the fact 
would not be changed that the representatives is responsible to the represented. This concept of 
responsiveness defines the relationship between representation and democracy in legitimacy 
through the relationship between the representative and the represented. In this sense, 
representative democracy can be called democratic. 
In the West, social contract theories provided the idea of limited government by mandate. 
Of political mandate and its ground, before the social contract theory, there was a theory in the 
Confucian East, the Mandate of Heaven. Confucianism surely does not develop the democratic 
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idea as participation of all the people in daily politics. It does not enhance a representative idea 
to the level of election by the people.97 Since Confucianism does not invent democracy in itself, 
it might be quite difficult to confirm that there are some elements of ‘by the people’. 
Yet, it is a reasonable argument that there are some solid basements of ‘of the people’ in 
the interpretation of Mandate of Mencius, ‘the Mandate of Heaven is the mandate of people.’ 
One clear point of Confucian representation is its emphasis on ‘for the people’. There is a clear 
responsiveness for being a genuine representative in relationship to the represented. Confucian 
representation theory pursues two main political goals, the welfare and cultivation of the people. 
The first is the pre-condition of the second. For the welfare of the people, hearing the people is 
necessary for recognition of the needs of the people. This hearing has three functions; reflection 
of the needs and opinions from the people, the procedure of selection of officials by 
recommendation, and the positive cooperation of the people in achievement of the welfare. 
Therefore, Confucian political theory must be rooted in legitimate representation in both 
concepts; standing for and acting for. Confucian representation is not just comprehended as the 
combination of ‘standing for’ and ‘acting for’ but also responsiveness in relationship between 
the representative and the represented. Insofar as the responsiveness accounts to hearing the 
people, respecting the people’s interest, and reflecting the people’s will, Confucian 
representation is a system operated by public opinion. In this sense, though Confucian 
representation does not bear equal participation in political decision making, it does not seem 
to be conflict with the principles of modern representative democracy. 
Another issue is the character of the representatives in Confucian representation. Confucian 
representative theory seems to suppose the principle of ‘by some qualified people.’ Now the 
problematic point is not this principle itself but how the qualification is only relevant to the 
position of representative in reference to modern representative democracy. If the Confucian 
representatives are technocrats in an elitist perspective in which the representative does not 
need to reflect the will of the people or should present his own judgment without considering 
the people’s mind, it may be hard to call it democratic. However, the very basic principle of the 
Confucian mandate is hearing the voice of the people. Even for the welfare and ultimately 
cultivation of the people, mutual cooperation is necessary. Though the goal of the Confucian 
mandate is clear as the best decision for the people, Confucian responsiveness is almost always 
not independent of the people’s perspective. Therefore, the issue is on the fairness or equality 
of the contestation procedure where other invalid factors which are not acceptable as reasonable 
in reference to political competence are excluded. And, hitherto, there seems no clear evidence 
                                           
97 Though, here, I do not argue that there has been that kind of idea like election by the people in Confucianism, 
in a later chapter, an example of idea of election from the very ground to emperor will be drawn in Jeong 
Yakyoung’s understanding of representation as a recruitment procedure from the bottom to top. 
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of anti-democratic elements which are impossible to be compatible with representative 
democracy in the mandate theory of Confucius and Mencius. 
There have been many arguments against the Confucian concept of mandate in the sense 
that the concept is not consistent with democracy because it seems authoritarian and 
hierarchical though it is comparable to representative theory in some senses. However, not just 
in the East but also in the West, there is a strong tradition of an anti-populist understanding of 
democracy. If we understand democracy that is fulfilled with not just procedure of broad or 
equal participation but also reasonable consequences, then there seems a room for legitimate 
representation consistent with democracy. In fact, this is the actual democracy where we live 
out daily life.  According to this view, the fact that Confucian representation does not allow 
participation of people who are not cultivated enough is not simply incompatible with 
democracy as long as the mandate is conditional depends on the mind of the people. In this case, 
we can say that Confucian representation stands on a legitimate authority and in this context 
this representation is authoritative rather than authoritarian. Not all the authoritative power is 
authoritarian. And Confucian representation is in a legitimate authority insofar as there is an 
idea of conditional government by mandate. 
 
 
8. Democracy and Virtue 
 
A. Two conceptions of democracy 
 
In previous sections, democracy has been examined with the relationship between political 
authority and equality. Then, it was provisionally concluded that legitimate political authority 
is based on a decision-making procedure by equal participation in democracy. Yet, the equal 
participation does not exclude the interference by some relevant reasons, and this is not in 
conflict with democratic authority. 
By this classification of the relationship between political authority and equality, the 
concept of democracy is understood with two contrasting views; the populist and the 
meritocratic. In representative democracy, these populist and meritocratic views have 
reasonable versions in terms of the character of the representative, namely mirror concept and 
distinctive concept.  
On the one hand, some say that the representative should be a mirror of the represented and 
the requirement from the representatives is similarity with the represented. This is basically an 
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argument that is inspired by the equal influence conception of democracy.98 The mirror concept 
of the representative is the only way to realize the equal influence of the individuals in 
representation. In other words, the mirror concept is a virtual version of the equal influence 
conception. In this mirror concept, there is no room for the virtue and this is a non-meritocratic 
conception of representation. This view seems to be in conformity with the democratic principle. 
Surely, this non-meritocratic conception of democracy has an affinity with the pure concept 
of democracy that is generally understood as government by ‘demos.’ In this conception, the 
representative body is a minimalized body of the represented. The only difference is the size 
and there is no substantive alteration. Hence, legislative power should be given only to the 
descriptive representative body. In addition, many complementary means of direct democracy 
such as referendums and petitions are preferred to representative decision-making. Broader 
deliberation in the public sphere and Dahl’s ‘Mini-populus’ also can be the solutions to cover 
the weak points of representative democracy. In this sense, this can be defined as a reasonable 
version of the populist view of democracy in the representative system. We can call this view 
the ‘equality primary conception’ of representative democracy. 
On the other hand, there is a view of that representatives must be a sort of competent agent. 
In both the principle and practice of modern representative democracy, this argument seems 
more realistic. In the history of modern politics, in general, the candidates have been required 
to have a certain distinctiveness from the constituency. This competence based representative 
democracy necessarily involves the differentiation of the role and character of individuals in 
the political decision-making procedure. In this conception of democracy, not all the people 
have same degree of influence on public affairs. If some are regarded as more proper agents 
with some specific issues by legitimate mandate, they may be engaged more decisively in the 
decision-making procedure. The selection can be varied not just by elections but by many other 
relevant considerations. These considerations do not contain only gender, race and religion but 
also education levels, examinations, reputation and numerous justifiable factors. Yet, clearly it 
is true that there is less room for ordinary people to participate in the political decision-making 
procedure than the equality based conception of democracy. For this reason, this democracy 
can be defined as a reasonable version of meritocratic conception of democracy in the modern 
representative system. It can be called the ‘competence primary conception’ of modern 
representative democracy. 
In sum, there are two types of variety in understanding of representative democracy. In the 
equality primary conception of representative democracy, the representative should be the 
                                           
98 It is distinctive from the Przeworskian participationist democracy because this equal influence view 
emphasizes ‘equality’ rather than ‘participation.’ 
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miniature of the whole represented. At least, it is supposed so and some complementary means 
elaborate the system. In this conception of democracy, while few rule in fact, it is regarded that 
there is no difference to rule by all. In contrast, in the competence primary conception of 
democracy, the representatives are required to have some specific competence from the 
represented. In this conception, they must be competent actors for the represented. In other 
words, if the populist and equality primary conception of democracy is a system where the 
democratic principle is dominant over representation, the meritocratic and competence primary 
conception embraces a representation leading form of democracy. 
Certainly, in these two views, the competence primary conception of democracy seems to 
consist of the most general form of legitimate government in modern politics. Also, in this 
system, some relevant social authority meets the democratic principle of political equality 
without conceptual contradiction. It is because the representatives are required a certain virtue 
and not all the people held those virtues. 
In conclusion, most democracies accommodate legitimate democratic political authority as 
its necessary condition. While it is undoubtedly often argued that any factors that can affect 
equal influence must be alienated in democracy, only irrelevant elements have been dismissed 
not just in practice and but also by principle. Relevant aspects such as competence are still 
legitimately influential in democratic decision-making procedures. This character of modern 
democracy is found plainly in the competence based conception of representative democracy. 
In this conception, the representative is required to have some virtues by the principle of 
distinctiveness. 
 
B. Relevant element of competence in Confucianism: ‘Virtue’ 
 
What I am concerned about in this thesis is not what Confucius actually said in his period. 
The point of this research is what Confucius and Mencius would say about contemporary 
representative democracy in the context of their ideas. This is an argument both for Confucian 
democracy and a Confucian reinterpretation of liberal democracy. 
Certainly, there is a methodological issue about this reinterpretation particularly with the 
Skinnerian view. According to the Skinnerian school, every idea of thinkers can only be, and 
should be, understood in the historical context, and others only evoke distortion of the ideas. 
However, as I present the set of methods of this thesis in chapter 2, there are many doubts 
whether Skinner himself could afford to realize his method in his own research. In addition, 
even though the Skinnerian view is a reasonable argument for the interpretation of political 
theories, there seems no consensus amongst the political theorists who are the best qualified to 
judge that the Skinnerian view is the only reasonable method. 
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As seen in reputation, the Skinnerian view is a dominant method in understanding political 
ideas as realistic in an historical context. However, as it can be said that no one has absolute 
intellectual ownership of certain idea, radically, there may be no ideas which are exclusively 
independent. If there is a reasonable influence from other ideas, whether some ideas can be 
called an ‘-ism’ or termed as ‘-rian’ may depend on the judgment of the relevant people. 
Likewise, as the Skinnerian view is regarded as a reasonable method in the research of political 
theory, some other methods can be nominated for another reasonable one only if it satisfies 
some basic conditions for judgment. 
This thesis does not aim to explain why and how Confucius and Mencius said something. 
Instead, this research aims to suggest some possible and reasonable ideas that are compatible 
with liberal democracy in their positions. This is not an argument against a Skinnerian but a 
study beyond that. In other words, this study is based on the interpretation of the ancient text in 
its historical context which, then, aims to apply the interpretation to the present world. If it is 
not a reasonable method in research or one that should be rejected, it seems hard to say which 
political theory is meaningful in the present day. 
In this methodological foundation, this thesis concerns the legitimacy of present 
representative democracy in a Confucian context. First, it is clear that irrelevant elements 
should be set aside from their influence on political equality. Neither Confucius or democratic 
theory will allow any irrelevant social inequality to be embedded in politics. It is not only 
because the embedment is a violation of political equality but also because it interrupts the 
possibility of good decisions. This interference cannot be justified in either procedure or 
consequence. Only some relevant aspects can be acceptable in both Confucian tradition and 
democratic principles. 
Second, it is necessary to examine whether some particular Confucian principles are 
consistent with democratic principles. One important essence of Confucian political thoughts 
is that all people have a similar human nature to be a sage by self-cultivation but only well-
cultivated people are qualified to participate in political decision-making. While the former 
supposes an equal chance to be a good citizen, the latter does not seem so democratic regarding 
its limit of participation. 
Now the problem is what the content of cultivation is and how it is relevant. First, it is 
obvious that Confucian cultivation is exclusively concerned with virtue. In a radical sense, an 
illiterate farmer could be the Son of Heaven if only he is the most virtuous person. Of course, 
it may be more reliable that the virtuous person has proper and practical competence in many 
areas of government because the virtue is based on practical wisdom through daily life not by 
academic education. Confucius and Mencius do not deny that in most cases education is the 
necessary way of self-cultivation. Yet that education does not necessarily require literacy. They 
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were interested in “how to make one’s way in life, not in discovering the truth” (Ames and 
Rosemont, 1998, p. 5). Confucius himself learnt Li [rites] by question and answer with the 
people, and one of the disciples of Confucius said that that education can be possible not only 
by reading but also by watching the teacher’s behaviour and its practices. 
In conclusion, democracy is a system where not all claims should be equally influential on 
the decision but where all claims should be put on the table as equal. Once, the claims are set 
on the table, only some reasonable claims could be and should be reflected through decision-
making procedures. In these procedures, not all the claims can be treated as equal. This is 
because the authority and legitimacy of decision-making depends on not only procedural justice 
but also the justifiability of the consequences. 
In modern representation, democratic authority necessarily demands competence and the 
competence is understood as relevant. This recognition procedure of relevance is confirmed by 
belief-systems in each society. As long as Confucian representative theory which is rooted in 
virtue consists of belief-system in East Asia more or less and it is recognised as relevant, 
Confucian political thought does not seem to be conflict with modern representative democracy. 
In addition, there is no doubt that this understanding will be fruitful for the development of 
representative democracy in Confucian East Asia. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
 
In modern politics, it is impossible talking about legitimacy without representation. Political 
legitimacy demands a certain necessary relationship between the ruler and the ruled. In this 
relationship, the ruled and the ruled are conceptually altered into the representative and the 
represented in modern representative democracy. For this relationship, thinking of democracy 
without representation is difficult in modern politics. The democratic relationship between the ruler 
and the ruled has become an essential condition for legitimate representation since modern 
democratic revolutions. Without representation, the government cannot be legitimate. In other 
words, representation is almost the only form of legitimate government in modern politics. 
In the West, since the Middle Ages, the concept of representation has acquired the meaning of 
‘act on behalf of some other(s).’ This concept of representation has become a core idea of 
government where the relationship between the representative and the represented has occupied 
much of the legitimation. In the modern period, there have been some ideas that aim to destroy the 
distinction of the ruler and ruled or at least to overturn the positions. In addition, in practice, many 
revolutionary events inspired by the French and Russia revolutions certainly aimed to achieve this 
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kind of destruction and transformation in the name of democracy.99 Nevertheless, democracy could 
not exclude the relationship of legitimacy and representation. Instead, the history of modern 
democracy has made a reasonable harmony of them. This is not a reluctant compromise but a 
normative agreement that induced representative democracy. 
In the concept of representation, mandate provides the basement for a specific authorization in 
a concept of limited government. The concept of mandate is defined as certain human activities by 
which some people are granted power to govern others by reference to a belief-system. And this is 
the point where the Confucian concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and the western mandatory 
theory meet each other. While western representation has developed from ‘the symbolic’ to ‘the 
substantive’ and from ‘standing for’ to ‘acting for’, the Confucian mandate combined both 
conceptions from the very beginning. 
In effect, the necessary conditions of representation, standing for and acting for are embraced 
in both modern democracy and Confucian thought. The concept of mandate as the foundation of 
representation is common to both theories. That specific authorization procedure evokes a 
normative sense of legitimacy and provides the idea of limited government. This principle of limited 
government is the core of democratic legitimacy in modern representative democracy. 
In addition, both the representative theory of the West and Confucianism are consistent with an 
epistemic concept of democracy through harmonization of contestation and participation. This 
combination needs some qualifications of representatives and it has to be revealed in performance 
and virtue. Though it seems to be in conflict with democracy in the equal influence conception, it 
is not so with the competence embedded conception of democracy. In representative democracy 
there are relevant reasons by that some disqualified opinions can be excluded in decision-making 
procedure. In this sense, the principle of the Confucian view of a qualified representative is 
consistent with democracy insofar as democracy is rule by public opinion not merely rule by the 
people. Democracy based on enlightened understanding and epistemic democracy also endorses 
both a distinctive concept of representative and an equal chance to participate. In representative 
democracy, this view is consistent with the concept of good type of representative as long as modern 
representative democracy is not a system that selects anyone but other than good people as 
representatives in both principle and practice. The concept of a distinctive qualification of the 
representative can be discovered in both Ancient Confucian thought and modern democracy. 
At this moment, we are faced with the naked features of modern democracy not merely with 
representation but also the notions of legitimacy, limited government and mandate. If only there are 
relevant reasons, equal influence or equal participation legitimately can give the way to the some 
other conception of democracy. In addition, at this moment, the concept of democracy itself 
                                           
99 The English and the American revolutions are surely exceptions to this stream. 
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becomes controversial. In other words, democracy needs to be scrutinised only with other 
foundational or derivative notions. One clear thing is that the notions should not be western original 
ideas, rather in comparative studies some neutral concepts need to be applied first. 
What I am inclined to say here is not that present representation is unreasonable, irrational, or 
invalid in terms of democratic principles. Instead, I am arguing that representative democracy is a 
complex entity of convention, custom, and contingency especially in its nature where mixed 
principles co-exist. As we have seen before in dealing with legitimacy, representation is a concept 
in which one common framework accommodates different meaningful and legitimate contents 
based on each belief-system, the form of life. 
Yet the complexity, diversity, and wide spectrum of concepts of representation do not mean 
obscurity. As Pitkin says, “representation does have an identifiable meaning, applied in different 
but controlled and discoverable ways in different contexts. It is not a vague and shifting, but a single, 
highly complex concept that has not changed much in its basic meaning since the seventeenth 
century” (Pitkin, 1967, p. 8). The representative stands for and acts for the people.  
In legitimacy, there is a necessary relationship between the ruler and the ruled. Yet, the sources, 
ways of operation, and substantive values involved in the relationship are exclusively dependent on 
each belief-system which is consistent with practices based on indigenous political culture. There 
seems a similar analogy in representation. Representation can be legitimate when it is based on an 
appropriate binding relationship between the representative and the represented. This kind of 
relationship should be recognized as reasonable amongst enough numbers of the community. It has 
not been changed even in the period when representation has been in conformity with democracy. 
Now, this is the time to turn the focus on whether the idea would be applied to East Asian 
history and thought.  
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Ch5. Political Legitimacy of Mandate of 
Heaven 
 
1. Introduction 
 
My research started from the conceptual analysis of political legitimacy. In previous chapters, 
I have claimed that South Korea does not have to rely on ‘borrowed legitimacy’ from the West 
insofar as political legitimacy should be founded fundamentally on practice and custom. Instead, 
this research argues that the traditional political thoughts of Confucianism could provide fruitful 
ideas of representative democracy which are consistent with democratic theory, particularly with 
an epistemic conception. 
As I have examined the essence of political legitimacy in contemporary politics in this thesis, 
representative democracy appears the most common and actually the only political system where 
democratic legitimacy has to be achieved. If we consider both the practical feature and normative 
principle of present day politics, it seems true that representation shapes democracy. It does not 
only mean that the representative system determines the features of democracy but also that 
different representative institutions could change the substantive part of democracy.  
In terms of legitimacy, I have discussed the constant tensions between representation and 
democracy in modern politics, particularly focusing on the role and virtue of representatives. There 
have been long lasting conflicts about principles of distinctiveness and resemblance in the character 
of the good representative. These controversies have also been involved with different views and 
traditions based on the belief-system in each society. Therefore, this thesis argues that these 
controversies can be solved only on the basis of practice and custom insofar as the role and 
character of representatives are crucial parts of political legitimacy in representative democracy. 
In this light, in East Asian politics, political legitimacy and representative democracy need to 
recruit some fruitful sources from the Confucian representative theory. Although it is true that 
democracy has not been developed in Confucian East Asia, it does not signify that there is no 
affinitive relation between Confucian thought and modern democracy. Instead, Confucianism has 
always been concerned with the legitimacy of government. In particular, as a political philosophy, 
it is no exaggeration to say that Confucianism is a set of thoughts on legitimate representation. In 
this sense, many of them seem to be able to provide reasonable grounds for legitimacy. This is the 
argument which will be examined in this chapter. 
For this argument, first I shall analysis the core idea of Confucian political thought; the concept 
of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and its interpretation in Mencius that the people’s mind is Heaven’s 
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mind. Second, the concept of Heaven seems a good candidate for the source of legitimacy in 
representative democracy though the concept itself and the means of interpretation, and how we 
can understand them in relation to modern democracy are still not so clear at this stage. Finally, 
this chapter argues that the Confucian mandate is consistent with representative democracy in 
which present East Asian governments can satisfy legitimacy with effective and necessarily 
indigenous political sources. 
 
 
2. Re-interpretation of Confucianism 
 
Many political theorists who have studied Confucianism have developed theories in relation to 
contemporary political values such as liberalism, democracy, and human rights.100 Theodore de 
Barry, one of the leading scholars tried to link Confucian values to essential Western ideas such as 
liberty and human rights. His two works, The Liberal Tradition in China (1983) and Asian Values 
and Human Rights (1988) may be sufficiently eligible to be called the epochal landmarks of 
Confucian study in the West. Bell (1995) argues for affinity between Confucianism and democracy 
in his Democracy in Confucian Societies: The Challenge of Justification. Since then, numerous 
works have been written by many theorists, and it may be impossible to discuss all the articles. Yet, 
it is clear that there have been some patterns of comparison in those studies. In terms of 
methodology, the scholars choose a way in which they emphasize the potential or immediate 
usefulness of Confucian values’ with some political issues which are essential for modern politics 
but which originated from the modern West. 
Of course, there are counter arguments against the advocacy of Confucianism and its utility in 
contemporary politics. For example, Huntington (1991; 1993; 1996; 2000) argues that 
Confucianism cannot be the source of Asian types of democracy because of the authoritarian nature 
of Confucian thought. Fukuyama (1995) is also not so optimistic about the relationship between 
Confucianism and democracy. Instead, he warned that though the interference and influence of 
Confucian ideas are inevitable in Asian countries, it should always be adopted carefully because 
the nature of Confucianism is authoritarian. 
Yet, there are also many arguments for the compatibility of western political ideas and 
Confucian thought in developed ways. For example, some recent research argued not only that 
                                           
100 There are many distinguished philosophical and religious theorists and works about Confucianism. They are 
essential to understand Confucian ideas and its values to everyone who is interested in Confucianism including 
political theorists. For example, Fung (1983 [1934])’s A History of Chinese Philosophy, Creel (1949)’s, 
Confucius, the Man and the Myth, Fingarette (1972)’s Confucius: The Secular as Sacred deserve regarding as 
modern classics about Confucianism. However, this thesis only focuses on the aspect of political thoughts of 
Confucianism in contemporary political studies. 
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there is compatibility between Confucianism and modern political ideas but also that Confucianism 
has alternative or more positive ideas for liberal democracy and humanity.101  They said that 
Confucianism deals with human self-realization in a deeper and greater way on the basis of the 
articulation and integration of individuals. 
However, it is also true that these researchers are always conscious of the external critics. It is 
easy to find some expressions that ‘although Non-Confucian liberals may not accept it …’ (Chen, 
2007, p. 206). There seems a deep and wide gap between different views about the possibility and 
necessity of compatibility between Confucian values and western or modern political values such 
as democracy, liberalism and human rights. 102 
Democracy, liberalism and human rights must be common values which are respected 
everywhere. Yet, those ideas are also concepts which have been discovered or invented in a recent 
period of human history in some cultural backgrounds. Probably this is one of the strong reasons 
why some researchers would not agree with the argument for compatibility between those values 
and some other cultures. If one becomes open-minded to cultural diversity, 103  a view for 
compatibility would be accepted more easily. However, in most cases, it seems difficult for the 
argument for compatibility to be understood.  
In fact, this is the reason why this thesis takes legitimacy of representation as the main political 
concept of analysis. There have been always governments in each community of human history 
and those governments must be required to be legitimate. It is simply because no government can 
survive without it. And, this thesis is based on the theory that political legitimacy is involved with 
a certain cultural background which confers a form of life in each society linked to its belief-system. 
In this sense, compatibility between Confucian thought and democracy (not liberal democracy) is 
necessarily demanded. 
Second, even though in Confucianism there seems absolutely no idea that can be linked with 
democracy, liberalism, human rights, the rule of law or any modern values, there is a concept and 
system of representation. In Confucian governments, there is a representative or a group of 
representative people who rule. In contemporary politics, whether it is liberal, communitarian, or 
constitutional democracy, if a government is democratic, it takes a form of representation to be 
legitimate. Hence, if we find out some elements for compatibility between Confucian ideas and 
                                           
101 See Lee (1996)’s ‘Liberal rights or/and Confucian Virtue?’, Hu (1997)’s ‘Confucianism and Western 
Democracy’, Chen (2007)’s ‘Is Confucianism compatible with liberal constitutional democracy?’, Kim (2010)’s 
‘Confucian Citizenship? Against Two Greek Models’ and Kim (2012)’s ‘To Become a Confucian Democratic 
Citizen: Against Meritocratic Elitism’. 
102 Parekh (1993) argues that present western democracy is a liberalism dominant democracy and it may not be 
necessary to consider it as the final version of democracy or ideal type. Rather, it is only a certain type of 
democracy which was invented in the West, and somewhere else many different types of democracies would be 
possible and necessary in the context of their culture, religion and tradition. 
103 Of course, it is not merely an issue of an open-mind. Instead, it needs a serious theoretical and philosophical 
discussion. However, it is also true that there is not a clear consensus about this issue yet. 
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modern representation and they are not against common sense, it would enable the development of 
politics in Confucian East Asia. In addition, if those elements of Confucianism could give some 
fruitful ideas which have not been discovered so in the West, its contribution would be not just 
essential for countries where Confucian tradition is still influential but also helpful for western 
countries.104 
Legitimacy and representation are important and radical values which are consistent with liberal 
democracy. In the theory of good government, they have a long history in politics. Much modern 
liberal democracy is still under the principles which are not in conflict with political development 
which we need now in Confucian East Asia. It is not meant that it does not care whether those 
values which may be found in Confucianism are accompanied with essential ideas for democracy 
and human rights. Most of all, any interpretations or re-interpretations of Confucianism which are 
in conflict with those political values would not be accepted by the people who are living in 
democracies in the present world. It means that the interpretation cannot win support and at the 
same time the interpretation cannot become a resource for legitimacy. In effect, there is no need 
even to consider some specific ideologies. Whether it is anti-democracy, the abuse of human rights, 
or just immorality, if enough number of people stubbornly refuse to accept a government and are 
ready to resist the representatives, there are already sufficient reasons for the government to be 
replaced by a new one. 
In fact, in previous chapters there are many arguments for the reasons why this thesis takes 
legitimacy and representation as its main subject. Yet, in this chapter, a more concrete and necessary 
ground is revealed. It is because the most political and key concept of Confucianism is the ‘Mandate 
of Heaven’ and all its implications are connected to legitimate government in representation. In 
addition, most of the ideas of the concept are not in conflict with modern political values.105 
 
 
3. Mandate of Heaven 
 
In this chapter, the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and its interpretation will be re-interpreted in terms of 
the political legitimacy of representative theory. Particularly this study focuses on two aspects. First, 
Mencius’ principles of mandate and the realization of the conceptions correspond to the legitimacy 
theory and are ultimately applicable to present democratic representation. Second, the concept of 
the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ is an idea that is necessarily based on the cooperative actions of the people. 
                                           
104 This is the view of Daniel A. Bell (1995, 2000). 
105 A difference must be distinguished between an idea that is not sufficiently democratic compared to liberal 
democracy and an idea that is not democratic. An idea can be useful for democracy or even be an alternative in a 
different way in some place even though it does not seem to satisfy western liberal democracy sufficiently. 
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Since Mencius himself had lived in the centre of the war period, he recognised well that Ren should 
contain substantial power to be persuasive. 106 Mencius supported this argument by arguing that in 
the cases of the great kings he found that all the kings had been granted voluntary support from the 
people to win the campaigns and vice versa. 
 
A. Mencius’ development of Confucius’ idea 
 
Confucius’ concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and its interpretation by Mencius that ‘the 
people’s mind is Heaven’s mind’ is still influential in present representative democracy in 
Korea particularly. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven is found in many different parts of 
Confucius’ Analects, Mencius’ Mencius, and other Confucian texts. However, the idea is 
expressed clearly in Mencius. It is a rather long discussion, but there is no better phrase which 
shows the idea of Mencius about the relationship between Heaven and the throne. This phrase 
(Mencius, 5A:5) will be considered by looking at separately. The first starts as follows; 
 
Wan Chang said, “Is it true that Yao gave the Empire to Shun?” Mencius said, “No. The Emperor 
cannot give the Empire to another.” “In that case who gave the Empire to Shun?” “Heaven gave it to 
him.” “You say Heaven gave it to him. Does this mean that Heaven gave him detailed and minimum 
instructions?” “No. Heaven does not speak but reveals itself through his acts and deeds.” “How does 
Heaven do this?” “The Emperor can recommend a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give 
this man the Empire; just as a feudal lord can recommend a man to the Emperor but he cannot make 
the Emperor bestow a fief on him, or a s a Counsellor can recommend a man to a feudal lord but 
cannot make the feudal lord appoint him a Counsellor. In antiquity, Yao recommend Shun to Heaven, 
and Heaven accepted him; he presented him to the people, and the people accepted him. Hence I said, 
‘Heaven does not speak but reveals itself by his acts and deeds.’”107 
 
Here, it is clear that the mandate cannot be granted by the Emperor, the previous king but 
Heaven. The Emperor recommends a man to Heaven, then, whether he is eligible or not depends 
on his personal acts and deeds. If the acts and deeds are sufficiently acceptable to Heaven, he 
                                           
106 The scholar who particularly focuses on this practical function is Jullien (2004). 
107 In this thesis, all the quotations of Mencius are based on the translation by Lau (1970). There are several 
authentic English translations including Legge (1861, 1893, 1895, and so on), Dobson (1963), Chai (father and 
son) (1965) and Lau (1970). Despite Lao’s translation being incorrect in places, generally it can be acceptable 
compared to others. In addition, because he is the only translator among the translators who was educated and 
had taught in the UK, it must be easier and familiar to British English readers. D. C. Lau received graduate 
training in philosophy at the University of Glasgow and had taught since 1950 in the School of Oriental and 
African Studies, University of London, where he has been a Professor since 1970. Of course, in some parts, the 
incorrect translations are remedied and replaced by correct and more accurate expressions by myself. Of the 
issues of English translation of Mencius, see Nivison (1980)’s ‘On Translating Mencius’. 
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would be a new ruler by the principle, Mandate of Heaven.  
The phrase that Yao recommends Shun to Heaven is generally interpreted that Yao appoints 
Shun as one of the highest ministers in his government. The requirement for a representative of 
the people entirely rests on the official performances of the candidate. In this sense, it can be 
called a ‘performance based’ mandate. In this case, the virtue of a representative only consists 
of sufficient administrative capacity to achieve certain goals. 
In this case, there seems no room for interference by the interest or will of the people in the 
relation between Heaven and the people. Yet, in terms of legitimacy, though performance itself 
can be a substantive element, it cannot be the fundamental source of legitimacy. The source 
comes from the reason-giving relationship between the representative and the represented 
within a belief-system. Most of all, the performance based mandate seems too abstract to be 
understood as a procedure of legitimation distinctive from justification ex post facto. Chang 
points out this. 
 
Wan Chang asked, “May I ask how he accepted by Heaven when recommended to it and how 
he was accepted by the people when presented to them?” Mencius replied, “When he was put in 
charge of sacrifices, the hundred spirits enjoyed them. This showed that Heaven accepted him. 
When he was put in charge of affairs, they were kept in order and the people were content. This 
showed that the people accepted him. Heaven gave it to him. The people gave it to him. Therefore 
I said, ‘The Emperor cannot give the Empire to another.’ 
 
Here, Mencius stressed the necessity of judgment. In this phrase, the fact that the affairs are 
well administered is based on the understanding that the people consent to accept the minister 
who carries them out. Thanks to the performance, the people might enjoy a well-ordered society 
and a peaceful life so that the people might welcome his appointment. This cause and effect 
sounds not so special at all. However, when we are reminded that in most pre-modern periods 
the ministers’ performances have not concerned the people but the rulers, this is not a negligible 
element. 
In terms of Pitkin’s concept, there is a huge gap between the ‘standing for’ and ‘acting for.’ 
Although most rulers and ministers stand for the people or the nation, before modern periods 
most of them had no idea that they had to act for the people. Yet, in the Confucian mandate 
theory, a clear duty of ‘acting for’ is being suggested as a necessary condition of legitimate 
government. 
In addition, in most medieval states, the exclusive judge who evaluates performances was 
also the ruler not the people. Yet, according to Mencius reply, in terms of judgment, Heaven 
and the people are the only subjects and there is no room for the ruler. The incumbent king only 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
１１４ 
 
has a right and a duty to recommend a person to Heaven. After the appointment there is no 
further consideration of his judgment. There is nothing left for the recommended person to do 
without waiting for the judgment by the people and ultimately Heaven. In this procedure of 
verification, Heaven does not care about the ruler’s interest or will. The candidate’s 
performance is concerned only with the people. In other words, the performance of those who 
are represented to Heaven is recognized only by the people. 
This recognition procedure implies two aspects of the Mandate of Heaven which are hidden 
in the previous part. First, the mandate is founded exclusively on the interest and will of the 
people. Second, the performances should only concern the interest of the people so that the 
people accept him. The people are the only object of the performances and the only subject of 
judgment as well. Here, acceptance by the common people is necessary for holding the mandate 
(Black, 2009, p. 97). 
While the interest of the people seems relatively clear as the welfare of the people, the ways 
of expressing the will of the people is not. Surely, there is a role and status for the people in the 
concept of the Mandate of Heaven, but the procedure is not concrete at this stage.108 In terms 
of democracy, the Confucian mandate does involve concepts such as of the people and for the 
people but not by the people. To say in the context of legitimacy, there should be voluntary and 
visible expressions and activities from the people. Those conditions seem not to be met fully 
yet. According to the three stages of legitimacy, till now only the first condition is achieved. 
The interest of the people and its connection to the idea of the Mandate of Heaven may be the 
source for legitimacy, whereas the operation procedure is not clear. We need more definite 
evidence for sufficient legitimation of this regime. Mencius provides the explanation for the 
next stage. 
 
Shun assisted Yao for twenty eight years. This is something which could not be brought about 
by man, but by Heaven alone. Yao died, and after the mourning period of three years, Shun 
withdrew to the south of South river, leaving Yao’s son in possession of the field, yet the feudal 
lords of the Empire coming to pay homage and those who engaged in litigation went to Shun, not 
to Yao’s son, and ballad singers sang the praises of Shun, not of Yao’s son. Hence, I said, ‘It was 
brought about by Heaven.’ Only then did Shun go to the Central Kingdoms and ascend the Imperial 
throne. If he had just moved into Yao’s palace and ousted his son, it would have been usurpation 
                                           
108 The relationship between the interest and the will of the people in representation is not clear. Surprisingly 
many theorists who study representation do not make it clear in their research except a few thinkers such as 
Pitkin. This conceptual analysis seems to be necessary for the foundation for the research of representation. For 
example, there could be a claim that in the liberal tradition of representation rather than the democratic, the will 
of the people may be a less important factor because it does not guarantee the interest of the people. Yet, since 
this chapter is not suitable to do the analysis, only democratic representation would be considered and tested as a 
general form of modern representation. 
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of the Empire, not receiving it from heaven. The Tai shih [Great Declaration] says, ‘Heaven sees 
with the eyes of its people. Heaven hears with the ears of its people’ (Mencius, 5A:5). 
 
In this part, the operation procedure was exposed. First, there is a weak concept of 
cooperation. Shun serves as a prime official for 28 years and it is regarded as unusual in this 
phrase. This unusually long career is understood to be a result of help from Heaven. Yet, it is 
not plausible that Heaven help him by some visible means because there is no such concept or 
idea of a personal god in Confucianism (Creel, 1949). 
Heaven does not speak by itself. The Confucian Heaven is not the personal god who speaks 
to humans directly, rather it seems closer to the cosmic order and the laws of nature. At the 
same time, it is also involved with political authority and legitimacy. In fact, whether the 
identity of Heaven can be interpreted as an absolute being that engages human lives or just an 
order of nature is not clear. Even in the many Confucian texts written by numerous Confucians, 
the features of Heaven are not coherent but various. 
However, one thing is obvious that there is a common idea among the Confucians that the 
Confucian Heaven is distinctive from a personal god such as the Christian God particularly in 
the Old Testament who communicates with people which his own voice. It is also not just an 
inanimate scientific entity which is absolutely separated from the people’s will or a moral 
foundation. It is also different from the concept of ‘Nature.’ (Ames and Rosemont, 1998, pp. 
46-48) The Confucian Heaven is in between the personal god and an inanimate object. In 
particular, in terms of politics and morality, though it is not like the Christian personal God who 
does corrective actions by himself, the Confucian Heaven has a key role in regulating human 
behaviours. Heaven shows its will basically by the natural order but also demonstrates political 
will through the people. In this sense, in Confucianism, 
 
Heaven hears and sees as our people hear and see; Heaven approves of actions and displays its 
warnings, as our people approve of actions and hold things in awe; this is the connection between 
the upper and lower worlds (The Book of History; Rainey, 2010, p. 5). 
 
Accordingly, the only possibility to be considered is the role of the people in relationship 
with Heaven. In this light, it is reasonable to infer that the successful performances will need 
sufficient cooperation from the people. Therefore, the phrase ‘Heaven’s help’ is understood to 
be Heaven follows the will of the people and their broad and active cooperation is the not only 
the evidence of the people’s will but also the cause of the consequence. 
While there was support and cooperation from the people during the performances of Shun 
as a minister, more positive and visible activities by the people followed after King Yao’s death. 
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Shun tried to disappear to enable the smooth succession of the throne from Yao to Yao’s son, 
whereas there were many clear evidences that the people still regarded Shun as their political 
leader. Even though Shun had definitely gone into retirement, the people continuously went to 
ask him to solve disputes among them and honoured him instead the son of Yao. Shun did not 
enforce this or abuse his former status to get this loyalty. The people’s following of Shun was 
surely a voluntary activity and might have been highly risky both to Shun and the people 
because there was an incumbent ruler, the son of Yao. However, the people did not hesitate to 
show their preference in regarding Shun as their real king, ruler, and representative. At this 
stage, “the Mandate of Heaven was equivalent to the support of the people” (Lewis, 1990, p. 
236; Black, 2009, p. 97). Therefore, now the authority of Heaven is the source of legitimacy in 
Confucianism and it is operated only by the people’s voluntary and collective activities. 
In many pre-modern societies, the king is the one who stands for the entire nation and the 
people who live in it. He or she represents the people and the nation. They are the exclusive 
chiefs and the sources of political authority. Yet, in most cases, there has been no need of a 
mandate that is specifically in reference to the people. Appointment or inheritance had been the 
major means to take the position of ruler. In some cases, military power and its practices had 
been the foundation of political authority. Though the normative elements of military 
performance would be helpful for the efficiency of empirical consequences, it had not been the 
necessary condition. In history, there must be some political communities where the 
government has depended on a religious mandate. However, most of the religious mandates 
have not been involved with the will or interest of the people to a meaningful degree. There 
have not been enough grounds that could justify or promote the interference of the people in 
mandate and representation. 
In contrast, in Confucian thought, any superb performance or a glorious inheritance would 
not be enough for a man to be an authentic ruler if there is no mandate of Heaven. The position 
of a king is not the absolute source of political authority at all. It is conditional in the sense that 
the ruling position is dependent on the mandate of Heaven and the people’s mind. In Confucian 
political theory, as the ministers and officers receive their authority from the king, the king 
himself receives his authority from Heaven. Heaven appoints men of virtue and wisdom as the 
rulers and teachers of the mass of the people (Hsu, 1975, p. 74).109 In sum, the procedures are 
as follows; in a general condition, the previous ruler recommends a candidate to Heaven, and 
the appointment by Heaven would be followed.110 
                                           
109 This is quoted from Hsu (p.74) but the term of ‘God’ is replaced by ‘Heaven’ in this thesis. In his book, Hsu 
does not distinguish God and Heaven, while it seems necessary to replace God by Heaven in most cases. In this 
thesis, except in inevitable cases, Hsu’s concepts of God and natural law are changed to Heaven. 
110 Confucian thinkers recognized that there were some extraordinary situations such as revolutions where a new 
ruler should be raised by the people without recommendation from the previous ruler. 
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B. What is the nature of the Confucian Heaven and how does it work with the people? 
 
Heaven is the sole source of political authority. Legitimation of a government can be fully 
achieved only by Mandate of Heaven. This Mandate of Heaven exclusively depends on the 
people’s visible activities and cooperation. In this sense, the concept of Heaven as the source 
of political legitimacy not only implies that the ruler’s position is optional but also that it is a 
secular procedure operated by active recognition by the people. 
There are three stages of procedure; a candidate is recommended, the candidate is tested, 
and the candidate is appointed. The appointed ruler can be removed by the mind of Heaven 
which is regarded as the people’s mind. In all three stages and principles, the function of the 
people’s mind is crucial. The king should hear the people’s voice to search for eligible and 
competitive candidates at the first stage. During the second, in order for the performances of 
the candidate to be successful, the people’s judgment and cooperation is necessary. Finally, the 
procedure of appointment by Heaven is confirmed by the people’s acceptance as a kind of 
political ratification. 
In sum, there are three stages of procedure in the recommendation, test, and appointment 
and also there are principles of screening, sanctioning and responsiveness. In fact, these 
procedures and principles are necessary conditions for good representation not just in the 
Confucian ancient world but also in contemporary representative democracy. Screening and 
sanctioning have to be done continuously in the perspective of responsiveness. 
Through the procedure, the principles of screening and sanctioning are operated. Both 
principles essentially consist of representative legitimacy. Incentive and sanction is one of the 
basic frames of legitimation (Beetham, 1991) and the effective tool of regulation of public 
office (Thompson, 2005). In representation, one of the main functions of elections is generally 
understood in the perspective of anticipatory voting (Mansbridge, 2003) in which the 
constituents judge the performance of the incumbent representatives by the principle of 
disappointment (Alonso, Keane, and Merkel, 2011, p. 6). By the systemic repetition of this 
sanctioning, screening of the representative is possible. Screening is clearly the purpose of the 
election in representation and this is the point where modern representative democracy is 
distinct from Ancient Greek democracy. The candidates are tested and better ones will be 
recommended and recruited into the higher positions. Not only public performances but also 
moral character will be considered because the Confucian representative is a model of the 
people in virtue.111 Bad performances and immorality would be judged by the people. By this 
                                           
111 In fact, the morality is important not just with this model perspective in Confucianism but also in general 
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screening and sanctioning, the Confucian representative should have competence which is 
responsive to the people’s interest and opinion. 
Even after the final candidate becomes a ruler, sanctioning is still being operated. In 
addition, there is no confirmed tem of the position. Ironically, while the Confucian ruler is 
known as an absolute monarch, there is no other position that is more conditional in principle. 
In order to avoid the sanctioning, the ruler always has to pay attention to the voice of the people. 
The needs, interests, and will of the people are the prior issues for the ruler to be a genuine and 
legitimate representative. The ruler should make efforts to respect and reflect the will and 
interests of the people. This does not mean that the Confucian ruler should deliver the raw 
opinions of the people to laws and policies. The Confucian representative is neither a technocrat 
who makes a decision in dependence on the people’s opinion nor a delegate who completely 
relies on the people’s raw view at any moment. Instead, there is a duty to do the best to make 
better decisions in responsiveness to the people.  
In this understanding of the Mandate of Heaven, the king of China has been called ‘Son of 
Heaven (천자:天子)’. In fact, the name, Son of Heaven itself seems not so unique. Rather, it might 
be a popular concept in many different ancient worlds such as Egypt and Latin America. The 
implication is that Heaven is the source of legitimacy that Finer points out in the frame of belief-
system. However, there are at least three distinctive characteristics in Confucian representation. 
First, in the Confucian East, the name, Son of Heaven, has been understood as an optional 
and temporary position of the ruler so that the ruler is only legitimate under the Mandate of 
Heaven. In contrast, in most other cases where political authority is based on Heaven, the name 
might mainly be used to emphasize the absoluteness of the ruling position. While most of the 
other rulers had enjoyed absolute power based on a religious foundation in the strong 
symbolism of Heaven and its son, Confucian Chinese rulers had been continuously tested and 
required to fulfil moral and public duties. In effect, while it is a common idea that the concept 
Heaven provides the foundation of absolute power in Confucian society, Heaven provides a 
conditional character of the position of a ruler. In other words, Confucian representation always 
requires a limited government.112 
Second, the operation procedure of legitimation is also quite distinctive. In Confucianism, 
there are few ideas that can be linked to a religious concept of Heaven. For this reason, the 
operation from source to substantive level is literally secular from the very beginning. 
                                           
representative democracy because the morality must be involved with more serious performance in future. For 
instance, it is not inappropriate to regard that honesty in character of a politician would grant more expectation 
of the realization of her promise in campaign. See Susan Mendus (2009) and Elizabeth Wolgast (1991). I will 
deal with this issue in chapter 7 in the concept of integrity of virtue. 
112 In this light, it may not be true to say that a conditional mandate in relation with the people is only possible in 
democracy. 
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Confucians do not depend on an oracle, a divination sign or an illusion. They only accept 
reasonable secular means, the people’s opinion. The secular operation procedure is to see and 
to hear the people’s mind. 
Finally, there is a clear substantive feature of legitimacy in the Confucian ‘Mandate of 
Heaven’. In history, there are many rulers who do not care for the people’s welfare but are 
respected as a great king. However, in the concept of the Confucian ‘Mandate of Heaven’, they 
cannot be a legitimate representative and because the government does not satisfy the 
substantive condition. Confucius and Mencius always say that the reason for being of a 
government is to provide a sufficient degree of welfare and education for all people under the 
government. Mencius argues that the first is to regulate the livelihood of the people, then, the 
ruler could urge them to do the good (Mencius, 1A:7). 
Welfare and education are necessary conditions for both the self-cultivation of individuals 
and the legitimation of a government. The ultimate goal of Confucianism is to make the people 
pursue the good in character and in behaviour in the relationships of the community. For this, 
education is essential. Yet, education is only possible on the basis of sufficient welfare for all 
the people. If a ruler makes a goal of government only the wealth or strength of the state or the 
material prosperity of the people, he is not a son of Heaven, even though he is represented to 
Heaven and accepted by the people. If a ruler abuses the military power so that the people fall 
increasingly into in a cruel situation of war, he is not a son of Heaven even though he has a 
good purpose according to those two Confucian substantive conditions. It is because the Son of 
Heaven’s way to govern would become a model to all the people as a way to be a good person. 
In this case, the ruler who abuses physical power fails in the operation procedure and the 
substantive condition as well. 
In conclusion, in Confucian representation, the name and status of the Son of Heaven is 
only valid during the time in which the rulers perform their duties and their conduct and affairs 
must be recognized by the people. The performance is only subject to the people’s welfare and 
moral development. Heaven provides the optional position to the ruler, and the people are the 
only subjects who evaluate the ruler’s performance. Yet, this is far from any concept of 
populism or cannot be possible by invalid manipulation because the Confucians (or Sages) 
always look at whether the performance satisfies the substantive condition. This is the 
relationship of the conditional contract between Heaven, the ruler, and the people.113 In this 
light, it may be possible to say that the Confucian concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ satisfies 
the conditions for legitimacy; resource, operation and substance in principle. Now we turn to 
                                           
113 This kind of contract needs not to be understood only by the social contract theory. Rather, this idea has been 
in common in general. Lin and Chen call this Confucian idea a “contract-based social connection” (Lin, 1996, 
2003: Chen, 2007, p. 204). 
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the practical application in Mencius, particularly focus on the operation procedure and the 
substantive condition. Once, the character of Heaven as the source of legitimacy becomes clear 
in distinction from the religious concept, the problematic issue whether it is meaningful in 
present representation may depend on the operation and substance. 
 
C. Applications in Mencius: ‘Revolution’114 
 
In the concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ and its application in Mencius, at least two 
principles are revealed. The first is that though Heaven is the source of political legitimacy, it 
does not speak on its own. It only speaks following on people’s mind. The people’s recognition 
and ratification by visible cooperative activities consist of the operation procedure for 
legitimate government. Second, there must be substantive elements for a legitimate ruler. He 
must take care of the people’s welfare first. This must emerge from all his performance and will 
be judged by the people. In this part, it would be examined that how those two principles are 
related to the virtue of a representative. 
 
Operational Procedure of People’s Mind 
 
The clearest case in which the Mandate of Heaven’s application has been maximized is 
revealed in the example of the justification of the overthrow of the government of vicious kings. 
 
King Hsuan of state Chi asked, “Is it true that King Tang banished Chieh, and the King Wu 
marched against Tchou?” Mencius replied, “It is so recorded.” “Is regicide permissible?” “A man 
who mutilates Ren is a mutilator, while one who cripples Yi [義: rightness or justice] is a crippler. 
He who is both a mutilator and crippler is an outcast. I have indeed heard of the punishment of the 
                                           
114 In general, Confucius has been interpreted as a moderate compared to Mencius because he has never argued 
directly for the justification of revolution. But, there seems to be a historical misunderstanding in this 
comprehension. To be sure, Confucius says that if the ruler would not accept the sage’s advice, the sage would 
be better to leave. Of course, it does not mean giving up of good politics or provide an excuse for the duty of the 
sage. Rather, the sage’s leaving has a function to show how the ruler is wrong. In this sense, Confucius’ advice 
can be read as negative resistance. Mencius elaborated on Confucius’ argument. Mencius clearly suggests more 
positive resistance. To be precise, he says that the sage should organize a revolution if a tyranny reaches a stage 
where the people could not bear any more. However, about Confucius’ negative resistance, Mencius and other 
Confucians did not criticize Confucius’ principle as too weak or wrong. It is not because that they have blind 
faith in the doctrine of Confucius but because they have known well that the times and circumstances were 
different between Confucius and themselves. In fact, while the emperor’s authority had been respected 
regardless of substantive power during the period of Confucius, in Mencius’ time nothing remained like the 
formal respect.  This is the reason why the period of Confucius is called ‘The Spring and Autumn’ and the time 
of Mencius is named ‘The Warring States.’ In the former period, leaving was enough to bring change because 
there were still some virtues, whereas in the latter, revolution is necessary for saving the people under the tyrant 
urgently. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
１２１ 
 
outcast Tchou, but I have not heard of any regicide” (Mencius, 1B:8). 
 
Confucius suggests leaving as a solution when a minister is faced with deadlock after all 
the attempt to correct the ruler’s faults. In Mencius, not only leaving but also killing the tyrant 
is allowed and suggested as necessary for the people under a tyrant. To Mencius, killing 
someone of the household is the worst immoral crime in the world, and killing someone in the 
community is murder. But in the case of tyranny, he says that ‘I only heard that the tyrant was 
killed not that a ruler was murdered.’ In this sense, there is a decisive distinction between a 
revolution against a tyrant and the murder of a person (Hsu, 1975, p. 57). Killing a tyrant is not 
regicide but a just punishment. 
The particular point is that the tyrant is not a legitimate ruler at the moment. He has already 
lost the position of ruler and representative and is just a wicked criminal who committed 
mutilating Ren and crippling Yi. What Mencius makes clear is that though he looks like the king 
incumbent, in fact he is not a genuine ruler at all. In Mencius theory, a tyrant is not a bad or 
even the worst king, but simply not a king. In order for a king to be a king, there should be the 
Mandate of Heaven. If there is no Mandate of Heaven, he is not a king at all in any sense. Hence, 
when he is punished, he is not a culprit but already a convict. And, these crimes are most vicious 
and harmful for the people so that the criminal deserves to receive a fair penalty. Therefore, 
revolutionary actions are necessary and praiseworthy behaviour.115 
Yet, even though we put aside the issue when and how the action could be justifiable,116 
killing a ruler causes another substantive issue; how to avoid an anarchist situation? In addition, 
the periods of Confucius and Mencius are the ages of Wars. If they do not show the next step 
of the people who are governed by the tyrant, the people could be faced with a worse situation 
without a sovereign, such as being slaves. The answer of Mencius is that the better and real 
sovereign only has the right to kill the tyrant and the people would be protected by the new 
ruler. In other words, the candidate to be a new ruler should already be a real ruler in the sense 
that the people already regard him as a new ruler, and the first thing he has to do is to perform 
the duty of overthrow the one who is fake, a ruler in name only. He would have to correct the 
name of ‘Son of Heaven’.117 
                                           
115 The argument that the sages have a right to resist a tyrant may be compared to Locke’s claim for the 
justification of resistance. Yet, while Locke’s individuals resist a tyrant to protect his or her own life and 
interests, Mencius’ sages rise against the tyrant to save others’ lives even giving up the chance to escape. 
Resistance is not a right but a duty. Of course, this kind of sacrifice is a common idea all over the world. Yet, the 
duty is a burden to the highest class, namely nobles in the West; an occupation of any person who is enlightened 
morally more than others in the Confucian East. In the latter, they were generally intellectuals, teachers, and 
students. 
116 I will put this later in this section. 
117 Of course, there must be more moderate situations such as the king is not enough to be a genuine Confucian 
ruler but also not such a tyrant. Mencius also seems to thinks of it. In that case, he appears to anticipate 
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At this stage, there are some legitimate operations in the process of overthrowing the 
tyranny. Given Mencius’ interpretation of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’, Heaven speaks through the 
people; Heaven’s mind is the people’s mind. Yet, according to the theories of legitimacy, the 
mind should be expressed by visual activities such as voluntary and cooperative actions 
(Beetham, 1997). If so, is there any argument for those activities in Mencius? Surely there is. 
The conditions and procedures are revealed in Mencius. King Hui of Liang asked about this 
point. His state was much smaller and weaker than the states around and he was defeated three 
times in the wars with these states. For this reason, he asked the question how he could get 
revenge successfully when he met Mencius. Mencius answered as follows: 
 
“A territory of a hundred Li’ square118 is sufficient to enable its ruler to become a true King. If 
Your Majesty practices a government of Ren toward the people, reduces punishment and taxation, 
gets the people to plough deeply and weed promptly, and if the able-bodied men learn in their spare 
time, to be good sons and good younger brothers, loyal to their prince and true to their words, so 
that they will in the family, serve their fathers and elder brothers, and outside the family, serve their 
elders and superiors, then they can be made to inflict defeat on the strong armour and sharp 
weapons of state Qin and state Chu armed with nothing but stave (Mencius, 1A:5).” 
 
Although the king Hui is a ruler of a small state, it is only if he shows the politics of Ren, 
that he deserves to be a king of a great kingdom. In this phrase, Mencius’s suggestion should 
be understood as not only normative but also a practical strategy. Like many other great 
Confucian scholars, Mencius is not such an idealist that he is out of touch with reality. For 
example, in another part of Mencius, he advises that a small state should be obedient to a large 
state in the order of Heaven (Mencius, 1A:3), and a wise king of a small state should wait for 
the right time in a preparation by good policies of Ren (Jullien, 2002, p. 212). 
Accordingly, the case of King Hui of Liang can be interpreted as the Liang state not being 
too small or weak to undergo war with the Qin state and the Chu state. In Mencius view, Lianq 
is a state that has a potential power to defeat the other two states in a certain situation. According 
to Mencius, there are at least two possibilities. First, Liang can be strong enough to carry out 
the war against the two enemies by the politics of Ren. These politics would bring not just the 
welfare of the state but also robust patriotism amongst the people. Second, the Qin state and 
the Chu state seems strong now but domestic solidarity and loyalty among the people may be 
relatively weak. In this case, if the people recognize Liang’s king as a new genuine ruler, they 
would betray the incumbent king. In this light, therefore, it is reasonable to understand Mencius 
                                           
correction by some regulations in charge of Confucian Sage (Mencius, 7A:31). This is also a decisive point in 
terms of the role of sage as a genuine representative and will be drawn in latter section. 
118 ‘Li’ is a unit of length which is about 0.4km. 
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advice as morally embedded practical guidance in military affairs (Bell, 2006, p. 30; Twiss and 
Chan, 2012, p. 469). 
Then, Mencius’ encouragement for the king Hui of Liang is understood in the practical 
sense of modern war of the national state in which not only the soldiers but also most ordinary 
people are necessarily involved. Clausewitz (1989 [1832]) argued that in modern war the most 
important factor which determines victory or defeat is not the strategy or weapon but the will 
of the soldiers and more decisively the desire of the people. Particularly, he distinguished the 
wars before and after the French Revolution, and claimed that the nature of war had been 
completely changed forever after the birth of the national state. He said that it is almost 
impossible to defeat the national state where millions of people bounded with patriotism and 
are ready to die for their country. Here, Clausewitz was pointing out the fact that previous wars 
were disputes between kings and princes desiring power with the people just enforced into 
military service, whereas modern wars are accomplished by national people who come to the 
field of war voluntarily and enthusiastically. The following quotations of Mencius seem to fit 
perfectly the sense Clausewitz intended. 
 
“If you will put in practice a Ren (benevolent) government, this people will love you and all 
above them, and will die for their officers” (Mencius, 1B:12). 
 
The duke Wan of state Tang asked Mencius, saying, “Tang is a small kingdom, and lies between 
Chi and Chu. Shall I serve Chi? Or shall I serve Chu?” Mencius replied, “This plan which you 
propose is beyond me. If you will have me counsel you, there is one thing I can suggest. Dig deeper 
your moats; build higher your walls; guard them as well as your people who are prepared to die in 
your side and will not leave you; this is a proper course” (Mencius, 1B:13) 
 
The historical term, ‘the Warring States’ designates the period of Mencius. Confucianism 
known as a philosophy of morality is produced from the centre of extreme wars. Unlike Taoists, 
Confucians did not argue that the solution of serious violence and conflicts between states is to 
dissolve the state or its powers. They are not moral idealists or unrealistic optimists. On the one 
hand, Legalists argued that strict laws and rigorous execution were the only way to win the war. 
Yet, on the other hand, Mencius suggested an alternative. First, Mencius talked about the 
cooperative actions of the people who are under the government of Ren. They are delighted to 
participate in war with the ruler of Ren. So far, so good. Yet, can the governance of Ren work 
at war practically? This is a question whether the virtue can work in practice against external 
enemies. Mencius wrote this about it. 
 
“The rulers of those States rob their people of their time, so that they cannot plough and weed 
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their fields, in order to support their parents. Their parents suffer from cold and hunger. Brothers, 
wives, and children are separated and scattered abroad. Those rulers, as it were, drive their people 
into pit-falls, or drown them. Your Majesty will go to punish them. In such a case, who will oppose 
your Majesty? In accordance with this is the saying, ‘The Ren (benevolent) has no enemy.’ I beg 
your Majesty not to doubt what I say” (Mencius, 1A:5). 
 
In this answer, Mencius refers to a situation where there is not strong opposition because 
the people of the enemy states cannot afford to stand up against the war. In this sense, the 
operation of the source for legitimacy is based on the cooperative and voluntary participation 
of the ruler’s people in war. If a ruler is qualified to be a legitimate king, and if he wants to 
conquer other states where the people suffer from vicious government and his people are ready 
to participate in the war, he could be a ‘Son of God’. In addition he could triumph with the 
strength of his people and the weakness of the people of other states. Here, Heaven speaks 
through the people of the ruler. 
Yet, there still seems to be something more. Why does Heaven not speak through the people 
under vicious and brutal government? Mencius referred to this. He says that there must be clear 
and strong actions which show the voluntary agreement of the people who are conquered. A 
king asked Mencius whether he can get a state Yen. Mencius answered, 
 
“If the people of state Yen will be pleased with your taking possession of it, then do so. Among 
the ancients there was one who acted on this principle, namely king Wu. If the people of Yen will 
not be pleased with your taking possession of it, then do not do so. Among the ancients there was 
one who acted on this principle, namely king Wan. When, with all the strength of your country of 
ten thousand chariots, you attacked another country of ten thousand chariots, and the people 
brought baskets of rice and vessels of congee, to meet your Majesty's host; was there any other 
reason for this but that they hoped to escape out of fire and water?” (Mencius, 1B:10) 
 
The people who are living in the conquered state may be the strongest bearer of Heaven’s 
voice in this example. They clearly show how they welcome the conqueror as a new ruler, a 
real ruler, by voluntary visible actions of support. This is the practical power of governance of 
Ren. 
Heaven is the source of legitimacy. Most of all, the name, ‘Son of Heaven’ shows this 
explicitly. There have been many other ‘Sons of Heaven’ in different ancient civilizations, yet 
many of them depended on religious authority. Instead, for Confucian rulers, the Son of Heaven 
is only evaluated by political competence and its practices. The conduct and affairs are the 
visible expression of his character, Ren. It has emerged dramatically in a war situation, and it is 
Mencius who could see the extreme of chaos and recognize the power of Ren. The power of 
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Ren is not limited within a victory of war itself. The power of good government and the triumph 
go beyond a war. Its massive potential strength is shown in the follow passage, 
 
Mencius said, “There are men who say, ‘I am skilful at marshalling troops, I am skilful at 
conducting a battle!’ They are great criminals. If the ruler loves Ren (benevolence), he will have 
no enemy in the kingdom. When Tang was executing his work of correction in the south, the rude 
tribes on the north murmured. When he was executing it in the east, the rude tribes on the west 
murmured. Their cry was ‘Why does he make us last?’ When king Wu punished the state Yin, he 
had only three hundred chariots of war, and three thousand life-guards. The king said, ‘Do not fear. 
Let me give you repose. I am no enemy to the people!’ On this, they bowed their heads to the earth, 
like the horns of animals falling off. The term ‘Royal correction’ is but another word for rectifying. 
Each State wishing itself to be corrected, what need is there for fighting (Mencius, 10B:4)?” 
 
Why were the rulers so fearful hearing the sigh from the people? If the people cry like that, 
how is it that the rulers cannot be better than before? If a good ruler of the smallest state wins 
a victory over the bigger state next and the news spreads to all states, all rulers ‘under-Heaven’ 
need to be disillusioned. Here, Mencius changes the nature of contemporary war and sees the 
real power of the people. He wakes up the ruler and all the people ‘under-Heaven’. 
In fact, this is not a new invention of the idea of revolution but an interpretation completely 
within the very basic principle of Confucius. Confucius says that if the rulers keep the 
performance in their states, the states would be extended beyond the seas;  
 
I have heard that rulers of states and chiefs of families are not troubled lest their people should 
be few, but are troubled lest they should not keep their several places. … Therefore, if remoter 
people are not submissive, all the influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract 
them to be so; and when they have been so attracted, they must be made contented and tranquil 
(Analects, 16:1). 
 
As John Wu (1967b, p. 341) says, to remain in human society is one thing, but to join a 
good government is another thing in the distinction between life in nature and in the state. Of 
course, this claim would be meaningful only in a situation where there is no barrier to move 
from one state to another. At least, that was true in the periods of Confucius and Mencius. In all 
their travels from state to state, they did not need to explain the reason for their movement or 
to show any certificate for valid travel. Most of all, in Confucian thought, there is a clear idea 
that the individual is free to choose the ruler he would like to serve. In addition, even though 
he is in a position of minister, he is free to leave his office if he is displeased with the ruler’s 
governance. In many cases, it is not only his right but his duty. As Confucius says, the 
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performance of the leaving itself has a function in dismissing the legitimacy of the 
government.119 In this sense, freedom of movement surely had been a practical condition for 
operation of the normative function of the Confucians’ choice. 
The function of freedom of movement among states is not just limited in the case of 
Confucians. It also explains the relationship between good politics and the influx of population. 
In contrast, bad politics should drive the people out. In fact, as seen above, this is the foundation 
for Mencius’ argument for revolution. Yet, if the principle can only be operated in a war 
situation, it seems not enough to be a general axiom. Mencius explains the application of the 
principle in a peaceful era. He shows how the state becomes stronger or is extended as follows: 
 
Mencius said, “If a ruler give honour to men of wisdom and employ the men of talent, so that 
offices shall all be filled by individuals of distinction and virtue; then all the scholars of under-
Heaven will be pleased, and wish to stand in his government. If, in the market-place of his capital, 
he levy a ground-rent on the shops but do not tax the goods, or enforce the proper regulations 
without levying a ground-rent; then all the traders of under-Heaven will be pleased, and wish to 
store their goods in his market-place. If, at his frontier-passes, there be an inspection of persons, 
but no taxes charged on goods or other articles, then all the travellers of the under-Heaven will be 
pleased, and wish to make their tours on his roads. If he requires that the famers give their mutual 
aid to cultivate the public field, and exact no other taxes from them; then all the famers of under-
Heaven will be pleased, and wish to plough in his fields. If a ruler can truly practice these five 
things, then the people in the neighbouring kingdoms will look up to him as a parent. From the first 
birth of mankind till now, never has any one led children to attack their parent, and succeeded in 
his design. Thus, such a ruler will not have an enemy in all under-Heaven, and he who has no 
enemy in under-Heaven is the minister of Heaven. Never has there been a ruler in such a case who 
did not attain to the ‘Royal dignity’ (Mencius, 2A:6).” 
 
Procedural and Substantive Condition: Welfare of the People 
 
The welfare of the people has two functions in Confucian representation. First, it is the 
basis of judgment whether a minister’s performance is sufficient to regard him as a candidate 
for the ruler. In this case, the welfare of the people is a part of the operation procedure in the 
legitimation of Confucian representation. The people may be the best judge because the people 
themselves are the object of the performances. Second, whether the performance is successful 
or not itself becomes the standard for judgment because most of the minister’s policies and 
ideas may not be realized without the cooperation of the people. Not only in an exceptional 
                                           
119 Moving of virtuous Confucians or sages not only provides a standard of morality of a government but also 
practically power with its existence (Mencius, 6B:6).  
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situation such as war or massive civil engineering works but also in an ordinary period, the 
prospect of success needs a high degree of collaboration by the people. If the former as the 
standard of judgment is about the consequence of the performance, the latter is about the beliefs 
of the people on the character of the minister. In this sense, the welfare of the people is involved 
both in operation and substance in Confucian representative legitimation. 
In terms of the function of standard, Mencius may be the strongest advocator in 
Confucianism. When Mencius was given a question how to legitimate a government, he said 
that ‘look after the old who do not have offspring to be taken care (Mencius, 1A:7).’ This is the 
basic standard of welfare for legitimate government. 
Yet, the reason why welfare is the most intrinsic condition for legitimate government is not 
just for the requirement of basic livelihood but for the personality of human beings. Although 
Confucius is well aware of the importance of the welfare of the people, Mencius is the one who 
clearly explains the relationship between material livelihood and morality. The reason why the 
lack of welfare is fatal to the people is that poverty causes all the evil of human beings. 
According to Mencius, poverty is the source of all moral and social evil (Rainey, 2010, p. 98). 
For this reason, Mencius condemns the government which does not provide sufficient welfare 
for the people. He says,  
 
In years of plenty, most young men are quiet; in years of poverty, most young men are violent; 
it is not that the potential that Heaven has sent down to them changes. They become violent because 
of what traps and drowns their mind and hearts (Mencius, 6A:7). 
 
If a person who is not a sage commits a crime because of poverty, it is not his fault but the 
responsibility of the government and the ruler. Of course, not all the people immediately 
become a criminal when they fall into poverty. Yet, most of them, even good men should have 
to do something not only for himself but also for his family. In this sense, Mencius understands 
the relationship between welfare and humanity at a practical level. In general, it is understood 
as a relationship between ‘constant production (항산 恒産)’ and ‘constant mind (항심 恒心)’. He 
says, 
 
They are only men of education, who, without a certain livelihood, are able to maintain a 
constant mind. As to the people, if they have not a certain livelihood, it follows that they will not 
have a constant mind. And if they have not a constant mind, there is nothing which they will not do, 
in the way of self-abandonment, of moral deflection, of depravity, and of wild license. When they 
thus have been involved in crime, to follow them up and punish them; this is to entrap the people. 
How can such a thing as entrapping the people be done under the rule of a man of Ren? (Mencius, 
1A:7) 
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The ruler’s job is to care for the people. To Mencius, the ruler is not a man who has authority 
to order the people but a man who takes care of the people (Rainey, 2010, p. 96). Government 
has a duty to make the people happy and prosperous (Hsu, 1975, p. 65). In some senses, every 
ruler of a state is a kind of a representative. Yet, there would be severe differences depending 
on whether the ruler has any duty in relation to the welfare of the people. The difference and its 
implications are clearer when we compare the conceptions of Confucius ‘Son of Heaven’ with 
the concept of representative for princes and kings of medieval ages. According to Pitkin (Pitkin, 
1967, pp. 246-252), until the 17th century, while there has been an idea of ‘standing for’ as a 
meaning of representative from the 12th century in the West, there was absolutely no conception 
of ‘acting for.’ However, in Confucian tradition, the concept of representative immediately 
takes the implication of ‘acting for’ from the very beginning. In other words, without ‘acting 
for’, no one can ‘stand for’ in the Confucian state. 
However, the welfare of the people is not limited to a standard function of judgment. In 
fact, the degree of welfare is always connected to the operational procedure. Not in an extreme 
situation such as war, but also in an ordinary period, performances of policy such as taxation 
are necessarily related to the people’s judgment and actions. At the time of Mencius, tax is one 
of the most important considerations in the goal of welfare. Mencius repeatedly said about this. 
 
If, in the market-place of, he [a ruler] levy a ground-rent on the shops but do not tax the goods, 
or enforce the proper regulations without levying a ground rent; then all the traders of the kingdom 
will be pleased, and wish to store their goods in his market place. If, at his frontier-passes, there be 
an inspection of persons, but no taxes charged on goods or other articles, then all the travellers of 
the kingdom will be pleased, and wish to make their tours on his roads. If he requires that the farmers 
give their mutual aid to cultivate the public field, and exact no other taxes from them; then all the 
famers of the kingdom will be pleased, and wish to plough in his fields. If he does not exact the fine 
of the those people who do not work or grow mulberry tree for cloth, then all the people of the 
kingdom will be pleased, and wish to come and become his people (Mencius, 2A:5).120 
 
Here, again, Mencius is aware of the practical power of good politics by appropriate tax 
regulation.121 He emphasizes that if there is a better tax system in a state, all the people of other 
states may want to move to the state. The people show their support for the government by 
visible and even risky actions and those actions not only directly grant legitimacy to the state 
                                           
120 Mencius mentioned not only about the tax by goods or money but also claims that the government should be 
careful with the tax in service. He says that people should not be taxed in service during the farming season in 
order that the people should be free from famine (Hsu, 1975, 65; Mencius, 1A:3). 
121 Confucius and Mencius suggest 1/10 or 1/9 tax for land hire for farming in general. 
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but also make the state stronger. The distinction between the legitimate and the strong collapses 
here.122 In effect, there is a strong logical cause and effect between ‘enjoy with the people’ and 
‘becoming the stronger state.’ In this sense, welfare is not only a substantive condition but also 
the decisive element for the operation procedure. The logic of operation procedure is explained 
by a parable of two friends. 
 
Mencius said to the king Hsuan of state Chi, “Suppose that one of your Majesty’s ministers 
were to entrust his wife and children to the care of his friend, while he himself went into Chu to 
travel, and that, on his return, he should find that the friend had let his wife and children suffer from 
cold and hunger; how ought he to deal with him?” The king said, “He should cast him off.” Mencius 
proceeded, “Suppose that the chief criminal judge could not regulate the officers under him, how to 
deal with him?” The king said, “Dismiss him.” Mencius again said, “If within the four borders of 
your kingdom there is not good government, what is to be done?” The king looked to the right and 
left, and spoke of other matters (Mencius, 1B:6). 
 
In this parable, the friend who entrusts his family to his friend represents Heaven, and the 
other friend who is entrusted is ‘a ruler’. The family members signify ‘the people’. Daniel A. 
Bell (2000, p. 303) explains this Confucian relationship between Heaven, the ruler and the 
people as a connection between owner and tenant. The owner of ‘all-under-Heaven’ is Heaven. 
The ruler is a servant who has a duty to take care of the people who are the tenants.123 When 
Confucius and Mencius lamented that the ancient principle had been changed during their days, 
it designates the reverse of the positions of the ruler and the people. In this sense, Confucius 
says that politics is only to correct the name. In effect, the whole political issue of Confucianism 
is to correct the name, the Son of Heaven, if it is not correct in practice. Of course, this 
correction includes revolution. 
How is the gap so wide between the good and the bad ruler in terms of the people’s mind? 
In Mencius, there is a clear example of the contrast between them. First, there is the example 
of king Wan. 
 
“The Book of Odes says, He [King Wen] surveyed and began the Sacred Terrace. He surveyed 
it and measured it; The people worked at it; In less than no time they finished it. He surveyed and 
began without haste; The people came in ever increasing numbers. The King was in the Sacred Park. 
The roe were sleek; The white birds glistened. The King was at the Sacred Pond. Oh! How full it 
was of leaping fish!” Mencius says, “It was with the labour of the people that King Wen built his 
                                           
122 Let us be reminded the discussion about justice between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the Republic. 
123 Surely, this idea seems quite similar to the teaching of Jesus. Yet, there is also a clear distinction. While in 
Confucianism there is no concept of a personal God, in Christianity, the concept of a personal God is the core. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
１３０ 
 
terrace and pond, yet so pleased and delighted were they that they named his terrace the ‘Sacred 
Terrace’ and his pond the ‘Sacred Pond’, and rejoiced in his possession of deer, fish and turtles, It 
was by sharing their enjoyments with the people that men of antiquity were able to enjoy themselves 
(Mencius, 1A:2).”124 
 
Next, the opposite case is drawn; 
 
“'The Tang shih says, ‘O Sun, when wilt thou expire? We care not if have to die with thee.’ 
When the people were prepared ‘to die with’ him, even if the tyrant had a terrace and pond, bird 
and beasts, could he have enjoyed them all by himself (Mencius, 1A:2)?  
 
In sum, in the relationship between Heaven and the people, it is the interest of the people 
that links the connection in operational procedure. In this light, “political authority is a trust 
conferred by the Mandate of Heaven upon the government for the welfare of the people (Wu, 
1967a, pp. 214-5: Chen, 2007, p. 201).”125 
 
 
4. Korean Development of ‘Mandate of Heaven’ 
 
A. Jeong Yakyong’s re-conceptualization 
 
Questions: Between Morality and Proceduralism 
 
As it becomes clearer, the Son of Heaven is not an absolute position but a conditional 
political status. The position as a ruler can only be given by Heaven. Insofar as Heaven sees 
and hears through the people, the ruler can only be recognized and ratified by the people. The 
candidate should show his capacity by successful performance and the voluntary cooperation 
of the people is necessary for the success. These visible actions also consist of the operational 
procedure of legitimation of the ruler’s government. Seriously insufficient welfare of the people 
                                           
124 There is a similar phrase as follows: “When a ruler rejoices in the joy of his people, they also rejoice in his 
joy; when he grieves at the sorrow of his people, they also grieve at his sorrow. Sympathy of joy will pervade 
the kingdom; sympathy of sorrow will do the same: in such a state of things, it cannot be but that the ruler attain 
to the royal dignity (Mencius, 1B:4).” From this phrase, a principle emerges namely ‘enjoy with the people’ and 
becomes a condition and standard for a ruler to keep when the ruler wants to establish a palace or any public and 
national construction. 
125 Chen interprets this mandate as ‘moral’ in such expressions, ‘moral responsibility’, ‘moral demands’, and 
‘moral obligations of the rulers (2007, p. 202, 204).’ However, although the mandate is based on the character of 
the ruler ultimately, the relationship must be understood as ‘political’ because this relationship between Heaven, 
the ruler and the people is exclusively meaningful in a public sphere. 
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would cause the withdrawal of their support immediately. Welfare is important not only because 
it is the foundation for the livelihood of the people as an intrinsic condition of good government 
but also because it is essential for the goal of Confucian government. If the welfare of the people 
is the least necessary condition for all government, education of the people to be good men and 
women is a sufficient condition for Confucian government. 
Here is a delicate point. Surely, successful performance and sufficient welfare seem to be 
close to material fulfilment rather than the enlightenment of mind and soul. Only the people 
could recognize the external capacity of a ruler by visible consequences which are achieved 
when he is a minister or a ruler. There seems no room for a consideration about his character as 
an internal competence or morality which is generally known as the key virtue for a Confucian 
ruler. Yet, there is a missing process in these examinations of external performance. How does 
the great king Yao know Shun? If a king only provides welfare but does not make any effort for 
the education or enlightenment of the people, what does the sage, the minister do? How are the 
education and enlightenment for the Confucian goal for the people to be good men and women 
related to government itself? All these questions are about the relationship between the virtue 
of a ruler, its operational procedure and substantive value and Confucian enlightenment in 
morality. 
In order to make these complex issues clearer, it would be helpful to turn back to the 
starting point of Confucian political legitimation, the Mandate of Heaven. Mencius interprets 
it as the ‘mandate of people’ in 2nd century B.C.; nevertheless, Mencius’ argument had not been 
welcomed because of its radical nature. Yet, on the basis of Mencius’ interpretation a Korean 
Confucian Jeong Yakyong draws a kind of basic logic of the first social contract model in order 
to explain the meanings of Mencius’ interpretations in the 18th century, two thousand years later. 
In this part, Jeong’s three short treatises will be examined. All three are very short but are 
deemed as most important to understand his political vision. 
 
Jeong Yakyong’s Interpretation in Tang-ron, Won-mok, and Won-jeong 
 
Although Mencius has been respected as the second great Confucian sage after Confucius, 
his advocacy for revolution has not been welcomed by rulers. After the Han dynasty, in the 
imperial era, a trend of Confucianism appeared, with a one-sided relationship such as Sangang 
(Three bonds) emphasized in family and in state rather than mutual duty and right (Chen, 2007, 
pp. 197-203). Sangang is a set of ethics about the relationship between husband and wife, father 
and son, and ruler and people, and one-sided loyalty and obligation has been regarded as more 
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important in this relationship.126 In this trend, it might be natural that Mencius’s argument for 
revolution would be declined. 
For this reason, it is not an accident that the opening of Tang-ron (탕론: 蕩論: Treatise about 
King Tang) begins with an answer to the same question of King Hsuan in Mencius whether it 
is right that King Tang banished Chieh. Jeong’s answer is that it is old Tao (道:way) and not the 
first by King Tang. Jeong explains that the same revolution has been operated by the legendary 
King Sinnong in the period of Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors who are frequently called 
simply ‘Yellow Emperor’. Yellow Emperor is literally the origin of the term ‘emperor’ in China, 
Japan, and Korea, and well known as the founder of the state and politics. From this, Jeong 
justifies good politics started by revolution from the very beginning. 
Then, he turns the focus into the theoretical foundation of the ‘Son of Heaven.’ His 
question is this: ‘Whether the Son of Heaven is established from Heaven or arises from the 
earth?’ He answers it himself. 
 
Five family consist of In; the man who is recommended as a leader becomes the leader of In. 
Five In consist of Li; the man who is recommended as a leader becomes the leader of Li. Five Li 
consist of Bi; the man who is recommended as a leader becomes the leader of Bi. Five Bi consist of 
Hyun; the man who is recommended as a leader becomes the leader of Hyun. Then, the man who is 
recommended by the leaders of Hyun127 becomes the (feudal) lord.128 Finally, the man who is 
recommended by the lords becomes the Son of Heaven. For this reason, Son of Heaven is 
recommended by the people (Jeong, Tang-ron [1818?]).129 
 
While Mencius explains using extreme examples in the ‘Warring period’, Jeong uses more 
logical and general illustrations from a peaceful period. Though in this passage there is only a 
procedure of recommendation but no consideration for the conditions of the leader and the 
procedure or substantive values, at least it is clear that the source of legitimacy for the ‘Son of 
Heaven’ is a mandate from the people. It may not a social contract among equal people because 
this recommendation may not be done by all members of the family but only by the male elders. 
However, this procedure would be close to a simplified version of a possible organizational 
procedure at the beginning of a political community reached at a certain stage of civilization. 
In other words, although there does not seem to be sufficient evidence to regard this 
                                           
126 Chen calls it ‘Imperial Confucianism’ (2007, pp. 198). 
127 In, Li, Bi, Hyun are all the names of administrative territory. 
128 In fact, at this moment, there might be no such feudal system yet. 
129 Like many other his works, Tang-ron, Won-mok, and Won-jeong have been written during he was exiled from 
1800 to 1818 for 18 years. For this reason, it is not sure when those articles have been written exactly. All these 
works are included in Yeoyudang-jeonseo (complete collection of Yeoyudang). Yeoyudang is Jeong’s pen name. 
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recommendation as a social contract or democracy, it surely deserves to be a legitimate 
representation from ‘down’ to ‘top’. Whatever the competence of a leader at each stage, it must 
be recognized by the people or at least by the leader of the family. 
How about dethronement? Jeong makes it clear that “it is impossible without the people’s 
recommendation.” Therefore, if there is a disharmony among the five families, they can change 
the leader of In. In this manner, the Son of Heaven would be changed by the lords and it is same 
as the change of a leader in the smallest community. He says that “for it is the order of 
recommendation from down to top in the past, it is the reverse of appointment from top to down 
nowadays.” 
Jeong also gives a clue about the qualification of the leader in a parable of group dancing. 
When a leader of group dancing is needed, a person would be chosen. Then, if the man performs 
well, he will be left as leader. Yet, if not, he must be reinstated in his former position, and 
another person who is deemed as qualified would be chosen. Then, if he fulfils his job, he would 
be called ‘our leader.’ In this parable, Jeong notes that the recommendation procedure from 
down to top is necessary but also there is a standard for an authentic leader. The leader must be 
good at his job. If not, he must be exchanged by a better suited person. While this exchange 
would be done by the authority of Heaven, the authority would actually be revealed by the will 
of the people. 
In Won-mok (원목: 原牧: Treatise about the Origin of Ruler), Jeong argues again that “at the 
beginning, there was no ruler but only the people.” The ruler appears only when he is needed. 
He explains the origin of ruler that if there is a conflict between two neighbours, then, they go 
to an elder known as wise. If the wise man solves the problem, he will be in charge as judge 
and the same thing might happen in many other villages as well. The next events follow the 
procedure of establishing the Son of Heaven in Tang-ron. Yet, in Won-mok, Jeong makes 
another point clear that for this origin it is sure that the ruler is a man who is exclusively for the 
people. The ruler is only needed for service for the people, and there is no other reason for being 
in the position. Therefore, if a ruler enjoys a luxurious life when the people suffer from poverty, 
it is absolutely wrong. If it is wrong, correction is necessary in Confucian political principle. 
Jeong claims at the beginning of Won-jeong (원정: 原政: Treatise about the Origin of Politics) 
that “the term ‘politics’ means correction.” 
 
All the people are equal. Yet, some enjoy the benefit of land and well-being, whereas some 
cannot get the benefit and suffer from poverty. For this reason, [the ruler] improves the land and 
divides equally to the people; this is correction, and this is politics (Jeong, Won-jeong [1818?]). 
 
In Won-jeong, Jeong mentions not only inequality and its correction of land but also points 
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out power, social status, wealth, and welfare in the same way. And he concludes that “for this 
reason, it is correction that should be done first [in politics].” In fact, this is the teaching of 
Confucius that politics is nothing but the correction of the name. “Let a ruler be a ruler, a subject 
a subject, a father a father, a son a son” (Analects, 12:11). Mencius interprets this correction in 
an extreme situation that it is a duty for Sages and Confucians to correct the tyrant in support 
of the people because the tyrant is not a ruler.  Jeong Yakyong explains the reason by suggesting 
the original simplified version of the organization of political society and the representation. 
Confucius provides a principle of the Son of Heaven, Mencius interprets it in application, and 
Jeong clarifies it in a historical supposition. To sum up, all three change the concept of Heaven 
from an abstract ‘cosmic moral order’ (Black, 2009, p. 95) to the mind of the people. Therefore, 
the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ becomes a belief-system for political legitimacy based on a certain 
idea in which the mind of the people is regarded as the only key to the operational procedure. 
 
B. Examples in Joseon dynasty 
 
Listening to the Young Confucians 
 
Listening to opinions from the ministers is not enough for law and policy to be justified. 
As I have noted frequently, Confucianism is a set of ideas in which educated wise men and 
their opinions are regarded as important as any other ministers and even the king, the ruler, as 
well. The persons who are deemed to be heard as first may clearly be the elder and respectable 
Confucians. Although they may not be the sages, it is an important tradition and necessary that 
the rulers and ministers consult the Confucians in a great reputation because it is well known 
that being a sage is rare since Confucius and Mencius. Yet, it is not true that the Confucian 
government’s politics and the policies’ legitimation always depends on the elder Confucians’ 
support. There is also a strong tradition that the young students’ opinions should be heard as 
seriously. In particular, the views of students of the highest national education institutions has 
been respected as influential enough to cancel the laws and policies which might already be 
confirmed by the government. The highest national education institutions had always existed 
in all the different Chinese and Korean dynasties from the earlier period of the civilization to 
the end of the 19th century and had been at the centre of not only education but also government. 
There are many different and interesting examples in the Annals of the Cho-sun Dynasty 
(1392-1897).130 In 1478, when King Seongjong wanted to appoint a former minister Jeong 
                                           
130 Cho-sun (Korean: 조선; 朝鮮; 1392-1897) was a Korean dynasty founded in 1392 that lasted for approximately 
five centuries before the Japanese colonization. 
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Injee who had served six kings as a national elder, namely Sam-Ro, there had been arguments 
for and against in government.131 Sam-Ro is a name of the honoured status originating from 
the earlier history of the Confucian legend and the bearer of the honourable position had been 
respected as a father, teacher, and elder brother of a ruler. The controversial issue was that 
Jeong Injee made a large profit by loan sharking. Among the debates whether he was suitable 
for the honour, the decisive judgment was given from the opinions from the ‘Seong-Kuen-
Kwan (성균관:成均館)’. Seong-Kuen-Kwan had been the national highest educational institution 
of Cho-sun dynasty founded in 1362. A few people could enter the national institution through 
the competitive exams and its functions had been quite similar to the national university in the 
present world.132 
Some ministers who had been against the appointment said to the king that many of the 
students were ready to send letters to the king to say that they were opposed to the appointment. 
The fact that there were widely opposite opinions among the students of the national Confucian 
school was one of the strongest grounds for those ministers against the appointment. After the 
nine days debate about this appointment, the appointment was finally withdrawn. 
Letters are the most common way for Confucians to argue for and against political issues 
in the Confucian world, particularly in the Joseon dynasty. Yet, the student of the national 
school had a rather stronger means as well. The students who consisted of approximately 150-
200 members chosen from the whole nation and had lived together in student residence could 
organize a student association, ‘Jaehwoi (再會)’ in which they frequently discussed 
contemporary political issues. If they decided to present some arguments, particularly in the 
case of being against some policies or king’s orders, they used to write a letter about the issues 
and then signed jointly. They marched along the street from the school to the government office 
and palace with the letter, then submitted it and waited for the reply sitting in front of the 
palace. If the king rejected the argument of the letter, then, the student used to hold more a 
serious demonstration. First, they boycotted classes and went to a fast, then, if there was no 
action from the government, secondly, they evacuated the school and returned home. 
The ‘evacuation of school (공관:空館)’ happened 96 times during the Joseon dynasty. It had 
a powerful effect on the government. Without any physical protest, it had been influential 
enough for the rulers to be sensitive to arguments from the school. For example, even one of 
the most respected kings of the Joseon dynasty, Sejong was faced with the evacuation on 23rd 
July 1448, when he wanted to establish a Buddhist temple for his personal wishes.133 Though 
King Sejong argued that the construction was a just private affair, the ministers and students 
                                           
131 The Annals of the Cho-sun Dynasty, Seong-Jong, ninth year, book 89, (19/02/1478 – 27/02/1478). 
132 In fact, Seong-Kuen-Kwan is the origin of the present Seong-Kuen-Kwan University in Korea. 
133 The Annals of the Cho-sun Dynasty, Sejong, thirtieth year, book 121, (23/07/1448 – 15/08/1448). 
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condemned that it could not be private if it happened in the palace. The king became so angry 
and ordered the arrest of students, yet the ministers of the palace and justice would not carry 
out the royal order. Then, the king called the prime minster, Hwang Hei to solve the evacuation 
affair. The way chosen by the prime minister aged 85 was visiting the students from door to 
door and persuading them. 
This event clearly shows that the opinion of the students of the national school were not 
only respected as important as the ministers’, but also a barometer whether the ruler’s wield 
was legitimate or not. As a younger group of educated Confucians, the opinions of the students 
should be heard by the king. In other words, whether old or young, the views of educated 
Confucians are influential on the legitimacy of the Confucian government.134 
 
Listening by Survey135 
 
There was also a more modern way of listening to the common people. In the period of 
King Sejong, in 1430, an extensive survey had been taken covering as many as 170 thousand 
people from the common people to highest local officials.136 King Sejong suggested changing 
the rule for taxation on land in 1427. The contemporary tax was determined by the amount of 
harvest which was investigated by examiners dispatched from the central government. However, 
massive corruption was frequently and many results were incorrect. Sejong wanted to change 
it to a new mode of approximating tax with estimates based on fertility and the weather which 
were easily recognized by the central government. Of course, the suggested bill faced strong 
opposition. Many local land owners and local officials who had made a profit from the 
contemporary system would not accept the new system and oppressed the ministers. Even the 
prime minister, Hwang Hei disagreed with the king’s reform because he worried that the reform 
might threaten the dynasty of which King Sejong was only the fourth ruler. It was the survey 
that Sejong suggested to break the deadlock. The survey had been done for five months from 
5th March to 10th August in 1430. Overall 172,806 people had been asked in this poll; 98,657 
agreed and 74,149 disagreed. Yet, this was not the end but merely the beginning of the long 
procedure of the reform for 17years. 
Despite of the result of the poll, King Sejong had not been in haste to operate the new rule. 
                                           
134 South Korea may be one of the few countries where there is a term ‘student movement’. Although there have 
been some controversies, most Korean political theorists including Marxists agree that the role of the student 
movement has been decisive in democratization from the 1960s to 1980 than any other sectors’ protest. Many of 
the theorists admit that democratization in Korea has been carried out by students no less than by the bourgeois 
or working class but. In fact, two memorable demonstrations in 1960 and 1987 of modern South Korean politics 
were both led by students. 
135 Much of this section rests on the Park’s (2005) research. 
136 The Annals of the Cho-sun Dynasty, Sejong, twelfth year (23/05/1430 – 10/08/1430). See also Park (2005). 
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Instead, he commanded the ministers to gather and investigate reasons of for and against. The 
main reason for the distinct differences between agreement and disagreement being so 
distinctive depended on the province. In the northern area where productivity was lower, only 
1,410 agreed with the reform, and 35,912 disagreed. In contrast, in the southern area where 
productivity was higher, 65,864 agreed and only 664 disagreed. 6 years later, in 1436, Sejong 
presented a more elaborate bill and also pointed out the financial issue of the serious loss in 
national income. However, the second debate lasted for another 2 years. In 1438, in a situation 
where many ministers were still opposed, Sejong suggested the second survey. Yet, at this time, 
the supposed guide line for operation of the new rule was the agreement of two thirds. 
Nevertheless, the suggestion was also rejected by the ministers. As an alternative, the king 
ordered the government to set a model in particular provinces to be examined, and waited for a 
few years again. During the test period, Sejong visited and investigated the fields by himself. 
Finally, in 1448, in most reports from the provinces where the new rule had been operated, 
positive opinions had been revealed. Then, the ministers agreed the extension of the new system 
to the whole nation, and at the final stage, there was no minister opposed to the new law. This 
new rule for taxation was immediately applied to the constitution for the Joseon dynasty and 
lasted for two hundred years. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter reinterpreted Confucian political thought in reference to the legitimacy of 
representation in the context of modern representative democracy. The core of Confucian 
representative theory is the concept of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. Mencius interpreted the ‘mind of 
Heaven’ as ‘mind of people’. It is not so clear how the nature of Heaven can be understood between 
personal god and cosmic order. However, it has not been matter in Mencius’ political theory since 
he interpreted Heaven as the subject which is not just the sole source of the authority of Confucian 
representation but also a bearer of the will of the people. The fact that Heaven is the subject which 
reflects the will and interest of the people is clear in the sense that Heaven does not speak by itself 
but through the people. It also hears the voice of the people. In this light, though Confucian 
representative theory did not develop modern democratic theory, there is an obvious idea of 
conditional government and legitimate representation. In addition, it also provides the foundation 
of revolutionary theory against tyranny. In fact many peasants’ protests in Confucian East Asia had 
risen in the name of the Mandate of Heaven.  In other words, as the mind of people is the mind of 
Heaven, the order of people is the ‘order of Heaven ( 천명: 天命)’. 
A Korean Confucian in 18th century, Jeong Yakyong re-conceptualised the interpretation of 
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Mencius. He had drawn the fundamental logic of the beginning of the Confucian representation 
from down to top model in order to explain the meanings of Mencius’ interpretations. In this model, 
all the first representatives are recommended from the common people of each town. In the next 
stage, the chosen representatives choose again the higher level of representatives among them by 
recommendation. By repetition of these procedures, the ruler, ‘Son of Heaven’ is selected. In 
another essay, he argues that the concrete situation in which the top representative should have to 
be removed. According to Jeong, since the authority of representative comes from the mandate of 
the people from the bottom, it is clear the status of the supreme position as rulers must be conditional 
depends on the represented who recommended them as representatives. For this reason, when the 
representatives fail to perform the duty of representatives, they should be changed by new ones by 
the support of the people and sub-representatives. Mencius and Jeong’s representative theory had 
been applied in politics in Confucian East Asian. 
In this chapter, some examples in Joseon dynasty in the Middle Age’s Korea have been shown. 
First, unlike the general prejudice, in the procedure of listening to the opinions, there is no 
discrimination of social status, official power, or ages. The young students of the national school 
had been respected as the bearers of relevant virtue to be engaged in the important political decision-
making procedure. Without any physical protests, there were many well-ordered ways to propose 
their opinions and the most supreme power need to reflect the suggestions as authoritative judgment. 
There was also an example of survey of the ordinary people. The survey by King Sejong required 
17 years. It covered the opinions of as many as 170 thousand people from the common people to 
highest local officials. In this case, the opinions of ordinary people had been regarded as relevant 
and reasonable. Accordingly, this is the clearly practical example that showed that the concept of 
relevance in Confucian representation is not limited by social position, intelligence, or education. 
In this case, the people of Joseon dynasty were the subject who participated in the decision-making 
procedure which determined their own welfare. It has been done within the Confucian 
representative theory. 
The next chapter will challenge whether this Confucian virtue is compatible with modern 
representation and democracy. 
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Ch6. The Virtue of a Representative 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is whether Confucian Sagacity137 is to be acceptable as a virtue in 
modern representative democracy. Even if we accept that it is possible to interpret the Mandate of 
Heaven in such a way as to be consistent with electoral legitimacy, there is another Confucian 
doctrine that seems hard to reconcile with the principles of democratic theory, namely that the 
representatives that are elected should be of superior virtue. I assume that Confucian Sagacity can 
be understood as a type of a good representative. If an election is a procedure to choose a good type 
of representative, Sagacity can be an important condition for a qualified candidate.  
In this section, I shall go further to clarify the nature of political superiority as a virtue for a 
representative. Insofar as we consider virtue with character of political agent, the question would 
be essentially related to legitimacy. In other words, the issues of different types of representative 
are not only crucial for an effective government but also deeply involved with the normative 
perspective of political legitimacy. 
 
 
2. The Confucian Virtue of a Representative 138 
 
A. The Confucian virtue of a representative 
 
A Sage as an individual character has been a model of a good person and a good ruler as 
well. 139 As virtue is one of the most important issues in Confucianism, a Sage generally means 
                                           
137 In fact, the interpretation of its original meaning itself is controversial. Some theorists have used the term of 
‘Sageness’ as its English translation. In this thesis, ‘Sagacity’ is the term to refer to the concept in order to 
emphasize the character of practical wisdom. 
138 It is hard to translate the term, virtue, Deok (in Korean: 덕) or De (in Chinese: 德) into English. Deok is 
generally translated as ‘virtue’ or ‘power’. Yet, in this thesis, particularly in terms of the character of a good 
representative, following Ames and Rosemont, excellence seems the most appropriate understanding of virtue 
“in a sense excelling at becoming one’s own person.” (Ames and Rosemont, 1998, p. 57) 
139 Sage (성인: 聖人) is a distinctive concept from Junzi (군자: 君子) in Confucianism literally. While Sage is an 
ethical concept of ideal man, Junzi is a political concept as it means literally ‘son of a ruler’. However, in the 
idea of Confucius and Mencius, the end of Confucianism is to unify the two concepts. In other words, in the 
ideal society of Confucianism, a Sage should be a Junzi and a Junzi should be a Sage. For this reason, this thesis 
does not make a clear distinction between Sage and Junzi. See more Ames and Rosemont (1998, pp. 60-61). 
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the bearer of the extreme virtue in various ways. In this sense, Sage was a term coined by 
Confucius to describe his ideal human. To Confucius, the functions of a government and social 
stratification were facts of life to be sustained by ethical values; thus his ideal human was the 
Sage. Often translated as "gentleman" or "superior person" and sometimes "exemplary person" 
in English, the Sage literally means "lord's son". In the ideal of Sage, the ruler is supposed to 
be a king who has a superior ethical, moral, and intellectual position while gaining inner peace 
through being virtuous. While Confucius has been respected as a model of Sage, Confucius 
himself denied that he approached that degree of virtue. According to this understanding, it 
seems not practical but a utopian concept of good type of representative. However, despite its 
literal meaning, any righteous man willing to improve himself has a potentiality to become a 
Sage.140 There is no doubt that Confucius’ words came from humility, and Confucius always 
would choose the second best in the real world. Therefore, on the one hand, it is an extreme 
stage where an ordinary person hardly gets the position; on the other hand, there is a possibility 
for everyone to be the ideal man.141 
Politically, a Sage is generally understood as an ideal man or a good person suitable to be 
a ruler or official among all the people rather than those who are in higher social and political 
positions. What Confucius was doing is to “shift the sense and reference away from position, 
rank, birth, or function toward aesthetic, moral, and spiritual characteristics.” (Ames and 
Rosemont, 1998, p. 61) Mencius also does not demand any hierarchical social standards of 
qualification such as class, age, achievement and origin but virtue (Ahn, 2002, pp. 32-3). 
Particularly, Mencius understood a Sage as a virtuous man. The Confucian term, a Yudeokja (유
덕자; 有德者) exactly means a man who holds virtue that Mencius always anticipated as a 
necessary condition of good ruler. Mencius said, “I never answer any questioner who relies on 
the advantage of possessing position, pride, age, achievement or status as an old friend” 
(Mencius, 7A:43). 
If the ideal ruler is a person who has a virtue, what is the core of this virtue in Confucian 
society? This virtuous ruler is a person who has Ren (인:仁).142 Without Ren, the ruler loses a 
country. 
                                           
140 Paul Goldin's translation of Junzi as "noble man" is a clever attempt to suggest both the earlier political 
meaning as well as the later moral meaning. See more Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (1999), The 
Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, Ballantine Books.  
141 It was Xunzi who redefined the term and concept of Sage as a hierarchical and utopian conception (Ames 
and Rosemont, 1998, p. 65).  
142 Ren is generally translated as ‘benevolence’, ‘goodness’, and ‘humanity’. As a more sophisticated but 
accurate translation, there is also a term of ‘manhood-at-its-best’. (Ames and Rosemont, 1998, p. 48) In fact, 
Ren cannot be translated simply as benevolence because it has many diverse meanings beyond benevolence. 
However, the translation of manhood-at-its-best seems to be abstract to the people who are not so familiar with 
Confucian tradition. For this reason, in this thesis, I use Ren directly sometimes and choose various terms as a 
translation of Ren as appropriate in each context. 
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Only the man of Ren is fit to be in a high position. ... Confucius said, “There are two ways and 
two only; Ren or no-Ren. ... The Three Dynasties won the Empires through Ren and lost it through 
no-Ren. ... An Emperor cannot keep the Empire within the Four Seas unless he is benevolent; a 
feudal lord cannot preserve the altars to the gods of earth and grain unless he is benevolent (Mencius, 
4A:1-3). 
 
However, this virtue of Ren necessarily requires practical wisdom. He clearly argued that  
 
Even if you had the keen eyes of Li Lou and the skill of Kng-shu Tzu, you could not draw 
squares or circles without a carpenter’s square of a pair of compass; even if you had the acute ears 
of Chih Kuang, you could not adjust the pitch of the five notes correctly without the six pipes. ... 
This is because they do not practise the way of the Former Kings. Hence it is said, ‘Goodness alone 
is not sufficient for government; the Law unaided cannot make itself effective’ (Mencius, 4A:1). 
 
The Sage has both moral and political responsibility to the people. The King Wu was the 
most professional official of affairs with flood control which is crucially important to the 
Chinese agricultural civilization. Yet, the virtue that made him a ruler is not just the knowledge 
of the special skill but responsibility. He did not visit his home for 8 years to care for control of 
flooding because he thought that if there were any damages from the flood, it would be his fault 
as an official of the department (Jullien, 2004, p. 139). 
This virtuous character is the distinctive element in Confucian political thought. The 
virtuous man changes the people’s mind not only his political performance but also by his 
virtuous character itself. Peoples are influenced by his virtue directly. In this context, he said 
that “A gentleman transforms where he is passing through, and works wonders where he abides. 
He is in the same stream as Heaven above an Earth below. Can he be said to bring but small 
benefit?” (Mencius, 7A: 13). In addition, this influence is better than a government of regulation 
in the sense that it changes the character of people as good enough. And this is the point where 
the Legalists and the Confucians could not compromise. 
 
Good government does not win the people as good education does by influence. Good 
government is feared by the people; good education by influence is loved by the people. Good 
government wins the wealth of the people; good education by influence wins their hearts (Mencius, 
7A:14). 
 
Here, the reason why the people fear good government is not because the government is 
coercive but because there may be some orders that should be obeyed even when the people do 
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not understand or do not agree with the orders. In contrast, when the people are enlightened or 
educated by influence of good character of the representatives, there is no need of enforcement 
of orders without agreement. 
In Confucianism, the best politics is ‘the rule of principle’ which is distinctive from ‘the 
rule of force’. In ‘the rule of principle’, the cleverest and the most respectable becomes the ruler. 
The ruler possesses the highest virtue as the representative ruler such as benevolence, justice, 
moderation, and knowledge. He 143  becomes literally a model of all the people and his 
governance is respected as perfect. He is appointed by the previous ruler but the process 
absolutely depends on public opinion. He is nominated by the people and ratified by the ruler. 
To be accurate, the ruler is appointed by a recommendation from the people. That is the 
procedure of the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. 
Everyone who is virtuous can be entitled to be the ruler. Confucius and Mencius clearly 
argued that the social status as descendants of the ruler is not sufficient at all for one to be the 
next ruler. Anyone who has a virtue enough to be a model of the people should has enough 
competence, responsibility and responsiveness in the relationship with Heaven on the one side, 
and with the people on the other side. The ruler must always listen carefully to what the people 
want, so that the people would grant legitimacy for his ruling with enough voluntary actions. 
Virtue, competence and responsiveness of the Confucian representative evoke cooperative 
interactions that are necessary to achieve the welfare of the people, the public good. 
In Confucius’ ideal, a king should be a Yudeokja, the virtue bearer; in Mencius’ ideal, a 
Yudeokja should be a king. While Confucius gave the principle, Mencius clarified the practical 
application of the principle with revolutionary theory. However, the basic common idea has not 
been changed in Confucianism for more than two thousand years. Only virtuous people are 
eligible to be a competent ruler and a representative of Heaven and the people in reference to 
the Confucian belief-system. 
The first condition of a Confucian representative is virtue. The core of Confucian virtue is 
Ren. However, insofar as this virtue includes the competence of responsiveness to the people 
as necessary and the most important condition, political capacity as practical wisdom that 
provides the welfare of the people must be a another essential standard of a Confucian 
representative. In Mencius, Mencius always clearly suggested these two intrinsic conditions of 
a Sage king, the Confucian ideal ruler. Two maxims that ‘only a virtue bearer is a legitimate 
ruler’ and ‘to the people, if they have not a certain livelihood, it follows that they will not have 
                                           
143 Confucius and Mencius might not think that a woman could be a ruler. We are not sure of the reason that 
whether they thought a woman is not suitable for the position or just they could not imagine that situation 
because of the limit of the periods. However, there are numerous researches that argue that they may agree 
woman representatives in contemporary democracy because they do not mind any other conditions but the virtue 
and practical wisdom as a requirement for a good ruler. 
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a constant mind’ show well these ideas. Here virtue meets practical wisdom. In the text, this is 
drawn as 
 
What must one's Virtue be like so that one can become a true King? He becomes a true King by 
bringing peace to the people (Mencius, 1A:7). 
 
In sum, there is a dependence on public opinion which is the only way to be a legitimate 
ruler. The virtuous ruler is open to opinion where there is free speech. This is the perfect politics 
in the best harmony between an individual and systemic virtue. To say it in the way of 
Confucianism, this is a state where the Sage becomes the ruler and it is secured by the system. 
In Confucian legend, there were three emperors in the old Chinese dynasty those who fulfilled 
the condition. In the middle ages in Korea, two kings are often mentioned as examples.144 
 
B. Critics of Confucian virtue 
 
Though Confucian representative theory only permits division of roles among the equal 
people or assumed equal at least, it is clear that the Sage is a superior person and has a character 
distinctive from the ordinary people. There seems to remain a significant issue with democracy. 
Some could argue that modern representative democracy does not allow any discrimination not 
only based on social position, class, or wealth, but also intelligence, morality or education. The 
point is that Confucians do not recognize anything but the virtue of a person for a qualified 
representative. Therefore, the question to be examined here is whether the principles of 
Confucian virtue of a representative are coincident with the principle of democracy. 
While a Sage is the key of Confucian representation, there has been a serious critique in 
relation to Asian despotism. The superior character of a Sage has been understood as an obvious 
evidence of Asian despotism and hierarchical authoritarianism. Even if it is not so serious, at 
least it seems far away from modern representative democracy. In fact, there has been a very 
strong and long term argument for the hierarchical characteristics or even nature of 
Confucianism. It is to say that Confucianism is an unsuitable idea for democratic representation. 
Orientalism holds this idea in common (Said, 2003[1978]; Hall, 1991; Parekh, 1992), and 
Wittfogel’s (1957) ‘Oriental Despotism’ is the developed version of the views (Moore, 1974, 
p. 163). 
One immediate counter argument against Orientalism is that the king Sage is neither the 
barbarian nor the tyrant. Contrary to the common view of Asian despotism, there have been a 
                                           
144 In Joseon dynasty, they are King Sejong (1397-1450, reign. 1418–1450) and King Jeongjo (1752- 1800, reign 
1776 – 1800). 
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sophisticated set of political thoughts about the role and virtue of the representative in 
Confucianism. In fact, Confucianism is a political philosophy which has been devoted to the 
virtue of a representative. The top principle of this ‘virtue based representative theory’ is that 
the ruler must not be a tyrant or an absolute emperor. The prior duty of the ruler is to care for 
the people. The government should provide basic welfare for every member of the state and 
there should be some special treatments for the vulnerable groups (Mencius, 1A:7). For this, 
Confucius and Mencius emphasized the importance of listening to the voice of the people in 
the theory of Mandate of Heaven. Jeong Yakyoung understood that this duty could be inferred 
from the origin of the selection procedure of a legitimate ruler from bottom to top. Mencius and 
Jeong both strongly advocated revolution when the necessary conditions of the representative 
government are denied. In this sense, the requirement of superiority and competence is not the 
element of despotism but a relevant standard of a legitimate ruler. While the requirement may 
provide some political authority, this authority also grants the corresponding responsibility and 
duty of responsiveness. The ruler is a representative who should do not only stand for but act 
for the people. For this, mandate and continuous interaction must be essential. This is limited 
government and far from the absolute power. 
It becomes clearer in comparison with the rival political thoughts, Legalism. In Legalism, 
all people are assumed as fundamentally vicious and humanity is selfish and evil, so that 
stringent laws and harsh punishments are required to keep them in order. The government must 
be a vigorously regulated machine, and the ruler must be cruel.145 His responsibility is for the 
state not for the welfare of the people. If the ruler is only cruel and not virtuous, the people may 
not follow the ruler in their mind. Although the ruler is clever in some senses, the moral 
character of the ruler is regarded as not relevant with effective wielding of power. There is no 
such concept of responsiveness between the ruler and the ruled. While the ruler can be a 
representative only in the sense of ‘standing for’, he does not need to ‘act for’ the people. In 
this sense, the Legalist ruler is a dictator who only commands and the people are subordinates 
who only have an obligation to obey. In the theory, there is no coherence of virtue as a good 
person and good representative. 
In contrast, the whole Confucian thought is about being a good person and a good 
representative. Confucian thinkers believe that as a good person, the Sage is a representative of 
the people. This is the basis of legitimacy in every government. The concept of Sage must be 
similar to Socrates’ philosopher king rather than a barbarian king. Yet, the Confucian Sage ruler 
is distinctive from the Machiavellian ruler who is competent in a sense that he is a bearer of 
Virtu. While Machiavelli’s Virtu is not subject to the personal character of ordinary people or 
                                           
145 For this reason, the virtue of the ruler of Legalism is often compared to Virtu of Machiavelli. 
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the condition of citizens, the virtue of Confucius Sage is related to both areas as a good citizen 
and a good ruler at the same time. A Vicious person could be a good ruler in Machiavelli’s state, 
whereas a virtuous person only can be entitled to the position of ruler in Confucius world.146 
Now, there are distinctive views of the character of a good representative. This must be 
connected with different cultures, values, and belief-systems. This is also related to the first 
conceptual issue of this research, political legitimacy. While there is a common framework as 
a structure of political legitimacy, different contents consist within the frame. Likewise, there 
seems a difference of the requirement or competence of a good representative in different 
societies. It is a problem of Confucian virtue and culture. This is the final conceptual issue to 
be examined in the research in the connection with the previous conceptual analyses of 
legitimacy and representation. 
 
 
3. Role and Virtue of a Representative 
 
A. Diversity of the virtue of a representative 
 
In representation, there are some reasons why the people support a representative. 
Legitimate representation requires those reasons for the people to believe, consent, and support 
a person or an assembly as a representative of them. In this sense, the reasons bind people and 
the people’s actions. In representative democracy where the representatives are elected by the 
people, candidates are required to give the reasons to the constituents. The reasons may include 
various elements such as vision, ideology, capacity, experience, character and identity and they 
will be presented through utterances and actions. Yet, the judgment of whether they are enough 
to be a representative exclusively depends on the constituents not any others. 
At this point, we can be aware that there are certain requirements for the role and virtue of 
a representative. And these requirements are rooted in each belief-system. As there are different 
views about the role of a representative, the qualification for the role would be various. In 
addition, if the roles expected by the represented are similar, the contents of the qualification 
for the roles expected by the same people would be different depending on the political culture. 
On this view, we can call these different contents of qualification for roles the virtue of a 
                                           
146 Another rival idea of Confucianism, Taoism did not care about the virtue of ruler at all. Taoist did want the 
ruler to do nothing because the world would be operated by nature. While it is unclear that ‘by nature’ implies 
the autonomy of free individuals, in this sense, Taoism is often deemed not a political thought. There is 
absolutely no virtue of representative or government. In fact, there may be no government which we can 
imagine. To say in a modern view, Taoism seem to assume that Rousseau’s peaceful state of nature would last 
forever if there is no artificial interference such as social contract. 
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representative. 
The relationship between the role and virtue of a representative could be clarified in two 
realms, empirical and normative senses. First, in empirical sense, while the role is a matter of 
what the representatives have to do, the people actually do not always control the decision-
making of the representatives. Whether it is ideal or not, realistically it is almost impossible. 
For this reason, in a real election, the constituents consider who is suitable for the role in 
practice. This is what is called the virtue of a representative.147 Although the competence or 
capability of the representative does not always guarantee the sufficient achievement of the role, 
generally the people who choose the representative may anticipate those results. It is not only 
a plausible inference from experience but also a rational choice because the people expect that 
the representative will accomplish their job well as soon as possible without trial and error 
within the determined term. Whether the grounds of the people’s judgment are political vision, 
intellectual capacity, economic success, contribution for the society, or moral superiority, there 
should be some sort of preferences with the virtue of a representative. 
In addition, the virtue of a representative always tends to be revealed implicitly or explicitly 
in the procedures of representation broadly in the functions of the belief-system. In practice, 
role and virtue are connected intimately. In fact, often the achievement of the role cannot be 
distinguished clearly from the virtue of a representative. Moreover, it seems that the real 
character or capacity of a representative appears only when the person does the job as a 
representative. As Pitkin points out the repetition as an important merit of the representative 
democracy, the performances of the representative are regularly evaluated by the represented. 
Yet even at this moment, it is clear that what is brought to the political judgment is not only the 
performance but also the virtue of the representative. 
Second, in principle, there is a necessary but distinctive connection between the role and 
virtue of representative in relation to authorization and legitimation in political culture. Political 
representation based on a mandate procedure that necessarily requires authorization by the 
people. In other words, for a representative to do something genuinely in a role of representative, 
he or she should pass a stage of authorization which is embedded with culture necessarily. 
It is clear in a Confucian maxim, ‘Mandate of Heaven’. There should be a precious 
procedure of granting and receiving authority before the performance of a representative’s role. 
The representative rules instead of Heaven, in other words in the authority of Heaven. In this 
procedure of authorization, there is a ground of the judgment on people’s minds and belief-
system. 
                                           
147 In a broad sense, this may be the compromising form of the representation of ‘promissory’ and ‘anticipatory’ 
conceptions (Mansbridge, 2003). 
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In terms of legitimacy, this authorization procedure cannot but depend on culture of the 
society. There should be a certain type of concept of a good representative in each society, and 
this is the virtue of a representative. In addition, the conceptions of a representative’s virtue 
could be more various than role of a representative. If the role of a representative in people’s 
minds is different in each community, the necessary virtue of a representative may be diverse. 
In the case that the expected role is a mirror concept, the virtue of a representative would 
be diverse depends on the characteristic in each society. What the people demand from the 
representative is simply reflecting the views or interests of the people. Although it is not clear 
that that is the best way of representation, at least in the mirror view it is obvious what the 
representative has to do and it must be diverse in each society. 
From the view of distinction principle, the role and virtue of a representative is also not 
coincident thanks to the different political culture. In societies where superiority is regarded as 
a necessary qualification for a representative, the people would expect the representative to 
participate in decision-making procedures exclusively based on his or her own distinctive 
competence. It is because the contents of superiority must be diverse depends on the tradition 
and custom even though the role is similar in each other. Even though the role of a 
representative is identical, the virtue may be different again. For instance, if the people in two 
different societies agree that the role of a representative is to vote based on a representative’s 
independent judgment, the people of one society may prefer intelligence to morality and the 
other may be the opposite. 
In conclusion, the virtue of a representative consists of reason-giving functions of political 
legitimacy in both empirical and normative senses. People do not or cannot judge the 
performance of a representative without a belief-system. In any sense, in judgment of the people, 
their political performance, contribution, or reputation are involved with the cultural back 
ground. There must be different standards and values in evaluating the political performance in 
different societies. It must be same as the judgement of the character of the person who is 
suitable for the position of the role. In addition, insofar as political representation requires a 
foundation of mandate by the people, there should be a procedure of authorization by the people 
in a normative sense. This normative standard is applied to the individual character of a 
representative in moral and substantive senses. Therefore, it can be said that there should be 
good reasons for representation to be legitimate, and it is related ultimately to the suitable virtue 
of the candidates for good representatives.  
As a result, the virtue of a representative demanded is one of the most significant reasons 
which bind the representative and the represented in relation to political legitimacy. Therefore, 
if we consider cultural diversity with representation, it is crucial to scrutinize not only the role 
but also the virtue of a representative. 
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B. The concept of the virtuous representative has a long history in both the West and 
the Confucian East and is still valid in modern democracy insofar as it is associated 
with representation 
 
The issue of the virtue of representatives for good government is not a recent political idea. 
Rather, it may be right to say that from Socrates via Machiavelli to now, most political thought 
has been devoted to this subject. Although the theoretical, practical, and constitutional grounds 
for an authentic ruler have been changed variously for the periods, the subject that the political 
philosophers have considered has hardly been changed. Socrates regards love for wisdom as a 
virtue of the political leader of a polis, Aristotle moderation as a collective and systemic 
wisdom in ideal of mixed constitution, and Machiavelli Virtu for the unification of Italy. In 
other words, in terms of similar issue, there have been diverse conditions and models of 
authentic rulers such as philosopher king, military leader, theological faithful leader, and so on 
even including an heir of holy blood. 
It is not obvious that most of those conditions of a good representative have been changed 
fundamentally in modern democratic periods. For instance, two of the three grounds of 
legitimacy in Weber’s idea are traditional and charismatic domination, and its practical validity 
seems to be accepted widely even in contemporary liberal democracy as a sort of virtue 
required for being a successful political leader. In fact, it may be also undeniable that the virtue 
of representative candidates is still seriously influential no less than any other policies and 
pledges in electoral campaigns even in modern party politics.148 
The question who should be or who is qualified to be a good representative have been very 
familiar to modern political thinkers who were interested in the representative political systems 
in America, England, and even revolutionary France. In America, both the Federalist and the 
Anti-federalist had been aware that there were some aristocratic elements in electoral systems. 
For this reason, the Anti-federalist argued for resemblance as a necessary element of the 
representative and required more numbers of the representatives. Against this, the argument of 
the Federalist was not that the electoral system in American constitution would not be that kind 
of aristocracy. Instead, they did not hesitate to say that the representatives should be distinctive 
                                           
148 One of the latest major elections in the world was the general election of Germany on 22nd September 2013. 
In this election, the coalition of CDP and CSU won 41.5% and this victory has been interpreted as the result of 
the popularity of the incumbent Prime Minister, Angela Merkel. According to a survey, more than 70% of the 
voters answered that they would vote for Merkel if the general election is to choose the Prime Minister. 
(http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=37242) A survey by German public television station 
ARD found that 38% of voters backed the coalition only because of Merkel. 
(http://www.njherald.com/story/23498170/merkel-factor-boosts-partys-result-in-german-vote)  
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from the ordinary people and that is the better way to secure the interests of the state and the 
people as well. Though it was clearly not their intention for good politics in the New World, the 
present consequence of the American representative system where few distinctive people can 
be chosen seems to be consistent with the concern of the Anti-federalist who cared for 
resemblance. 
Interestingly, ancient Confucians did not mind class, social position, ages, and nationality 
in considering a person as a good representative. Even they rejected any kind of discrimination 
in representing and recommending a suitable person for a ruler and an official.  If only he is a 
good person in his five basic relationships with family, town, and country, it is regarded as solid 
evidence that he has virtue enough to be a good representative. They would not agree with any 
discrimination of right or duty to participate in public and political decision-making. They 
thought that the virtuous character was rooted in everyone and could be and should be 
developed by education based on learning and practice. For this, a certain level of welfare and 
educational system is necessary and these are the very duty of a good ruler as a representative 
of the people. Surely, this only can be realized in a political culture and belief-system in which 
enough numbers of the people of the political community have a common idea of good politics 
and a good representative. 
 
 
4. Three Views of a Representative’s Principle 
 
A. Principle of accountability 
 
There seems a general idea that the legitimacy of representative government is entirely 
determined by how the representation is endorsed with democratic procedure. In this view, there 
seems no room for the virtue of a representative in modern politics in terms of legitimacy. 
Systemic accountability is the main principle of democratic representation. 
This view is basically from an idea that representation is merely a complementary means 
for democracy in a large size political community particularly in modern periods. In 
contemporary politics, most people accept the view that the democratic principle is the 
foundation of legitimacy of representative democracy rather than the representative principle. 
In this view, the legitimacy of representative democracy is rooted in procedural accountability 
in terms of democracy. 
This procedural accountability view has been developed in an idea that the procedures of 
electing politicians consist of the most important parts in representative democracy in modern 
politics. In this argument, the views which focus on party politics and democratic procedure are 
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combined. While it seems a simple and even dangerous elitist view represented by Schumpeter 
(1942), it is also true that most discussions of representation focus almost exclusively on 
electoral systems within a similar presumption (Przeworski, 1999, p. 32). In this sense, political 
representation becomes minimalized within a concept namely electoral democracy. In other 
words, representation is replaced by election. This is the reason why many scholars are 
interested in electoral systems and structures. This idea hardly cares about a representative and 
its character because whether the representation is good or bad depends entirely on the system, 
structure and procedure. They may believe that the virtue of a representative has no function in 
modern representative democracy. Even though there is a need, the virtue should be understood 
in some systemic context.  
In modern politics, this systemic understanding of representation is often connected to the 
argument which emphasizes the functions of a political party rather than the virtue of a 
representative. They may claim that political parties have become the most important factors 
particularly in modern politics and there would be no room for the virtue of a representative. 
According to the argument, the analysis for politics should focus on the parties and the party 
system and those analyses are enough to understand the politics because they are the only 
practical and real bearers of the policies and their realization. In fact, in many places where the 
political system can be called a representative democracy, most candidates are nominated by 
political parties and they are subject to the campaigns operated by the parties. Not only in a 
stable representative democracy but also in a theory of revolution, as Gramsci and Lenin argued, 
certain political groups organized by leading revolutionaries seem to be essential resources. In 
this light, a group of dominant researchers such as Lipset & Rokkan (1967), Schattschneider 
(1960), Sartori (1976), Duverger (1954), and Downs (1957) have studied the relationship 
between politics and the party system. 
This procedural accountability view focusing on the electoral system and party politics 
must be the main stream of modern political science. The virtue of a representative has been 
regarded as an old and pre-modern idea. However, this research would argue that it is still 
important and a decisive factor in understanding and evaluating the political legitimacy of 
representative democracy in relation to cultural diversity. 
First, modern representation is designed not as a supplementary device but as an alternative 
to democracy from the beginning (Manin, 1997). While the complementary view of 
representation with democracy seems a formal and justifiable argument, this alternative view 
would be closer to the practical features of a modern representative democracy. Although it 
might be found in 18-19th centuries in Europe as well, the procedure and debates for the 
American Constitution in 1787 might be a plain example. The fear of the American forefathers 
was tyranny by the majority in democracy, and they formulated a frame of representation 
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sophisticatedly as an alternative. In modern history, representation has not been the 
complimentary device for established and justified democracy, and what happened was exactly 
in the opposite direction. Representation has been reluctant to accept democracy by force from 
the bottom. It is certain that much of the un-democratic and even anti-democratic elements still 
remained in contemporary representative democracy. In theory, as Rousseau (2004 [1762]) 
pointed out, the virtue of a representative cannot be absolutely subject to democratic procedure 
and may not be so because of the nature of representation. 
Second, systemic understanding of representative legitimacy does not seem to affect the 
importance of the virtue of a representative at all. Instead, this view shows that there are diverse 
aspects of the virtue of representation. For example, in the case of party politics, that can be 
understood as an institutional and collective virtue of a representative. In this case, the 
membership for a party would be regarded as a necessary virtue of candidates. When the 
representative elected would be required to vote as a member of a party than by any other 
standard, this demand of identity as a party member is understood as a certain type of virtue for 
a good representative. Even if the virtue is derived from a group as a party or a party system 
not an individual, it means that there is a need for a proper system which may promote and 
guarantee the virtue of a representative more effectively and genuinely in the sense the 
constituency asks. In effect, in any case, there cannot be a representative system which is 
absolutely irresponsible to the virtue of a representative. In addition, it is clear that no system 
has been accepted or deemed as a representation itself without a representative as a human 
individual or in a body. As long as we understand and define representation with actors as a 
representative, the representing behaviours of a representative need certain types of virtue and 
a representative system cannot dismiss the essence. 
In fact, all these objections seem to be rooted in a fundamentally sceptical view about the 
role of the representative as a political actor. This is a comprehensive argument that the virtue 
of a representative must rest on systematic regulations exclusively rather than individual 
character. Probably, this is the most basic foundation of why most political scientists and 
theorists, interested in representation, concentrate more on the institutions than the people, 
representative as actors. 
However, as Pitkin (1967, pp. 236-40) points out, there is a clear difference between how 
representatives are elected and what they do. No electoral system guarantees the legitimacy of 
representation; rather the system also is subject to the idea of who should be a representative, 
what they do and how they should actually perform in each society. Also there would be some 
added standards particularly related to degrees of various values required to be qualified. About 
this scepticism, it would be helpful to see Pitkin’s other sceptical view about institutions. 
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We should not be too optimistic about the capacity of institutions to produce the desired 
conduct; even the best of representative institutions cannot be expected to produce representation 
mechanically. On the one hand, without institutionalization, the ideal of representation would 
remain an empty dream; on the other hand, no institutional system can guarantee the essence, the 
substance of representation (Pitkin, 1967, p. 239). 
 
In other words, it only means that the virtue of a representative is still an essential issue for 
representation both in principle and in practice. 
 
B. Principle of resemblance 
 
There has been a conception of a democratic representative that the representative body 
should be a descriptive mirror of the represented. In this conception, the representatives have a 
functional role that only reflects the will and views of the represented. The assembly is 
representative in this view if it is ‘a miniature’ of the electorate, ‘a sample’ of it. The hypothesis 
underlying this conviction is that if the assembly is descriptively representative, then it will act 
to represent interests of the represented (Przeworski, 1999, p. 32). This may be the most general 
and basic understanding of democratic representation. 
To some extent, it may be the least compromising between democracy as rule by majority 
and representation as rule by minority. Theoretical advocates of democracy may not ignore 
Rousseau’s maxim that ‘representation is only another form of slavery’. Although the substance 
is obscure or even interpreted as totalitarian, when he conforms ‘will of all’ to ‘general will’, it 
implies how the government should be operated in a democracy. Insofar as representation is 
anti-democratic by nature as Rousseau points out, modern democracy is the only compromising 
form not desirable in practice. Therefore, at least, in order for the modern representation to be 
democratic, there need a strong descriptive link between the representative and the represented. 
To establish a true miniature, the participation of all people may be the most simple and 
essential principle. J.S. Mill’s anticipation of universal suffrage was not for the participation 
itself but for the parliament as a miniature which would bring about the interest of the public 
(Thompson, 1976, pp. 96-7). It is clear in his famous argument that “the right and interests of 
any person are only secure from being disregarded, when the person interested in himself is 
able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. … Each is the only safe guardian of his own 
rights and interests” (Mill, 2008 [1861], ch. 3).149 In this light, proportional representation has 
been designed. J.S. Mill was also in favour of Hare’s single transferable vote system rather than 
                                           
149 Here, the concept of interest is surely distinctive from the former utilitarian view such as Bentham’s selfish 
version. 
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a majority system. 
A descriptive concept as the virtue of a representative had been revealed explicitly in the 
argument of Anti-Federalists in the debate on the American Constitution in 1787 such as James 
Madison’s speech and John Adams’s writing. Madison said that “The legislature ought to be 
the most exact transcript of the whole society” and Adams wrote that ‘a legislature should be 
an exact portrait, in miniature, of the people at large, as it should think, feel, reason, and act like 
them’ (Callenbach and Phillips, 1985). In the context that there is no consideration of the 
qualification for the representative, it can be called a type of mechanical representation. 
In this mechanical representation, the representative should be a true picture of the people 
and the Anti-Federalists called it the principle of likeness (Manin, 1997, pp. 94-109). An Anti-
Federalist, Brutus, for example, wrote that “the very term representative, implies, that the 
person or body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them – a 
representation of the people of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people … They are 
the sign – the people are the thing signified … It must then have been intended that those who 
are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed 
by their interests, or in other words, should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose 
they are substituted. It is obvious that for an assembly to be a true likeness of the people of any 
country, they must be considerably numerous” (Brutus, 1788; cited as Manin, 1997, p. 110). 
If we accept democracy as its pure conception as government operated by all members of 
demos, the descriptive concept can be understood as a necessary and natural way to harmonize 
the ideal of democracy and its practice. Hence, in terms of the principle of resemblance, the 
rule of a Confucian Sage and its justification seems clearly contrary to modern democratic 
government. Although the Sage ruler is recommended by the people, listens carefully to the 
opinion of the people, and devotes his government to public welfare, there may be no room for 
the likeness with the people. Therefore, we may conclude that the Confucian concept of the 
virtue of the representative has almost nothing to contribute to the development of 
contemporary representative democracy; rather it must be dismissed. Yet, in fact, it seems clear 
that modern western representative democracy does not accommodates only the descriptive 
conceptions of representative and the principle of resemblance. If modern representative 
democracy only depends on this resemblance principle, present politics may not be democratic 
any more. 
 
C. The concept of good types of representative 
 
All the arguments against the virtue of a representative are related to the different views 
about how to understand the procedures of representation. Fearon (1999) clearly shows where 
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the disputed points are. According to his argument, one dominant tradition of the understanding 
of contemporary democracy is to regard an election as a mechanism of political 
accountability.150 In this sense, elected officials are motivated to choose policies the public 
desires because this will help get them re-elected. Elections function as a sanctioning device 
that induces elected officials to do what the voters want. Keane (2008; Alonso, Keane, and 
Merkel; 2011, p. 6) also argues that the election of representatives is a dynamic process subject 
to a disappointment principle. Elections are a method of apportioning blame for poor political 
performance. 
However, according to empirical researches,151 in fact, voters think about elections much 
more as opportunities to select good types than as sanctions to deter shirking by future 
incumbents.152 Fearon defines a good type as a politician who (1) shares the voter’s issue 
preferences, (2) has integrity, in that he or she is hard to bribe or be induced to work against the 
voter’s interests, and (3) is competent in the skills of discerning and implementing optimal 
policies for the voter. In addition, successful selecting of good types also implies sanctioning 
bad types, which gives bad types an incentive to appear as if they were good types. In this sense, 
the mechanisms of selection and sanctioning interact for democratic representation. Therefore, 
in principle, the selection view implies responsiveness without the necessary electoral 
accountability of a sanctioning view. In practice, the selection view is much more in 
correspondence with the voter’s thinking and motivation when they are voting. 
Fearon’s view has two significant aspects in modern representative democracy. First, in 
general, the electorates perceive elections as a device to choose good types among the 
candidates for a representative rather than sanctioning. Second, in some countries, the tendency 
of a good type choice is likely to appear more clearly than others. While Fearon gives the 
examples of well-developed Western politics, the sanctioning function of elections may easily 
be dismissed in developing and under-developed countries. Therefore, it may be true that most 
people in the world probably regard elections as the regular and exceptional chance to choose 
good types of representative than a mechanism of political accountability by sanctioning. 
                                           
150 It may be much easier to understand Fearon’s position in comparison with two other views. On the one side, 
there is a view called disappointment principle that elections are method of judgment for poor political 
performance. On the other side, there is a prospect that does not care much of election but more of process of 
permanent contact and deliberation between the representative and representation (Alonso, Keane and Merkel, 
2011, pp.6-7). Of course, both conceptions are also related to the virtue of representative, but it is clear that they 
do not focus on the issue of virtue as much as Fearon’s view or do not show obviously so. 
151 See Fearon (1999), Alonso, Keane, and Merkel (2011), Powell and Whitten (1993), Maravall (1999), Stokes 
(2003), Achen and Bartels (2004), and Maravall and Sanchez-Cuenca (2008). 
152 In terms of institution, there are also many limitations for the operation of systemic accountability such as 
‘term limit’ which is universal in most democratic countries. In the same sense, it may be hard to expect 
substantive sanctioning from life officials such as justices of the Supreme Court in the USA and life peers of the 
House of Lords in the UK. Many Latin American and South Korean presidents are allowed to serve for only one 
term, too. 
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In conclusion, in any case, it may be sure that there are some necessary types of virtue. 
Whether the virtue demanded is derived from human nature, regulated by a system, or both, the 
candidates must be entitled to some qualifications enough to be a legitimate representative. In 
some cases, they are required to be competent alternatives against the danger of majoritarian 
tyranny. Sometimes, the virtue can be an individual competence to overcome the exclusive 
interests of a certain locality or class. Some others may think that the very intrinsic condition 
for the genuine representative is to have similar views, emotions and intelligence. In this case, 
they must come from the same categories of the represented such as class, race, religion, locality, 
or nationality. In all this diverse cases, however, one common point is that there is a good type 
of a representative in the mind of the represented. 
 
 
5. Why Virtue Matters? 
 
A. The fundamental issue of representation is what the representatives have to do rather 
than how they should be elected 
 
Diverse features of representative democracy and different understandings of modern 
representation reflect the complexity of the nature. Since representation is normatively 
associated with the relationship between the representative and the represented, the activities 
of the representative which are expected from the represented characterize the representative 
relationship. In other words, a reasonable relationship which demands some duties based on 
accountability, responsibility, and responsiveness is necessary for fulfilment of representation 
between the two subjects. Though it is democracy in which the representative relationship 
works, whether the representation is genuine depends on the activities of the representative 
rather than of the represented. While the role of ‘demos’ is essential in democracy, the role of 
the representative determines the character of a government in representative democracy. In 
this sense, it seems clear that the subject of ‘representing’ is the representatives not the 
represented themselves. In fact, this is why ‘represent’ is not ‘present’. 
Accordingly, though the fact that representatives are elected is deemed necessary condition 
for a government to act in a representative manner in modern democracy in a concept of 
accountability, there should be some sufficient conditions as well such as providing expected 
goods and better decisions. While genuine ‘representing’ is related to procedural and 
institutional principles such as contestability, wide participation, and the political liberties of 
the citizens on the one side (Przeworski, 1991, p. 5), legitimacy of representative democracy 
must have substantive elements such as what the representative have to do on the other side. In 
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modern democracy, various electoral systems and government structures are just means for 
achieving the substantive goals. That is to say, in representation what the representatives do is 
more crucial rather than how the representatives are elected.  
Therefore, it can be said that the role of representative shapes the features the representative 
democracy. If there are different understandings of representative democracy in different 
political communities, they may depend on the different views of the role of the representatives 
that is expected from the people fundamentally. Since democratic representation became only 
legitimate form of government, there have been constant disputes about the role of the 
representatives. Particularly, autonomy of the representatives has been problematic in relation 
to the people’s will and interests in democracy. In effect, the autonomy of the representatives 
seem to be in conflict with some essential democratic principles such as self-rule. 
Pitkin (1967) and Manin (1997) show that there is a sort of anti-democratic essence of 
representation by nature in principle and in history, and much of this still remains in present 
representative democracy. In present politics, it seems clear that no representation 
accommodates an idea of pure delivery of the will of the people, even if it is possible in practice 
with help of the Social Network Service revolution in some senses. Hence, all the 
representations are apparently and literally distinctive in idea and institution from ‘government 
by the people.’ Even though there has been a wide spread idea of universal suffrage and 
transition from aristocratic parliamentary to popular party politics since the 18th century, it is 
obvious that most representatives are still a sort of elite and just small numbers of people tend 
to be chosen by the people. 
Therefore, in theory a spectrum in which different views about representative democracy 
contest each other can be assumed. On the one side, some claim that representatives should do 
their best to deliver the will or interest of constituents exclusively. On the other side, there will 
be an argument that representatives must be independent from the instinctive opinions of the 
represented and should consider what is really valuable and better for the people using their 
all capability. In the middle, there may be some modest compromise that it cannot be called if 
the representative do not represent the will or interest of the constituents habitually though it 
is almost impossible for the representative to recognize the opinions of the represented (Pitkin, 
1967). 
This spectrum provides two key points. First, there is no absolute model, institution or even 
conception with representation even though it seems the most general and popular concept in 
modern democracy. Second, the fundamental issue of the debates on representative democracy 
still lies on the question that what representatives have to do rather than how they should be 
elected. For example, according to the mirror concept of representation, representation is the 
reflection of the will or interest of people by representatives. Only if it is done well, the people 
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would not mind the type of the institutions. That may be the reason for the diversity. Hence, 
the core still remains on an issue of what the representatives have to do. 
 
B. People always have concerned the virtue of a representative 
 
Though the systemic understanding of representation seems dominant and rational in the 
present world (Alonso, Keane, and Merkel, 2011, pp. 6-7, Urbinati, 2011), the virtue of a 
representative has always been an important issue in representation. If we understand political 
representation as a ‘reason-giving-relationship’ 153  between the representative and the 
represented on belief-systems in each political community, there is no clear evidence that the 
virtue of a representative does not belong to the reasons. Instead, there are lots of practical and 
empirical grounds that people understand election as a process to choose good types of 
representatives (Fearon, 1999). And the moral basis for the process is common to the many 
conceptions of democracy. 
According to Finer, not only democratic but all other governments also need appropriate 
reasons in relationship between the rulers and the ruled based on certain types of belief-system 
which are embedded with the moral and cultural back ground.  
Insofar as representation is a system in which a person or a body of people represents a 
group of people, the representative is the subject who provides some plausible reasons to the 
represented. In modern democratic representation, candidates for a representative try to give 
good reasons for which the constituents have to vote. If these reasons include a normative sense 
of the individual character of the candidates, this means that there are some suitable virtues for 
good representatives and they may be presented through utterances and actions. For this reason, 
in looking at the idea of political representation, and particularly in the relationship with 
legitimacy, the virtue of a representative demanded by a constituency would be the key issue in 
all representation. 
In practice it is more realistic. In general, the superiors ‘tend to be’ elected as representatives. 
There is also a long time belief that the superiors ‘ought to be’ elected. Manin calls it ‘the 
principle of distinction’ (1997, p 95). Since superiority as a virtue of representatives is clearly 
an elitist conception of politics, it seems to contradict the principle of equality in democracy. 
However, this principle of distinction has been a general and long standing view about 
representation in the West. While it might have originated from the ideal state of Socrates, 
modern representation intrinsically seems not free from the legacy. Despite strong movement 
                                           
153 This is an idea stimulated and combined from Gutmann and Thompson (2004) and Finer (1999). Gutmann & 
Thompson argue that deliberation has a function of reason-giving process which satisfies the need to justify 
decisions made by the citizens and the representatives. 
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for democracy, this conception of representation roots deeply from the very beginning of 
modern representative democracy. It might be a dominant idea that a representative needs a 
certain type of qualification in the beginning of representative democracy. 
One of the remarkable leaders of French Revolution, Sieyes’s distinction between the civil 
rights of the citizen and the political rights of the electors shows his understanding of 
representative government. Sieyes thought that there should be some distinctions among the 
citizens; some have only passive civil rights and some are entitled to have active political rights 
as well.  
 
“Electors are representatives of the citizens who are the actual components of the nation. … 
Non-electors participate indirectly in the political life of their country through the voice of the 
electors who, in exercising their active rights, also guard the passive rights of all” (Urbinati, 2006, 
p. 149-52).154 
 
To him, politics is an arena where the ordinary people hardly understand and do what they 
want to. There should be qualified and virtuous representatives who are chosen by distinctive 
citizens as well. According to the distinction, passive and active rights are divided in politics, 
and the idea of active right corresponds to what Burke called virtual representation (Pitkin, 
1967). 
Burke (1961 [1774]) continuously emphasized the importance of the virtue of 
representatives on the basis of prudence and wisdom. His claim that whoever is eligible for the 
representative in England at his time might be regarded as plausible compared to the chaos and 
carelessness of the French Revolution.155 In general, this idea is well known as the Burkean 
view but the root of the thought would be older probably. While Burke’s speech to the electors 
of Bristol in 1774 is famous, the Burkean doctrine in fact originated much earlier and is to be 
found, in Discourse Concerning Government, by the Whig Algernon Sidney, first published in 
1698. Burke’s problem in his speech is clearly whether a representative ought to be a delegate, 
bound by ‘mandate’ and ‘instructions’, or rather a trustee making up his own mind on the issue 
of the day (Bogdanor, 1985, pp. 2-3). 
Gordon Wood understands and explains the Burkean problem as conflict conceptions of 
                                           
154 In fact, this argument has been used to justify political exclusion in the name of national interest or social 
utility such as James Mill’s argument against female suffrage and it is clear that non-active citizenship never 
disappears entirely in democracy, although the criteria change. There have been various exclusions according to 
age, gender, skin colour, cultural and ethnical identities, and religious beliefs. 
155 Thomas Paine (1976 [1791]) severely objected to the idea. However, it is ironical that Paine himself has 
become a member of National Constituent Assembly as an enlightened leader of the French Revolution. The 
revolution had been drawn by Sans-culotte mainly, but one of the most passionately welcomed political leaders 
was an American citizen. Burke might be aware of this situation. 
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representative between actual versus virtual, and local versus national in American Federal 
Constitutionalism. According to him, the Federal Constitution raised all over again the old 
distinction between actual and virtual representation in 1787-88 as it did in the Britain two 
decades earlier (Wood, 1969, p. 45). In fact, as it was clear in Britain in Burke’s speech too, the 
distinction was subjected to the national interest and localism. Here, the national interests 
plainly meant general and genuine interests of the whole nation distinguished from the 
aggregation of the local interests. The distinction between national interests and localism surely 
included a differentiation of prudence and competence of the representative from the tyranny 
of the majority entailed by participation of ordinary people. 
While the Anti-federalists offered a spirited defence of the most local and particularistic 
kind of representation that is much more in accordance with America’s social and political 
reality in their arguments, the federalists perpetuated an elitist conception of representation 
holding the powerful concept of united federal government. To the Federalist, “the great objects 
of the nation not only had been sacrificed constantly to the local view but the general interests 
of the States had been sacrificed to the Counties” (Wood, 1969, p. 46). They believed that it 
had occurred precisely because “the best people” had lost control of politics. Instead of 
choosing men for their abilities, integrity, and patriotism, the local constituencies choose men 
“who will vote for a new town or a new county.” (Wood, 1969, p. 46) 
The federalists expected to free America from the evils of localism (Wood, 1969, p. 47). 
And it is sure that what the federalists anticipated was a superior representative. They believed 
that ordinary people could not avoid the evil attraction of selfish interests, so that in parliament 
there should be distinctive people as representatives who see the greater and public good for 
the whole community beyond faction and fraction. It is not a problem that can be solved by 
systemic regulation. Once the people who just deliver the local and some specific interest had 
been chosen exclusively, it might be hard to correct the tendency. 
In this sense, James Madison made it clear that “the aim of every political constitution is, 
or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most 
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most 
effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust” 
(Federalist Papers, No. 57). In this context, it is plain that a body composed by lot is not the 
transcript or portrait that the founders had in mind. Rather, it is more possible that they thought 
a group of qualified persons could represent better than the represented themselves. 
Some other modern political thinkers also considered the virtue of a representative seriously. 
Mill (2008 [1861]), the forefather of liberal democracy recognized two contrary but necessary 
characters of representation, competence and participation. It is not so clear that he anticipated 
some sort of superiority in a representative. Mill held that government and society usually do 
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not know better than an individual what is in his interest, though he might not know either. Yet, 
Mill did not say that individuals or groups always know their own interests best (Thompson, 
1976, p. 19). Unlike the former Utilitarians, he undoubtedly distinguished the lower and higher 
preferences. His favour in the participation of the people surely originates from the educative 
function of participation not from any fact or belief that participation would bring better 
decisions. Mill believed that democracy should give as much weight as possible to superior 
intelligence and virtue in the political process (Thompson, 1976, p. 54). Mill had a deep 
attachment to an enlightened minority on the one hand, and at the same time, he was in favour 
of general suffrage for the people’s interests on the other hand. Most of all, we should be careful 
that Mill used ‘representative democracy’ interchangeably with representative government 
because the ultimate goal is not democracy but good government. To him, participation as a 
democratic principle is not absolute but instrumental element for good government though there 
is no doubt the instrumental educative function is necessary for the goal. 
In contemporary politics, it may be an undeniable truth that often the virtue of candidates 
becomes a core issue no less than any other policies and pledges in electoral campaigns. In 
other words, the policies are only meaningful when the people believe that the policies would 
be delivered sufficiently by the representative who is committed to them. In modern 
representative politics, there may be no party or policy which is powerful enough only by itself 
without a proper personal representative who operates on trust from the people. Although the 
minimum conditions for democracy include the enlightened understanding of each member of 
the political community (Dahl, 2000, p.38), representatives tend to be required more and in 
many cases it is a strong standard for winning an election (Manin, 1997).156 Thus, it is not an 
unreasonable assumption that a qualified representative should be elected among the candidates 
who bear a certain type of virtue as a good representative. 
 
 
6. Coherence of Virtue 
 
As seen above, the peculiarity of Confucian virtue is the coherence of virtue of a person as an 
individual and as a representative. A good type of a Confucian representative is a virtuous person 
not as a representative or ruler but as an individual living in a family and a town. He has to have 
the virtue not of a ruler but also of a good person, a good father, and a good neighbour. This seems 
to be a quite distinctive point from the requirement of a good representative in the tradition of 
                                           
156 This kind of enlightenment surely can be applied to not just individual level but can be extended to party 
politics in modern democracy. 
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western liberal democracy. However, this research would argue that it is not so. This thesis argues 
that the coherence of virtue as seen in Confucian representative theory is also found in the western 
tradition. 
 
A. Virtue of a son and a politician 
 
There are also many different views of the relationship of virtue in a good son and a good 
politician. There are at least four different types;  
 
(a) A bad son is more likely to be a good politician  
(b) Even a bad son could be a good politician 
(c) A good son is more likely to be a good politician 
(d) Only a good son should and could be a good politician 
 
In the West, first, Aristotle who distinguished a good man and a good citizen may agree 
with the cases of (b) and (c). For him, only under an ideal regime, can the good citizen rule and 
be ruled in accordance with the virtue of a good man. In other and real political regimes, the 
ruler could not be a good son. That is why he argues for a mixed form of government of 
democracy and oligarchy. If Aristotle is an advocate of virtue for politics not only for good life, 
Machiavelli may be in the position of the very opposite side. He argues that a good ruler needs 
not to be a good man or even should not be. There may be necessary moments for the ruler to 
be seen as a good man, whereas most of the time the character is not relevant to be a good ruler 
in Machiavelli’s concept. In this sense, he seems to be a strong defender of (a) and weak of (b). 
In ancient China, the Legalists have argued similar claims that a good ruler should never show 
his generosity or humane character to the people or even to the followers. Apparently this idea 
lacks the traditional virtue of Greece and Confucianism. 
Radically, democracy as a political system does not guarantee good politicians as a result 
of competence. More precisely, the chosen representative is a qualified politician by the 
justification of the democratic procedure according to the Schumpeterian view. To say in a 
Rawlsian way, this is a pure procedural justice in which outcomes will be justified in any 
circumstances. In the context of representation, it can be interpreted that whoever is chosen 
would be recognized as a qualified representative.157 
Yet, there are always dangers of choosing a bad person as a representative. Hume and 
                                           
157 In general, it is known as an idea of representative democracy by market system in which the candidates 
compete with each other. 
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James Mill agreed that everyone should be supposed a knave. It is not because everyone is a 
knave but it often happens that a knave is selected as a representative. In addition, when it 
happens, the consequences are so serious to many people. Hume and Mill’s concern has three 
important implications in modern representative democracy. First, this is a warning that there 
should be an institutional restraint to control representatives and the people should watch the 
representatives even after choosing them. Second, it also premises that by institutional 
regulation a bad person could be a good politician. Third, it can be said that democracy is a 
system in which a bad person becomes a good politician by the regulation. In this sense, modern 
representative democracy is not a system that guarantees good politicians as its outcomes but 
an institutional design in which people choose some people as representatives, then constantly 
check whether they are doing a good job for the represented. This view is consistent with the 
case (b).  
In sum, while Socrates was an advocate of the view of (d); only a good son should and 
could be a good politician, Greek democracy must be on the opposite assumption.158 Aristotle 
was an arbiter between Socrates and ancient democracy. Machiavelli suggested a very creative 
view of (a); a bad son more likely to be a good politician. Though he has been blamed 
continuously because of this suggestion, it is true that he revealed some real features of politics. 
At the beginning of modern representation, many theorists such as Burke, Sieyes, and the 
Federalists had been in favour of (c); a good son is more likely to be a good politician. Then, 
gradually (c) has been replaced by (b); even a bad son could be a good politician. However, 
this thesis doubts that (c) is in conflict with (d) in real politics. In both cases, the voter wants 
to avoid choosing bad sons as much as possible. Most of all, it may be true that many people 
still do something in elections with the view of (d) and it is a reasonable choice. 
In the concept of Confucian Sagacity, the peculiar aspect is its coherence of virtue between 
private and public relationship. Not only in private relationship – family, friends, and (probably) 
village – but also in public relationship – school, local office, and national government, the 
sage’s actions are subject to ethical principles. There is no contradiction or conflict between the 
principles which should be kept within a private person and a public official. There is a positive 
assumption that if one is esteemed as a good son, a good friend, and a good villager, it is more 
likely that he is a good teacher, a good civil servant, and a good ruler. This is the coherent 
perspective of virtue in Confucianism. In this sense, Confucian Sagacity is strongly connected 
with (d). Though it seems anachronistic in principle, this view would be legitimate enough 
when the view is consistent with a belief-system in which a democratic procedure authorizes 
                                           
158 I agree with that there can be more various views of Socrates’ position. However, at this moment, this is a 
simplification and it seems not conflict with the general understanding of his philosophy. 
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the coherence of virtue of a representative. In addition, probably Confucius and Mencius would 
accept (c) as a plausible and realistic view in modern politics. 
Clearly, they would not agree with (a) and (b). Surely, Confucians have an idea that a bad 
son cannot be a good politician. It is not the normative claim that a bad son should not be a 
politician. Instead, it means that it is impossible for a bad son to be a good politician. For this 
reason, not only (a) but also (b) is not accepted. The difference of (a) and (b) is that there is an 
only one way (b) is acceptable when the bad son becomes a good son by self-cultivation. In 
sum, for Confucians, (d) is the best, (c) is the next, but (b) is rejected because it is not desirable 
but impossible. They thought that for the goal of a good government it was an easier and more 
realistic way to select a good person as a representative rather than controlling a bad person by 
any system. However, there is no reason for the Confucians to deny any systemic efforts that 
make a representative a good representative. Instead, we have to understand that they 
emphasized the importance of selecting a good person as a representative in both principle and 
practice. And there seem to be no conflict between this Confucian view and modern 
representative democracy. They are in common in many parts or they are complementary to 
each other. 
 
B. Coherence of virtue in Confucianism 
 
In this section, I would ask three questions; is there clear coherence of virtue in 
Confucianism?: is the Confucian Sagacity pursued in the concept of ‘self-realization’ not just 
in inner-satisfaction?: how about the ways of acquiring of the knowledge necessary for unified 
virtue? 
First, it seems clear that Confucianism is one of the strongest political theories that 
advocates the coherence of the virtue of a representative. There is an interesting question and 
answer between Confucius and one of his disciples that has a special implication for the 
coherence of virtue. 
 
Confucius said, “Zeng, my friend! My way (Dao: 道) is bound together with one continuous 
strand.” Zeng replied,, “Indeed.” When Confucius had left, the disciples asked, “What was he 
referring to?” Zeng said, “The way of Confucius is doing one’s utmost and putting oneself in the 
other’s place, nothing more. (Analects, 4:15) 
 
This is something that penetrates the whole wisdom and virtue of Confucianism. Yet, it is 
not so clear in other of Confucius’ words in the Analects. It is Mencius who suggested four 
main virtues of a good person and those virtues undoubtedly are also the most important 
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conditions for being a good representative. 159 The four virtues are “the mind which cannot bear 
to see the sufferings of others”, “the mind of shame and dislike”, “the mind of courtesy and 
modesty”, and “the mind of right and wrong” (Bloom, 2002, p. 77). Among them, the most 
fundamental virtue is ‘the mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others’. Mencius 
gave a situation that, 
 
“I say that all human beings have a mind which cannot bear to see the sufferings of others 
knowing that any of contemporaries, seeing a child about to fall into a well, will without exception 
experience a feeling of alarm and distress. It is not a matter of ingratiating themselves with the child’s 
parents, nor of seeking the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor of disliking the reputation [of 
having been unmoved by such a thing] (Mencius, 2A, 6).” 
 
In fact, Mencius declares compassion160 to be the very basic virtue for all human beings 
(Bloom, 2002, p. 76). That is not the virtue for a person to be more virtuous but it is necessary 
for him not to be vicious. For him, the virtue such as compassion is not sufficient but a necessary 
condition for a human. In following phrases, he says that whoever is devoid of a heart of 
compassion, shame, courtesy and modesty, and right and wrong is not a human being (Mencius, 
2A: 6). Yet, once one has the four virtues, one immediately approaches public and political 
competence. Mencius says that “when they are not [in the mind], they are insufficient even to 
enable one to serve one’s parents; when they find fulfilment, they are sufficient to enable one 
to protect all within the four seas” (Mencius, 2A: 6). Here, when Mencius emphasized that “one 
must know to enlarge and fulfil them” (Bloom, 2002, p. 77), he clearly argues for the coherence 
of the virtue of a representative. 
Second, can the Confucian Sagacity be realized in public realms not just in mind? In order 
to answer to this question, it seems necessary to examine whether the Sagacity can be 
recognised in different social conditions, and the answer is ‘yes’. Virtue is essentially related to 
not just internal identity but also external relationship and this is a distinctive characteristics of 
Confucian virtue. In fact, this is a peculiar aspect of Confucianism compared to its rival ideas 
such as Buddhism, Taoism and even Legalism. While all these ideas have focused on internal 
aspects of virtue, in Confucianism the internal virtue is meaningless if the virtue is not 
                                           
159 Insofar as the goal of the thesis is to contribute contemporary political development in Confucian East Asian 
at present, though the argument of this thesis is inspired by the Confucianism, it will not be constrained 
Confucianism. Therefore although I will frequently refer to what I take to be Mencius’ views on virtue, the 
question of whether Mencius actually held these views should not affect the strength of the argument In fact, 
this methodological view is what I quite from Wolf (Wolf, 2007, p. 148). 
160 惻隱之心 (측은지심) is translated in different ways, compassion, commiseration, or sympathy. Bloom used 
‘grieving-pity-of-mind’ following I.A. Richards (Bloom, 2002, p. 76). I shall use all these different terms 
depends on the context.  
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connected with social values and relationship or is not expressed externally in visible ways. If 
virtue is necessary for a person to be a person and a good person, the function of the virtue 
should be operated not just privately but also publicly in Confucian thought. It means not just 
that individuals cannot live without other people’s help and communication but also that human 
life is only meaningful in relationships. In other words, every person recognizes himself or 
herself only through the others in a society. For example, Robinson Crusoe’s life in the island 
has no meaning as a Confucian human being because there is not relationship with other people. 
There is absolutely no chance for him to act with compassion, shame, courtesy and modesty, 
and right and wrong which are the intrinsic foundations for all virtues. As a result, there is not 
self-awareness and self-realization in public relationship.161 
Third, how about the ways of acquirement of the knowledge necessary for unified virtue? 
This question also can be replaced as that what kind of education is needed for a man to be 
virtuous. In this issue, we need to understand the Confucian tradition of education and its 
characteristics. Confucian education is for self-cultivation and the very basic way of self-
cultivation is not reading of text but investigating of all things. According to Great Learning, 
 
Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts. Wishing to rectify their hearts, 
they first sought to be sincere in their thoughts. Wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, they first 
extended to the utmost of their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of 
things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete (Great Learning, 7)162 
 
Wisdom as a result of the investigation of all things of the world is clearly not an exclusively 
academic or highest philosophical truth. Whether it originates from the heart or the mind, it is 
clear that the goal of Confucian education is not for a specialised role. As discussed before, 
even a farmer can be a Sage if only he has appropriate virtues. The wisdom basically originates 
from daily lives and it must be practical insofar as the virtues could have practical problem-
solving capacities. To say in Jeong Yakyoung’s version, one is a wise man in a village when he 
solves the conflicts among the peoples whether he is educated or not. If one is a model of the 
people of a village, he is the sage whether he is literate or not. Those kinds of people should be 
recommended as representatives. In this sense, in Confucian representation, the virtue is unified. 
Then, as the wisdom is practical intrinsically, the practical wisdom should be internalized 
within a person by exercise. Though one is awakened and enlightened by investigating all things, 
this is not the stage in which one becomes a good person or genuinely knows the wisdom. The 
                                           
161 Of course, it is clear that that idea is not the particular one only in Confucian world. We will see this in the 
next section. 
162欲修其身者，先正其心. 欲正其心者，先誠其意. 欲誠其意者，先致其知. 致知在格物, 物格而後知至. 
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Analects begin with the sentence that “Confucius says that having studied, to then repeatedly 
apply what you have learned – is this not a source of pleasure?” Studying is not enough; practice 
is necessary for a man to be a good person. When Confucius was most pleased was the moment 
when he realized what he studied in daily life. This kind of ideal man cannot be compromised 
with Machiavelli’s ideal ruler at all. 
The exercise of wisdom is a procedure in which the virtue is accustomed within the mind 
and character of a person by repeated practice in various daily circumstances. In other words, 
it is a process of habituation of virtue. In fact, what the Confucians always focuses on is right 
conduct by habit. The set of the rules for right conduct has been structured in Li.163 Yet the habit 
is derived not from institutional restriction but virtual education which is entirely achieved by 
practice. Mencius’ distinction of governments based on law and on morality reveals the 
characteristics of education. 
The conduct of rulers and the ruled may be restricted by law or institutions, but it is not 
honourable but only shameful. It is because self-control is a result forced by law. Such self-
control does not result in volitional habitual behaviour. To some extent, it is not genuine self-
control but merely external control. Even though it still seems self-control because the final 
choice whether to obey or not depends on the agent exclusively, at least it is not the case of self-
realization in relation to virtue. It is because the controlled agent may become uncontrolled 
without forced external regulation. In contrast, if that is conduct within self-realized virtue, it 
would not be affected by other external enforcement. In fact, this is why Mencius claims that a 
government that only rests on law without virtue cannot be a good one. In this sense, the ruler 
is a moral model for the ruled rather than an intellectual expert. It is moral superiority that the 
good ruler should acquire in his character. And in this case, political legitimacy entirely depends 
on whether the ruler does virtuous actions by habit or not. 
In terms of this point, Mencius’s idea is coincident to the given conceptions of knowledge. 
In the example of the child in danger of falling into a well, Mencius does not make a contrast 
between reason and emotion. David Wong says that the example illustrates the characteristic 
intentional object of compassion. Compassion is distinguished from other sorts of emotion by 
certain perceived features of the situations to which it is directed. The intentional object of 
compassion makes salient the feature of the situation that is the suffering, actual or forthcoming, 
of a sentient being (Wong, 1991, p. 32; Chong, 2009, p. 192). 
 
C. Coherence of Virtue in the West 
                                           
163 It is conventionally translated as ‘rites’. Yet ‘propriety’ or ‘rules of proper behaviour’ seems more accurate 
understanding of Li(예: 禮). See more Ames and Rosemont’s (1988, pp. 51-53). 
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Now, I turn to compare the given western coherence of virtue with Confucian Sagacity. It 
is Aristotle who argues for coherence of virtue in the West. In a similar context with coherence, 
he calls it ‘unity of virtue’. Aristotle’s philosophy is about a good life, and it is essentially 
related to the virtue of the individuals. “If the virtue is not about one or some kinds of virtues 
but about all, integrity is indispensable for a good human life”. In this sense, He argues “for the 
unity of the virtues that they are all interconnected, so that if a person fully possesses one of 
them, he should have them all” (Cottingham, 2010, pp.2-3). In other words, virtue is one. 
Names for all different virtues refer to different aspects of the same single property. Therefore, 
“a person cannot have one virtue without having all the others” (Wolf, 2007, p. 145).164 
Why is unity necessary for virtue? According to Aristotle, it is because possessing a specific 
virtue means that one will act in a certain way ‘when one should, towards the things one should, 
in relation to the people one should, for the reasons one should, and in the way one should.’ 
This explains why Aristotle takes the full possession of one virtue to require full possession of 
all virtues (Webber, 2006, p. 15). It can be interpreted that unity is necessary because virtue 
needs knowledge.  
The western virtue is essentially related to knowledge, but knowledge is not about 
intelligence but ethics. At this point, it is fair enough to compare a model suggested by Mencius 
as a foundation of virtue with Wolf’s example. Wolf explains the characteristics of knowledge 
giving an example where a person rushes into a burning house to try to save a child.  
If one wants to do something in virtue, first, he needs to know the action’s right values and 
importance (Wolf, 2007, p. 149). He must know why it is worth doing. It is not enough to know 
the worth of the only action to be done by the agent. There should be comparison with other 
choices. As long as we can do other actions, knowing the action’s values means that the choice 
is the best or at least the appropriate result in comparison with others. If one is to be courageous 
or generous, one must know whether it is worth risking one’s life or paying for the money for 
someone or something. Virtue includes not only having a sense of how much of one good is 
worth risking or sacrificing for another, but also understanding when and for what kinds of 
goods different kinds of action are appropriate. It may also be applicable to the situations where 
different virtues are competent in the mind of the agent. Accordingly, “if a person is courageous, 
then he will also be generous, just, truthful, and temperate” (Wolf, 2007, pp. 160-1). In this 
light, Aristotle says that having a virtue is a matter of having a character “that disposes you to 
do the right thing in the right way, at the right time, to the right person, for the right reason” 
                                           
164 It is not just a tradition of Greece. St. Paul says that you may be perfectly untied in mind and thought (1 
Corinthians, 1:10). Praise for undivided heart and psychological and ethical unity are also broadly found in 
Christian tradition (Psalms, 86, St Luke, 9:25; Cottingham, 2010, p. 3). 
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(Wolf, 2007, p. 148). In this context, the classical Greek thesis of the unity of virtue is 
understood to imply that to have one virtue is to have them all. Therefore, knowledge is required 
for good life. 
In sum, in Greek tradition, there had been a close connection between virtue and knowledge 
by three steps; each virtue essentially involves knowledge; knowledge is essentially unified; 
virtue is unified (Wolf, 2007, p. 148). However, knowledge itself would not enough for a person 
to be virtuous. There must be a possibility that a person does a wrong action even if he knows 
well it is vicious. Maybe this is what happens in the real world. Then, there should be another 
process for the knowledge to be a virtue, a certain stage of mind. 
In this regard, the concept of compassion seems to be similar to the notion of love given by 
Cottingham, at least insofar as it is volitional. To Mencius, the resources for the action of 
compassion is xin (심: 心) but also means at the same time a reflection entity. For this reason, 
Chong argues that the word xin may perhaps be more appropriately referred to as the heart-
mind instead of just the heart (Chong, 2009, p. 192).165 
Hence, in Wolf’s example, the man who rushes in is a virtuous person, whereas in Mencius 
example, all people should do that and it is an action by nature. In some senses, Mencius’ view 
is similar to Jesus’ in his parable of the rescue of the Samaritan. The rescue is not just a 
behaviour that deserves praise but also an intrinsic duty as a Christian. To Mencius, that is a 
duty for all human beings. In this sense, with the question whether the Greek view about the 
relationship with virtue is coincident with the Confucian concept of virtue, we can answer ‘yes’. 
Second, this coherence must be realized in public realms not just as a status of mind. 
Cottingham says that the integration of virtue goes beyond exercising strength of will, gritting 
one’s teeth, and putting temptation to one side. The person of integrity goes beyond the concept 
of ‘self-control’ which is understood as the moral fortitude Kant admired. Only oppressing 
wrong desires and vice temptation for worse values is not the solution for a good life. Integrity 
is not a matter of suppressing or overriding these desires by inner or outer forces; rather it may 
result in psychological risk as Freud and Jung warned. Though one may surely be in a right 
position by self-control, one remains somehow “a divided self” (Cottingham, 2009, pp. 6-7). 
The virtue of integrity is in reference to social roles. This is also connected essentially not just 
with one’s identity but also the meaning of life and happiness (Mendus. 2009, pp. 96-104). 
Most of all, Aristotle says that there is no man who can live by himself or he is God. In 
Christianity, the prodigal’s decision to go back to his home and family is really the same as 
rediscovering his true self, since his exile from his family is an exile from his true identity as 
                                           
165 In fact, there has been controversies and long and serious debates whether the nature of the four sprouts is in 
the heart or in the mind among the Confucians over thousands years. 
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son and brother. He can only find himself again with them (Cottingham, 2009, p. 3). In addition, 
the most extended feature of this idea by recognition and reciprocity among the people may be 
fraternity in French Revolution. The idea and conduct of loving and respecting every person 
only because he or she is a human being consists of the strongest view that everyone is a 
meaningful being only within relationship. In terms of the coherence of virtue, Confucianism 
and some dominant western ideas are standing in the same position where genuine self-
awareness is impossible beyond a veil of ignorance. Therefore, in general, the Confucian 
concept of self-awareness is affinitive to Western ideas. 
Here is a clear distinction of notion between genuine virtue and mere self-control. A 
virtuous person acts for a reason that is apprehended not as outweighing or overriding any 
reason for acting in other ways but as silencing them (Aristotle, 1146b31-5; McDowell, 1979, 
ch. 3; Webber, 2006, p. 16). In this sense, it is plausible that the search for integrity is essentially 
a quest for self-understanding rather than self-control. As an example, Cottingham supposes a 
good politician. 
A young ambitious, devoted, and honest politician may be faced with many different 
temptations and corruptions for power even though his goal is still purely for the good of society. 
In this case, Cottingham insists that there is no miraculous application of moral character or 
some special way for more principled politicians. The politician of genuine integrity is 
essentially someone who knows who he is. What he does have is a certain psychological 
wholeness that is an understanding of the significance of all his various goals and desires, and 
the true place of each in his life plan (Cottingham , 2009, pp. 7-8). 
There may be some critics that the unity of virtue can be philosophically ideal but it is 
impossible to be realized in the modern world. Or, that is not the value of the present pluralistic 
society. This means that the coherence of virtue is neither possible nor necessary in a plural 
society. Surely, it seems that different kinds of lives may need different talents and skills. Some 
of them may involve some sorts of virtues more than others. 
Yet it is clear that any or almost any kind of life might have a need of any of the most basic 
virtues (Wolf, 2007, p. 157-8). Pluralism does not imply that all the values are to be treated with 
the same importance; rather it means that there should be not an implausible exclusion of values 
and all of them are entitled to be considered at fair standards. Literally pluralistic society is 
where different values and virtues co-exist and each human life falls into a variety of segments 
(MacIntyre, 1985, p. 205; Conttingham, 2006, p. 4). That only means that in order to be a 
meaningful being, we have to be careful in our awareness of the difference between the 
‘plurality and fragmentation of self.’ In other words, we cannot do everything, so we have to 
learn to prioritize. As George Harris writes and Cottingham points out, ‘we are going to bemoan 
the very fact that we are finite beings with inherent restrictions on how much we can achieve 
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in a life time (Cottingham, 2010, p. 5)’. Hence, the different values should be evaluated first 
therefore a virtuous person would regard appropriateness, importance, and priority before 
stating action. 
Finally, if the unity of virtue is necessary for a good life, knowledge is essential for unity 
of virtue, and knowledge and unity are still meaningful in plural society, how can we acquire 
that kind of unified knowledge for virtue? Before answering the question, it is useful to clarify 
more clearly the characteristics of knowledge in western philosophy. 
First, we have to make it clear that the virtue needed in Aristotle’s concept is not such an 
intellectual or confusing puzzle in ethics. It is not about maths but is a decision whether we 
have to rush into a burning house to try to save a child or stop along the highway to help an 
accident victim. In these cases, it is not clear that this kind of knowledge is more appropriately 
originated from the mind than from the heart.166 Second, that is not a virtue by nature. Aristotle 
distinguishes natural virtue from practical wisdom. It is a natural virtue that in a case where a 
person finds it easy to face physical risk, whether as a result of training or of biology, he may 
have natural courage. In this sense, we even often say that dogs are loyal. In contrast, practical 
wisdom is based on knowledge of what is important or worthwhile. Wolf shows the differences 
between the natural honesty and honesty exercised by practical wisdom by Kantian example 
when there is a murderer at the door looking for your innocent friend. In this case, practical 
wisdom necessarily requires not only judgment but some repeated and accumulated exercise of 
good judgments (Wolf, 2007, pp. 152-5). At this point, practice meets virtue which issues in 
nothing but ‘right conduct’ (McDowell, 1979; Webber, 2006, p. 16). Third, the knowledge of 
unity required by Aristotle seeks for ‘self-awareness rather than self-control’. Achieving an 
integrated life requires self-awareness (Cottingham, 2010, p. 2). This self-awareness is an 
alternative to any attempt to control oneself. It is recognition that it is impossible for a human 
being to control one-self perfectly. That is an understanding of the vulnerable self-limited 
within length of life, conditions of growth period, and many weaknesses contained in human 
character. The concept self-control is too difficult to be realized as a foundation of a good life. 
Instead, awareness of oneself implies that the one recognises the limit of life and pursue the 
meaning of a life in the limit. There is not unreasonable or impossible attempt to resolve a 
tension between an imperfect person and perfect control. This is the base of integration of a 
virtue. In other words, it is self-realization. 
Then, let us turn to the ways of acquirement. The knowledge is acquired by constant 
                                           
166 The more philosophers are likely to agree with these examples. Wolf says that John McDowell’s and Iris 
Murdoch’s conceptions of virtue and the role of perception in it are in much the same spirit as the view offering 
here (Wolf, 2007, p. 155). Also this is unlike the Kantian basis for the Western ethics in which reason is 
distinguished and dominant to emotion. 
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exercise by an agent, so that the knowledge becomes the agent’s character. When the knowledge 
is embodied in one’s character, in this case, we can finally say that he is virtuous. In this process, 
the exercise should be enough to be embodied in one’s character. The virtue is rooted deeply in 
one’s character by exercise, then, the virtuous man act virtuously by habit. This is what Wolf 
says that it is not clear that the actions derive from the heart or the mind. In other words, he 
seems to act naturally in the sense that nearly all others and even he himself cannot recognize 
whether the actions result from the heart or the mind. Webber illustrates about this stage that 
full possession of any one virtue means habitually being inclined to behave in a certain way 
with the right degree of strength in the presence of a certain situational feature, where what is 
right is relative to the strength of one’s other habitual inclinations in response to other possible 
situational features (Webber, 2006, p. 15).167 
In terms of the nature of habit in this context as completion of unified virtue, Cottingham 
explains the ground of our choices and acts of will, referring to Harry Frankfurt, that the heart 
of the matter is neither affective nor cognitive but volitional (Frankfurt, 2004, pp. 41-2; 
Cottingham, 2009, p. 10). It sounds very complex but he suggests a simple and familiar notion, 
loving something or someone. Apparently love seems quite far from the discourse about a 
philosophical concept of virtue and its unity. Yet, it is related to the nature of values to be 
examined before the choices of each agent who wants to be virtuous because loving is nothing 
but knowing its worth and devoting himself to it by his own will through action. In this sense, 
Cottingham argues that value derives from the will. It is not a function of how we feel towards 
something, for about our perceiving or recognizing some truth about it, but rather a matter of 
our exercising our will, our choice, to care about something or someone (Cottingham, 2009, p. 
10). 
To sum up, the virtue is essentially related to knowledge of ethics. Knowledge should 
include not only the virtue but the ability to judge and evaluate its value compared to other 
virtues’ values. For this reason, the knowledge cannot be satisfied by natural virtue but must 
also be accompanied by practice. The practical wisdom would be acquired by some sort of 
education. Yet it must be involved not only with the mind but also with the heart. For example, 
in terms of courage, normally we regard the virtue as necessary for firemen, policemen and 
soldiers but also we would use courage for a mother in appropriate cases in which no other 
terms fit a perfect description to illustrate the scenes (Wolf, 2007, p. 157). In this sense, the 
knowledge is close to practical wisdom rather than scholarly intelligence or particular skills, 
                                           
167 Habit is the decisive factor which distinguishes representative from oligarch. Pitkin says that it is surely 
ridiculous that a man represents a constituency if he is in the habit of saying ‘yes’ when the people of the 
constituency would say ‘no’ (Pitkin, 1967, p. 150). Also when we admit certain representative’s behaviours as 
institutionalized or patterned, it means nothing but that has become habitual (Pitkin, 1967, p. 236). 
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and that is why we call it character or a trait not intellectual capacity. And, at this moment, we 
can realise that how there are common traditions between the West and the Confucian East 
about the virtue of a good man in both private and public life. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Election is to select good types of representatives. What is the meaning of ‘good’ in this context? 
What is the implication of this ‘good’ between those who are like us and those who are better than 
us? In fact, election is only a certain device amongst diverse measures of representation. There 
have been many different concepts and applications of political representation in history; 
democracy by sortition, oligarchy by peers, monarchy by kingship and so on. Yet, the view of 
Montesquieu seems to be true that lot is natural to democracy; as choice is to aristocracy. 
To be honest, it may be true that if we want to choose those who are like us, we do not need 
elections. Sortition may be the most reliable institution that guarantees to establish parliaments and 
representative governments consisting of members like us as miniature. In principle and in practice 
as well, if contemporary democracy is purely deemed as representation by people like us, there 
may not be such strong arguments against sortition as an alternative to election. Otherwise, this 
implies that it is not that kind of democracy that we are thinking of in general. In other words, the 
fact that we choose our representative by election not by lot means that we do not want to select 
those who are like us as representatives. Political election is clearly an institution that is designed 
intentionally and intrinsically to select those who are competent in reasonable sense on a belief-
system. To be radical, election is a system in which we grant much of our sovereignty to some 
competent minority by a formal process namely voting. In this sense, representative democracy 
can be called a system where mainly representation works not democracy. It is clear that most 
people have the right to vote in principle but few people have the privilege to be representative in 
practice in most countries of representative democracy. In this sense, in modern representative 
democracy, while democracy grants most citizens to be qualified to vote, representation means 
government by true elites and elections are a means for finding that elites (Pitkin, 1967, p. 171). 
There is a dilemma in democratic representation or representative democracy. In democracy, 
the citizens are all politically equal; in representative democracy, some are more equal than others. 
In the conceptions of Dworkin, while democratic principle works in vertical and horizontal 
dimension, representative principle operates in difference of impact and influence (Dworkin, 2002, 
pp. 190-194). Although the democratic principle provides all individuals with an equal chance of 
governing, elections produce definite aristocratic effects in which they reserve public office for 
eminent individuals whom their fellow citizens deem superior to others (Alonso, Keane, and 
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Merkel, 2011, p. 4). This is an inevitable consequence of the combination of two different systems 
based on different principles, resemblance and distinction. While there seems only an instrumental 
difference between direct and indirect participation, as Rousseau and Pitkin hold, it raises tangible 
variations in principles of the character of representatives. 
Therefore, in order to understand the development of representative democracy, it is necessary 
to explore the peculiarity of the concept of good types of representatives in each country. Insofar 
as we adopt elections as a legitimate system mainly instead of sortition, it may be a significant 
issue who the good type candidates are, what the elements of competence are, and how we can 
judge. The legitimacy of representative democracy would depend on those aspects. At this stage, 
all the ideas and procedures about the issue of selecting good types of representatives must be under 
some particularities in each community. 
When Fearon defines a good type as a politician who shares a voter’s preferences, has integrity, 
and is competent of skill, the concrete contents and standards in each category would be various. 
There may be different people’s preferences, for example, from individual freedom to 
communitarian values, integrity in different ethics and moral conceptions, and diverse skills from 
ambition for power to humility as sage. At this stage, the question of what legitimate government 
is can be changed into ‘who are the good types of representative in each community?’ and ‘how do 
people recognize and confirm?’ This is the point where I have explored the relationship between 
legitimacy as a belief-system and cultural diversity in this chapter. 
The concept of the Confucian Sage is still influential to contemporary politics in Korea as 
Confucian East Asia. Some aspects of the concept would differ from the basic idea of democracy 
and surely be dismissed by reasonable social movement, deliberation, and institutionalization. In 
fact, that is the whole history of the modern development of politics in Korea. However, much of 
the idea of Sage as a political representative is not so distinctive from the concept of reasonable 
competence of the representative in the West. In a sense, they are standing on the same principle of 
distinction and it is undeniable that many of their aspects are intrinsically non-democratic or even 
anti-democratic. Yet, that is the principle in which we are living daily lives and accept in the name 
of representation. 
Unlike most prejudice, in my assumption, the concept of the Confucian Sage has many 
reasonable aspects that can be contained in modern representative democracy. There are some 
values which are not found in the Western main stream of representation in present days but deemed 
essential for good representatives and good politics entailed public welfare in the Confucian East. 
In addition, the important element of coherence of virtue as a condition of good representative is 
also found in the Western tradition that is reintroduced by some western theorists. Moreover, there 
is much possibility of compromise with modern democracy as well. 
In this section, the ultimate question to be examined is in what perspective Confucian virtues 
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are meaningful and coincident with western and general philosophical conditions for a good 
representative. In other words, as given in previous sections, if Sagacity has some common 
principles in modern representation in the virtue of a representative, what is the content of the 
principle? 
Some answers seem to be revealed here. The West and Confucianism have a common idea that 
there is a concept of integrated virtue which is necessary for a good person and a good 
representative. The virtue only can be unified by knowledge and is meaningful only when the 
knowledge is embodied by practice. Accordingly, if a person does something good for the people 
in a public position stably and coherently, he must be a virtuous person privately at the same time 
or in advance. While the idea that only good son should and could be a good politician seems 
radical somehow, it is not such an irrational argument. Rather it appears still valid in pluralistic 
modern representative democracy. Therefore, it may be possible to say that if virtue is to be unified 
and coherent by nature, we should choose representative from the good sons not the bad sons. 
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Ch7. Conclusion  
 
1. Contribution 
 
The original contribution of this thesis is the examination of the compatibility of political 
development and Confucian traditional thought in East Asia, particularly South Korea. This thesis 
also suggests an alternative methodology in the study of political theory in reference to culture, by 
arguing that such studies should tackle culturally neutral concepts, such as legitimacy and 
representation, rather than democracy, liberalism, and the westernised concept of human rights. In 
order to do this, this research has focused on three concepts: legitimacy, representation, and 
Confucian virtue. 
This research has proposed that political legitimacy is the most fundamental basis in the study 
of the relationship between political development and culture. Since legitimacy is essential in every 
government and cannot be borrowed, but can only be established on the practices and customs of 
the people, legitimacy should involve culture. From this view, Confucian traditional thought should 
be considered as the foundation of political development in Confucian East Asia. 
In most cases in modern politics, representation has been the only legitimate form of democratic 
government. Representation seems to conflict with the pure concept of democracy in principle since 
representation denies some of the intrinsic characteristics of democracy, such as self-rule and equal 
participation. In addition, representatives are generally required to have distinctive competence, 
beyond that of ordinary people. This distinctive principle has been accepted as relevant in 
representative democracy by the people. This compromise is possible in the epistemic 
understanding of democracy—that democracy is a system where people pursue better decisions. 
According to this view of representative democracy, Confucian representative theory, in which only 
good people are good representatives, does not conflict with modern representative democracy. 
It is often alledged that Confucian virtue is not consistent with the virtues required in modern 
democracy, even though representative democracy also demands competence. However, Confucian 
virtue is clearly based on the theory of conditional government, based on the Mandate of Heaven. 
This idea of limited government requires representatives to hear and respect the people since 
Heaven only speaks and hears through the people. Therefore, concepts that are regarded as essential 
in representative democracy—responsibility, responsiveness and cooperation—are also important 
elements in Confucian representative theory, both in principle and practice. 
Finally, the coherence of virtue as a characteristic of Confucian is not unique in Confucian East 
Asia. The concept of integrated virtue in good representatives is also found in western tradition. 
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Some western theorists such as MacIntyre, Mendus, and Wolgast have also been interested in this 
issue, in reference to good representation from the democratic perspective. For this reason, there 
seems to be no reason to reject the coherence of the Confucian view of the virtue of representatives. 
 
 
2. Main Arguments  
 
This thesis has discussed the relationship between political development and culture in East 
Asia, particularly South Korea. Broadly speaking, the main arguments of this thesis are founded on 
the conceptual analysis of four concepts: political legitimacy, representation, Confucian 
representative theory, and the virtue of representatives.  
This thesis argues first that political legitimacy is one of the most radical foundations of all 
governments, which cannot be borrowed since legitimacy is based on culture. Second, in modern 
representative democracy, the principles of representation do not conflict with democratic 
principles in the epistemic understanding of democracy. Third, Confucian representative theory is 
consistent with modern representative democracy in both principle and practice. Fourth, the 
coherence of the virtue of representatives is not common to both the West and the Confucian East. 
In conclusion, the concept of the “Mandate of Heaven” and the view of the integrated virtue of 
representatives in Confucian representative theory can be an important and effective source for 
political development in Confucian East in the context modern representative democracy. 
This thesis started with a question about the relationship between political development and 
culture and in this vein, has explored the concept of legitimacy. The first question that this thesis 
aimed to answer was whether political legitimacy can be borrowed. In the Asian value debate, there 
have been contrasting views about this relationship. The argument that there is a close relationship 
between democracy and political legitimacy is generally accepted in modern politics. However, 
even regarding this general argument, there are two different views in regards to culture. On the 
one hand, some argue that culture is more important than democracy. On the other hand, some argue 
that culture must be changed to attain democratic legitimacy. This thesis rejects both conceptions 
of this relationship. Instead, this thesis has argued that political culture is involved in legitimacy 
insofar as legitimacy is a set of beliefs held by the people. Some dominant theorists have suggested 
that certain concepts, such as practice, custom, belief-system, and living habits, are necessary for 
political legitimacy, and that such concepts correspond with political culture. Therefore, since 
democratic legitimacy is based on culture in each society, there is reason to argue that Confucian 
thought must be regarded as the very foundation of democratic legitimacy in contemporary politics 
in Confucian East Asia. From this perspective, it is worth examining whether Confucian tradition 
thought is compatible with democratic development in Confucian East Asia. 
Political Legitimacy, Representation and Confucian Virtue               Lee Kwanhu 
University College London              Political Science 
１７７ 
 
Thus, this thesis turned to the next problematic concept—representation. Representation is not 
only the most common feature of modern democracy, it is also one of the most decisive. In world 
politics, democracy is considered the only game in town and representation shapes democracy. In 
addition, since the democratic relationship between the ruler and the ruled is an essential condition 
for legitimate representation, without representation the government cannot attain legitimacy. In 
other words, representation is nearly the only form of legitimate government in modern politics. 
For this reason, it is one of the most appropriate tools to examine the relationship between political 
legitimacy, democracy, and culture. 
In the West, the concept of representation has acquired the meaning, “to act on behalf of some 
other(s)”. In regards to representation, the concept of mandate provides specific authorization in the 
concept of limited government. Mandate is defined as certain human activities by which some 
people are granted power to govern others based on a belief-system. This is the point where the 
Confucian concept of the “Mandate of Heaven” and the western mandatory theory intersect in 
regards to the concept of conditional government. While western representation has developed from 
the symbolic to the substantive and from “standing for” to “acting for”, the Confucian mandate 
combined both conceptions as necessary conditions of government from the very beginning. 
In addition, both the representative theories of the West and Confucianism are consistent with 
an epistemic understanding of democracy. From this perspective, democracy requires not only 
procedural legitimacy, but also demands good decisions. In other words, democracy requires some 
knowledge in order to execute good decisions. Accordingly, this epistemic conception of democracy 
requires certain qualifications for representatives. Though it seems to conflict with democracy, 
which in theory is the conception of political equality, it does not conflict with the competence-
embedded conception of democracy. Democracy based on enlightened understanding and epistemic 
democracy also endorses both a distinctive concept of representation and an equal chance to 
participate. The concept of distinctive qualifications of representatives can be seen in both Ancient 
Confucian thought and modern democracy. In addition, the virtues of responsibility and 
responsiveness that Confucian representatives should have are also core values in representative 
democracy. Therefore, the Confucian principle of qualified representation is consistent with 
democracy insofar as democracy is rule by public opinion, not just rule by the people. 
The core of Confucian representative theory is the “Mandate of Heaven”. Mencius interpreted 
the “mind of Heaven” as the “mind of people”, since Heaven does not speak by itself, but through 
the people. Although it did not develop modern democratic theory, the idea of limited government 
and legitimate representation exists within this mandate. In addition, it also provided a clear 
foundation of revolutionary theory against tyranny and, in fact, was used in many peasant protests 
in Confucian East Asia. Korean Confucian thinker, Jeong Yakyong, has shown the structure of the 
Confucian representation using a bottom to top model in order to explain Mencius’ interpretations. 
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In this model, all first representatives are recommended from among ordinary people and they 
choose those who will represent them, once again through recommendation. By the repetition of 
these procedures, the “Son of Heaven” is selected. If the representatives fail to perform their duties, 
they should be replaced with new representatives by the recommendation of the people and sub-
representatives. Mencius and Jeong’s representative theory had been applied in politics throughout 
Confucian East Asian. This thesis has expounded on some examples from Korea’s Joseon dynasty. 
Finally, this thesis has focused on the virtue of representatives. Confucian representation theory 
is understood as specialized in the virtue of representatives, rather than a systemic understanding 
of representation. This is one of the main arguments regarding the conflict of Confucian thought 
with modern democracy, although it clearly contains democratic or representative elements. 
However, all governments have been concerned the virtue of representatives, not only 
Confucianism. In modern representative democracy, voters understand elections as the procedure 
of choosing good types of representatives. However, what constitutes “good representation” is as 
diverse as the contents of legitimation in the common framework of legitimacy. In Confucian 
representative theory, the coherence of virtue is the core condition of a good representative, and the 
same view can be found in the West as well. Integrated virtue based on practice is the requirement 
of representatives in Confucianism, which does not conflict with the reasonable argument regarding 
the character of representatives in the West, which is considered acceptable in modern 
representative democracy. 
Modern representative democracy is a complex entity of convention, custom, and contingency, 
especially since mixed principles co-exist by its nature. As we have seen in dealing with legitimacy, 
representation is a concept in which one common framework accommodates different meaningful 
and legitimate content, based on each belief-system and daily living behaviors. Confucian 
representative theory is the fundamental background that constitutes the belief-system and way of 
life in understanding politics in Confucian East Asia. In this vein, the virtue of representatives is a 
decisive factor, which is not less important than the systemic understanding of modern 
representation.  
 
 
3. Limitation and Future Research 
 
There are some clear limitations to this thesis, most of them originating from the aim, subject, 
and method of this research, and it would be beneficial for these limitations to be explored in future 
research. 
First, this thesis has dealt with not just one or two but three different concepts in political 
theory—legitimacy, representation, and Confucian virtue. Each concept is an important concept on 
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its own. In addition, attempting to connect all of these concepts in one thesis is not common, even 
in the study of comparative political theory. Although it is necessary for this thesis to compare 
different cultural traditions regarding what constitutes good government, dealing with three big 
concepts in one thesis was an ambitious challenge, to say the least. For this reason, the conceptual 
analysis was inevitably insufficient to clarify each concept. For example, this thesis focused on the 
relationship between political legitimacy and culture only. It did not cover other factors such as 
ideologies, religions, and economics, which are also important in relationship to political legitimacy. 
In regards to representation, though this research emphasized an epistemic understanding, there is 
a need for further research to compare it with other conceptions of democracy.  
Second, this thesis did not discuss the relationship between multiculturalism and the legitimacy-
based methodology of this thesis. The view of this thesis is that present-day multiculturalism, for 
the most part, did not overcome western-centrism insofar as they argue on the basis of western 
theories. For example, Kymlicka (1995)’s argument is based on liberalism and Parekh (1993, 
2000)’s on communitarianism. In most cases of Confucian theorists, democracy is the basis of 
multiculturalism in which the compatibility between Confucian traditional thought and modern 
democracy is examined. However, this thesis has considered political legitimacy as a more 
fundamental basis of this compatibility. Nonetheless, it may be true that there is a need for more 
sophisticated research regarding the methodology of the comparative study of political theory. 
Third, this thesis could not examine the differences of Confucian traditions in each country in 
Confucian East Asia. Although Asian countries such as China, Japan, North and South Korea share 
Confucianism as a common political tradition, the features of developments have varied, not just in 
modern democratic periods but also during Confucian periods. The Confucian traditions in each of 
these countries during the Middle Ages were clearly distinctive, but also influence each other. This 
phenomenon has lasted throughout the periods of modernization and continues even today. For this 
reason, when we talk about Confucian East Asia, the term, in fact, indicates a set of very complex 
ideas and practices. For example, the virtue of representatives is distinctive in China, Korea, and 
Japan. However, in this thesis, the obvious distinction of the differences was not expounded upon 
since it was mainly based on Confucian traditional thought in Korea, particularly South Korea. 
Therefore, future research should deal with the variety of Confucian tradition in each country. 
Finally, since this thesis aimed to contribute to the theory of the virtue of representatives, it was 
not a comprehensive research of representative democracy in regards to Confucian traditional 
thought. Thus, representation requires a systemic understanding as well. In other words, the virtue 
of representatives is more accurately understood as it relates to the institutional background of each 
society, insofar as an institution and its operation influence the virtues of representatives in the mind 
of the people. In this sense, what I have argued is that the virtue of representatives is still a decisive 
element in good government in representative democracy, particularly in the Confucian East; 
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however, my intent is not to argue that a systemic view of representative is less important in the 
study of representation. The virtue of representatives and representative institutions, such as the 
party system, the electoral system, and the constitution are like two columns of the same ladder in 
the study of representation. Therefore, the study of the connection and relationship between the two 
views of representation is essential in future research. 
 
 
4. Implications 
 
Although this thesis has mainly discussed democratic legitimacy and Confucian virtue, this 
thesis has argued four important pointes regarding methodology in the comparative research of 
political theory. First, this thesis has suggested the concept of legitimacy as the foundation of 
comparative political theory study. Second, this research argues that in comparative political theory 
study, it is necessary to focus on practice as the accumulation of the people’s behaviours in belief-
systems, rather than formal institutions. Third, this thesis has proposed that there is a need to find 
and use more neutral concepts for comparative study, such as representation, which is common to 
both modern western democracy and Confucian traditional thought. 
First, this thesis argued that the comparative research of political theory, particularly in the case 
of different cultures, should start from the understanding of the nature of political legitimacy. This 
does not necessarily require the acceptance of cultural relativism. Rather, it is a suggestion that 
there are relative concepts in political theory that should be distinguished from common concepts. 
For example, while the framework of legitimacy as a belief-system may be common in every 
government, the contents of each belief-systems are varied insofar as the way of life is different in 
each society. Similarly, though democracy is the only legitimate system of politics, there are varied 
forms of electoral systems, party systems, and government systems. Constitutionalism may be one 
of the most important issues in democratic legitimacy, but its exact contents are distinctive from 
country to country. 
Second, this thesis has suggested that if politics are to be understood through the relationship 
between legitimacy and culture in a radical level, the practices and customs of the people in each 
belief-system must be examined since legitimacy can neither directly nor automatically emerge 
from institutions, nor can it be borrowed from institutions. Although institutions can be established 
by cultural aliens, a procedure of legitimation within the practices of the people is necessary. 
Without practice, the institution cannot be a foundation of political legitimacy. If we focus on 
institutional aspects, particularly on the standards of modern values, the comparison is destined to 
be unfair, since modern values were first conceptualized in the West. Accordingly, it is necessary 
to pursue a contextual understanding of practice and custom within a belief-system. For example, 
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just as the diversity of the electoral systems and government forms of the West are accepted, the 
practical particularity of Confucian representation when not in conflict with modern representative 
government must also be acknowledged. If the authority of the monarchical system and the House 
of Lords are acceptable in the UK, so should the authority of the Dalai Lama in Tibet be respected 
from the perspective of the legitimacy of representation. 
Third, previous research has often studied different political thought in order to compare 
different theories on the basis of certain values and ideologies such as democracy, liberal democracy, 
or human rights. Using these standards, scholars have compared theories directly by a statistical 
index in empirical studies or by institutional or conceptual differences in normative research. Some 
theorists have tried to clarify whether there is a common conception of equality, liberty, or rights. 
Some have been interested in institutional similarities and differences. However, insofar the 
concepts are conceptualized in the context of the modern West, the misunderstanding or 
misjudgement of non-western theories is inevitable. In other words, even though we are conscious 
of the prejudice toward non-western concepts or ideas, it is easily an unfair comparison when we 
still use western originated standards. For this reason, neutral concepts are useful for fair 
comparison and this thesis has suggested the concept of representation, which is a necessary 
element for legitimate government in both the West and Confucian East. In this case, the main task 
was to examine whether each tradition is compatible with modern standards of political legitimacy 
as seen in democracy. 
This alternative methodology focuses on trans-cultural studies of political theory. However, this 
methodology may also be helpful for three different groups of researchers: those who study general 
political theory by comparing western and non-western ideas; those who study non-western 
political theories that are generally under the influence of western original ideas; and those who 
study diverse western political theories. The implication of this methodology is the need for political 
theorists to be conscious of the western-centrism in the concepts of study in political theory.  
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